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ABSTRACT 
Financial market trading is investigated with respect to profit margins of 
the market makers. We analyse the bid-ask spread of market makers in a 
centralised market and in a fragmented market structure in respect of risk 
insurance and degree of competition which in turn influences market 
liquidity. Risk insurance can be obtained by sharing of the market order 
between risk averse dealers or through diversification of the portfolio 
which enables the market maker to hedge some of the risk. Market makers can 
reduce their risk exposure by trading in various assets or by being active 
in more than one market at the same time. Thus under the assumption of 
decreasing returns to scale risk averse market makers are prepared to share 
a market order. We also investigate the influence of futures trading on the 
spot market bid-ask spread. 
In part one, the bid-ask spread is analysed in respect of divisibility of 
the market order and diversification possibilities into different 
correlated markets such as the spot and the futures market. We show that a 
market where market makers can split the order is Pareto superior to a 
market where the order is indivisible. In addition, our finding is that 
trading in futures contracts has various impacts on the spot market bid-ask 
spread depending on the trading information available in the spot market. 
Our analysis of the bid-ask spread follows the inventory control argument 
and does not investigate any influence of asymmetry of information. 
Part two provides empirical evidence of some of the theoretical issues. 
Based on daily data of the Italian secondary market for government bonds we 
obtain supportive evidence of the inventory control argument and the next 
best dealer aspect based on our theoretical models. An alternative bid-ask 
spread analysis partly confirms these findings. 
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GLOSSARY 
Chapter 4: 
co = ct cash holding at time t 
ct+1 cash holding at time t+1 
cov(. ) covariance between spot and futures prices 
cov(a), cov(b), covariance of spot and futures prices of a seller, a 
cov(NT) buyer, and an inactive dealer in the spot market 
respectively 
E(. ) expectation taken over a random variable 
E(U)o expected utility of "no trade" 
E(U),, E(U)2 expected utility at the end of period 1 and 2 
10 = It inventory position in a risky asset at time t 
It+1 inventory position in a risky asset at time t+1 
k coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
X probability that an order arrives in the market 
M=T total number of dealers in the futures market 
µs, µf mean of the expected spot and futures prices 
N= Nl net futures position at time t+1 
N2 net futures position at time t+2 
N, NB, N 
TN SP net 
futures positions of the seller, the buyer, and the 
inactive dealer in the spot market, and the speculator 
respectively 
pa, pb spot market bid and ask prices 
pz , pz+l prices at time t and t+1 
°, pf p spot market price and futures market price 
pf c=pfo 
futures price at time t 
r risk free interest rate 
va 
p Cý ] correlation coefficient [cov(. )/(ý ps Pf 
, Cý price variance 
in the spot and the futures market 
Ps Pf 
(with subscript 1,2 = in period 1,2) 
U(, ) von-Neuman Morgenstern utility function 
,V V 1 value of the portfolio at time 
t and t+1 
t+ t 
VAR variance 
V number of buyers in the spot market 
W number of inactive dealers in the spot market 
W1, W2 terminal wealth at the end of period 1 and 2 
Wo initial wealth at time t 
X size of purchase (and sale) order 
(X-Y) difference between purchases and sales 
Y number of sellers in the spot market 
Z number of speculators in the futures market 
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INTRODUCTION 
The theme of this thesis is that of profit margins of market makers in 
dealership markets. 
Market makers are dealers 1 who are obliged to quote their bid and ask 
prices (buying and selling prices respectively) for a particular asset and 
to meet incoming orders from the public at these quoted prices within a 
certain time period. The ever-changing environment leads to the 
requirements of continuous presence and high flexibility of market makers 
in the market. These requirements are not without cost and the market maker 
gets her return of market making by the bid-ask spread which has been 
recognized in the literature by the 'transaction cost approach' studied 
among others by Demsetz (1968). 
This theory about the determinants of the bid-ask spread which has grown 
rapidly over recent years is called the theory of the microstructure of 
market making. 
The bid-ask spread is defined as the return to the market makers for 
standing ready to buy or sell an asset at their bid and ask price quotes. 
The dealer or market maker faces uncertainty by having to quote prices 
without knowing about the nature and the size of the incoming public order. 
In order to be able to fulfill the order the dealer has to carry inventory 
of the risky asset. The inventory carrying aspect has been developed by 
Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1980,1981, 
1983), and by O'Hara and Oldfield (1986), to mention just the most 
prominent studies. 
1We use the expression market maker, dealer, and trader interchangeably 
with the same meaning unless it is otherwise explicitly mentioned. The 
public is referred to as the private investor, the private trader, or the 
customer. 
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Most of these theoretical models, except the Ho and Stoll (1981,1983), 
models 2, analyse the bid-ask spread of a monopoly dealer and fail to 
account for competition between market makers. The results of Ho and Stoll 
show that the equilibrium bid and ask prices are determined by the next 
best dealer's price quotes which deviates from the monopoly case. 
Another source of uncertainty in the market is the presence of informed 
investors who possess superior information which results in a loss for an 
uninformed dealer who trades with such an informed investor. The analysis 
of Bagehot (1974) is the first study which considers the asymmetry of 
information in the market. Other subsequent and more elaborate studies are 
Jaffe and Winkler (1976) and Copeland and Galai (1983) which are followed 
by a number of other investigations. Thus, to stay in the market, the 
market makers set their bid and ask prices in a way that the resulting 
bid-ask spread covers the cost of a dealer coming from the risk inherent in 
such uncertainty. 
However, there is a problem in respect of the size of the spread. As the 
the bid-ask spread becomes larger the less likely it is that there are some 
incoming orders of the public, because the trading in the market is too 
expensive. In turn, the high cost encountered by the market makers in such 
a thin market will not attract other market makers as there are no profit 
opportunities. Hence, the market becomes less liquid. The final consequence 
is that the market becomes illiquid and breaks down. The problem of market 
thinness and market liquidity has been examined by Garbade and Silber 
(1979), Grossman and Miller (1988) and Pagano (1989). 
One of the main concerns of our research is the problem of risk insurance, 
particularly in respect of the inventory position of the market maker. 
2The bid and ask prices are actually analysed by using a duopoly model. 
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Hence we will focus on the issues of inventory carrying costs and leave 
aside the asymmetry of information problem. 
By analysing the determinants of the bid-ask spread we will try to find 
ways which reduce costs of market making and which result in a smaller 
bid-ask spread and a more liquid market. 
There are several ways of risk insurance for market makers. Risk averse 
market makers may reduce their risk exposure by trading in smaller 
quantities. Another source of risk reduction is inter-dealer trading. Due 
to differences between dealers positions, i. e. degrees of risk aversion, 
inventory positions and future price expectation, inter-dealer trading may 
be profitable for one or the other dealer. It will also narrow the 
difference between the dealers' positions. The risk inherent in trading can 
also be reduced through diversification. Market makers can choose whether 
they want to diversify into various assets or into different markets. 
The first approach to such risk reduction is the investigation of risk 
averse dealers with decreasing returns to scale in their cost structure 
which results in a convex cost curve. In order to meet the demand and 
supply of the public, dealers have to hold a stock of a risky security with 
unknown future price. In a competitive market dealers must quote the best 
price, in case of selling it is the lowest ask price and in case of buying 
it is the highest bid price, in order to get any trade. 
If we think of a trading environment where market makers quote their prices 
for a fixed order quantity which is known to them, then the risk can be 
reduced by allowing the splitting of the incoming order between the best 
quoting dealers. Thus, the market makers are able to trade smaller 
quantities which reduces their cost of inventory carrying and hence with 
reduced costs, the bid-ask spread is smaller. 
Until now, we argued about the cost of market making based on the 
4 
individual dealer's costs of uncertainty which has its roots in the unknown 
future price of the asset, the unknown time period of carrying the 
inventory, and the cost arising from risk aversion. However, if we analyse 
the market maker's pricing strategy we find that the market structure, or 
more general the trading environment, has an important influence on the 
market bid-ask spread. 
The transparency of markets is crucial for the trading procedure. Pagano 
and Roell (1990) investigate trading procedures of various regulated stock 
exchanges and over-the-counter markets (OTC) and find that the pricing 
strategies of market makers are influenced by the market structure. The 
factors which determine the trading procedure in the market are the 
knowledge of the dealers about the incoming order, the knowledge of the 
reservation prices of each other, and the knowledge about the trading 
history, especially about the last trade, before they have to quote their 
prices. We can define the type of market structure by these factors. 
If, for instance, market makers know each others' reservation prices and 
the last trade is made public immediately after it was executed and market 
makers know the order flow, then we speak of a centralised market 
structure. In contrast, if market makers only know their own reservation 
price and the last trade is not immediately made public then we call this 
structure a fragmented market. 
Biais (1993) compares the bid-ask spread of a centralised market and a 
fragmented market and finds that the bid-ask spread is the same for both 
markets. This result is obtained under quite -restrictive assumptions. Biais 
assumes that the average of the expected prices in a rational expectations 
equilibrium is equal to the average of prices which can be observed in a 
centralised market. We attempt to show that the bid-ask spread is not the 
same in a centralised and in a fragmented market structure. Again, we 
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investigate the risk reduction under the assumption of decreasing returns 
to scale. 
Another possibility of keeping the cost of trading low is diversification. 
With correlated asset returns market makers can reduce the price risk by 
trading in different assets. Ho and Stoll (1983) analysed the effects of a 
diversified portfolio on the bid-ask spread in a model with two risky 
assets. The impact on the spread comes from the risk incurred by the 
deviation from the optimal (or preferred) inventory level after a 
transaction has been executed for one asset. As dealers are assumed to 
balance their inventory at the end of the period, the spread is independent 
of the inventory level. Therefore, their finding is that the bid-ask spread 
is not affected by the diversification into two assets. However, they make 
the crucial assumption that the prices of the assets are correlated but not 
the transactions of the assets. If we change this assumption the result 
will change. 
On the other hand, market makers have the possibility to be active in 
various markets at the same time which may give them the opportunity to 
reduce the risk if markets are correlated. One such possibility is that 
dealers may be in the position to reduce their risk of carrying inventory 
of the risky asset by hedging the risk through trading in futures contracts 
and so hedge the price risk. 
The fact that market makers are active in more than one market at the same 
time calls for an investigation of the interaction between' such 'correlated 
markets. We can find a variety of studies which analyse the effects of 
futures trading on the spot market prices. The well known theories 
regarding the interaction of spot and futures markets are the traditional 
theory of storage (Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) amongst others), the 
theory of risk premium (Dusak 1973) and Breeden (1980)), and the forecast 
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power of futures prices (Grossman (1976) and Kyle (1985)). 
In addition the work of Anderson and Danthine (1983) investigates the 
effects of futures trading on the spot prices within the framework of the 
microstructure of market making. 
However, none of these analyses investigates the influence of futures 
trading on the spot market bid-ask spread which may show that market makers 
can obtain risk insurance by trading in futures contracts which enables 
them to narrow the bid-ask spread in the spot market. 
On the empirical side, we find a variety of studies examining the 
determinants or components of the bid-ask spread for a centralised and a 
fragmented market structure. There is evidence of the inventory control 
aspect and a component which explains the asymmetry of information between 
market makers, as in Hasbrouck (1988) and Stoll (1989). However the next 
best dealer argument has not been empirically investigated so far. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the theory of the microstructure of 
market making by examining the aspect of risk insurance and degree of 
competition which influences market liquidity. 
There is an ongoing change in the design of financial markets such as spot 
or futures and options markets. The type of trading procedure is subject to 
the particular characteristics of the market. These characteristics are the 
number and types of market participants which changed from relatively small 
investors to institutional traders who encourage or even call for large 
block trading. This is a challenge for the market makers who have to be 
able to absorb such a demand in trading. These market makers for instance 
in a dealership market are more professional than a few years earlier. 
These market makers are mostly international banks or large broker 
companies who know the market very well. 
Our analyses are intended to give some support for the decision makers in 
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designing the respective market structure which ensures an efficient 
trading procedure and which is Pareto optimal for a particular trading 
environment. 
The thesis is divided into two parts of which the first part contains 
theoretical work and the second part presents the empirical analyses. 
The first part contains chapters one to four. 
Chapter one gives an overview of the most relevant theoretical research in 
the area of the microstructure of market making. The literature survey 
gives the reasoning for the existence of a bid-ask spread and the role of 
the spread in respect of market liquidity. Furthermore, theoretical models 
are presented which explain the determinants of the bid-ask spread 
including empirical studies which investigate the components of the bid-ask 
spread. 
In chapter two we investigate how the bid-ask spread is affected by 
assuming risk averse dealers and decreasing returns to scale of the 
dealers' reservation price function. We allow for splitting of the public 
order which means that the dealer faces lower costs by trading a smaller 
quantity and therefore she can reduce the bid-ask spread. Such a model is 
set in a competitive market where we can have the situation that the number 
of active dealers is different on the buying and on the selling side. Such 
a framework has not been investigated until today. In addition, we present 
such a model for a centralised market structure and also for a fragmented 
market where market makers do not know each others reservation prices. 
Chapter three investigates the influence of futures trading on the spot 
market prices. The interaction of the spot and futures market is presented 
in this survey chapter. We analyse and discuss the theory of storage, the 
concept of risk premium, the forecast power of futures prices and the term 
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structure of interest rates. All these models explain the bias between the 
spot price at time T and the price of a maturing futures contract at time 
T. The lack of the investigation of futures trading on the spot market 
bid-ask spread leads us to the next chapter. 
In chapter four we present a bid-ask spread model which accounts for 
trading in futures contracts. We carry out our analysis for two different 
trading situations. On one side, we assume that market makers know the 
order flow. On the other side, we assume that the market makers do not know 
the order flow in the spot market which means that they face two types of 
uncertainty which are price and quantity uncertainty. 
We expect that with trading in futures the market makers are able to hedge 
some of the price risk of their inventory position and thus they reduce the 
spot market bid-ask spread. Our findings show that under the assumption of 
symmetry of trading on the selling and on the buying side there is no 
influence of trading in futures on the spot market bid-ask spread in the 
case where the market makers do not know the order flow. Therefore, we 
extend our analysis and let the amounts of selling and buying differ. We 
also analyse how our results change if we consider two periods instead of 
one period only. The results of this rigorous analysis give interesting 
insights regarding risk insurance for market makers and the interaction of 
markets. 
Part Two of the thesis includes chapters five to seven which are all 
empirical studies. 
This second part is intended to provide some empirical evidence for the 
theoretical issues discussed in part one. The empirical studies are based 
on data of the Italian Secondary market of government bonds. This market 
was reorganised in May 1988 with the creation of the secondary market in 
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which primary dealers are obliged to quote their bid and ask prices for at 
least five assets for a given period. These price quotes are binding for a 
quantity up to a fixed amount and the prices are displayed on a 
computerised information system. The actual trade with the public is done 
on the telephone. The traded deals are reported to a central unit and the 
aggregate volume but not its division is public information. 
The data obtained are daily time-series of bid and ask quotes which have 
been taken from the information system between 12.00 a. m. and 1.00 p. m. 
which represents the most active trading time of the day. 
3 
Chapter five investigates the pricing strategies of the primary dealers in 
the market. The daily data exhibit a distinct pattern of quoting frequency 
of the various dealers. One can ask whether some dealers may take advantage 
in quoting more frequently in one asset or another. 
We argued in part one that there is no asymmetry of information in the 
dealership market which can be explained by the professionalism of market 
trading with sophisticated information systems which allow that information 
is quickly and evenly spread among dealers. To test whether this is the 
case in the Italian secondary market, we analyse the quoting behaviour of 
the market makers. 
We assume that dealers who quote very actively in a particular asset can 
gain better information about the asset, especially in respect of the 
future price. If this is the case we have asymmetry of information among 
dealers. Under the assumption that the other dealers recognize that the 
"specialised" dealers have superior information; we expect that the bid-ask 
spread in such an asset is larger compared to the other assets due to the 
3We are very grateful to Ester Arisi for providing such an extensive data 
set. The data set used for the research is available from the author. 
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asymmetry of information. We assume that all the assets in this market have 
the same systematic risk which implies that the difference in the bid-ask 
spread (or returns) of various assets comes from differences in 
information. We employ different methodologies and compare the outcomes. In 
particular, we analyse the level of activity of the dealers by means of a 
cluster analysis. We then compare the findings of grouping together the 
various dealers with the results of an ordinary least squares analysis on 
the returns based on the price quotes. If the OLS result shows differences 
in returns for some dealers or some assets we may say that the market is 
segmented. If this is so, dealers have arbitrage opportunities which 
indicates that the market is inefficient and not Pareto optimal. 
Chapter six is closely linked to chapter two in which we develop bid-ask 
spread models for the centralised and the fragmented market structure. 
These models assume that market makers are allowed to share the market 
order. The analyses are based on the inventory control argument. Thus we 
investigate the determinants of the bid-ask spread within a similar setting 
to the models of chapter two. Furthermore, we test the hypothesis of the 
next best dealer's price quotes. 
We investigate the price quotes in respect of the inventory control 
argument for the centralised market structure in the Italian secondary 
market. In addition, we analyse whether equilibrium prices are in fact 
determined by the second best dealer, i. e. we try to find evidence of the 
next best dealer argument. 
Our study includes two different analyses. One- of them is an ordinary least 
square analysis which examines the determinants of the price quotes for 
each dealer separately for the bid and the ask side of the market. In 
contrast to the existing studies our models assume risk averse dealers who 
have reservation price functions with decreasing returns to scale. 
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In addition we investigate which dealer is likely to quote the best price 
due to her individual parameters which determine the reservation price. 
Such an analysis is based on a probit estimation. According to the 
theoretical model in chapter two we expect that a dealer who is not 
competitive which implies that her reservation buying (selling) price is 
below (above) the market price does quote her reservation price or does not 
quote at all. If the dealer's reservation price is the same as the market 
price the dealer quotes her reservation price and will share the market 
order. If the actual reservation buying (selling) price of the dealer is 
above (below) the market price then the dealer quotes just below the market 
price and gets the whole order. The results show how well our hypotheses 
predict the pricing behaviour of the market makers. 
Chapter seven contains an empirical bid-ask spread analysis based on the 
model of Stoll (1989). The serial covariance of price changes is compared 
with the respective bid-ask spread. The serial covariance is explained by 
the inventory control effect. This analysis is an alternative measure of 
the components of the bid-ask spread. The underlying assumption is that, in 
an efficient market with a constant bid-ask spread over' time, any change in 
the price can only be due to the spread or better the cost of trading (as 
discussed by Demsetz (1968)). This measure based on the inventory control 
argument means that a dealer who holds inventory intends to remain on this 
inventory level. If. for instance, the dealer sells a certain quantity then 
she deviates from this level. In order to induce trade which enables her to 
get back to the initial level, she increases her bid and ask prices which 
makes it more likely that the next transaction will be a purchase. The 
spread is then determined as a function of the probability of a price 
reversal and the magnitude of an adverse price change. 
We analyse empirically the relationship between the serial covariance of 
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returns calculated from daily price quotes and the square of quotes spreads 
where the empirical results of Stoll do not give any conclusive evidence. 
We extend Stoll's model by adding a variance component analysis which helps 
us to identify whether there are market inefficiencies and whether there 
are differences in the covariance between the bonds. 
The empirical investigation is carried out with daily data. The result 
indicates a positive serial correlation instead of a negative which is what 
we expect according to Stoll's inventory control theory. As a consequence, 
we also estimate the model on the basis of weekly data which slightly 
changes the findings. 
The final chapter contains our concluding remarks in which we summarise and 
discuss the various results of our theoretical and empirical analyses. In 
addition, we present an outlook for further research to be undertaken in 
this area. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF MARKET MAKING 
AND THE BID-ASK SPREAD 
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1.1. Introduction 
Technological and informational developments, especially in the financial 
markets indicate that the traditional economic models of the financial 
market no longer describe the situation in the real world. 
Traditional theories focus on more static analysis and consider the trading 
activity in the financial market as a one shot process. This kind of 
process gradually changed to a continuous trading procedure. In addition, 
the agents of the market place are confronted with a random demand and 
supply function which implies uncertainty about the flow of orders both on 
the demand as well as on the supply side. 
The earlier studies of bid-ask spread analysis examine a single market 
maker and try to determine the cost of trading for such a dealer. For 
determining the bid-ask spread all the costs of a dealer in the market have 
to be considered. The main components of such cost are firstly the 
inventory carrying cost, i. e. the opportunity cost of financing inventory. 
Second, there is the cost of immediacy, i. e. the cost of providing 
immediate service in the market by matching buy or sell orders at any point 
in time or even continuously, and thereby carrying the risk of uncertainty 
of future order arrivals and price changes. This uncertainty in turn 
influences the cost of holding inventory and is therefore a major 
determinant of the cost of a dealer. 
Third, there is a risk bearing cost added, because the dealer faces 
uncertainty not only from uncertainty about order arrivals in the market, 
but also from uncertainty about the future price of the asset. 
An additional complication which increases the cost to the dealer is 
asymmetry of information in the market, i. e. there are some dealers who 
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possess superior information than others and it arises an adverse selection 
problem for the uninformed dealer. If we focus on the cost of immediacy or 
the cost of transaction we have to consider the problem of uncertainty of 
the future price of the asset. An examination of the price volatility of an 
asset leads to an analysis of the underlying market structure, i. e. the 
market depth and the market liquidity. 
By assuming that the risk increases with the time horizon, it is evident 
that the rate of arrival of the market orders are crucial for the dealer's 
profit function as the longer she has to carry a position the greater the 
risk taken and the greater the inventory carrying cost involved. 
More recently, researchers noted that the market structure and the 
organisation of the market plays an important part in determining the cost 
of transaction. This may be due to the development of information 
technology and the change to continuous trading which even led to 
"international" trading by which we mean that stocks can be listed on more 
than one exchange at the same time and therefore stocks are traded 
simultaneously at different exchanges. These exchanges differ in their 
market organisation, i. e. they employ different trading systems, which may 
bring an advantage to one exchange or another. A further aspect of trading 
is that competition, amongst market makers on the one side and between 
exchanges on the other side, is more pronounced than before. 
This chapter gives a critical introduction to the field of the analysis of 
the bid-ask spread and then leads to the unanswered questions which will be 
dealt with in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Section two starts with a basic discussion about the cost of transaction. 
It is a good introduction and presents the earliest works in this area. We 
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also include the analysis of market liquidity which in turn is one of the 
determinants of the bid-ask spread in equilibrium. If the market is thin 
(which means that trading can not take place due to no (or insufficient) 
demand or supply), the market makers encounter uncertainty in the form of 
long intervals of trading. This in turn implies that they take on risky 
stock which they have to carry for a long time before they can sell it 
again. Such additional cost increases the bid-ask spread. This circumstance 
may lead to the market eventually collapsing as the investors (or 
customers) are not willing to trade at such high costs. 
Section three deals with various models which explain the determinants of 
the bid-ask spread in detail. The analysis is divided into three parts. 
Part one examines the problem of a so called "preferred inventory 
position". A dealer decides, based on her price expectation, how much of 
the risky stock she wants to keep in her position to be able to meet the 
demand. 
By trading in the market the dealer deviates from this "optimal" position, 
which means that the dealer faces increased costs due to the larger or 
smaller inventory. All of these models analyse the market situation with a 
single dealer as supplier in the market. However, as we already mentioned, 
the competition among dealers seems to be more and more the case in today's 
trading environment. Hence, although these studies give a valuable insight 
they are not accurate anymore. 
Part two presents more viable models in so far as several dealers are 
considered. Market makers are risk averse and due to their differences in 
price expectation, risk aversion, and inventory positions they compete in 
prices for the order demand. Such inventory control models are the basis of 
further research which also captures the importance of the underlying 
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market structure which has not been exploited so far. 
Part three contains studies on the asymmetry of information between market 
makers. Some dealers may have superior information about a particular asset 
which gives them a profit opportunity. Market makers who cannot distinguish 
whether they trade with an informed or an uninformed dealer may make a loss 
due to trading with an informed dealer. Thus, by taking into account this 
adverse selection problem they increase their bid-ask spread to compensate 
for an eventual loss. However, if we consider today's markets in which a 
computerized information system is present such superior information may 
become less important than other determinants. Asymmetry of information is 
also influenced by the information aggregation through the trading 
procedure. 
Although we focus on the inventory control aspect in our thesis, we still 
include this line of argument to have a complete overview of the 
literature. 
The final part of section three gives the results of empirical studies 
which evaluate the components of the bid-ask spread for various markets. 
The principal factors by which market structures differ are given in 
section four. The respective questions for determining a particular market 
structure (or system) are the following: 
Firstly, does trading take place in discrete intervals or continuously? 
Secondly, do the market makers know the order demand before they have to 
quote their prices? This question determines the nature of the trading 
procedure to be either an auction or a pure dealership market. 
Thirdly, do market makers know the reservation prices of each other which 
means that a market is either centralised or fragmented. 
Based on such an analysis, the differences between an auction market and a 
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dealership market are analysed. The final section of this chapter naturally 
contains the conclusions and the outlook for the subsequent chapters in 
this thesis. 
1.2. Cost of Transacting 
Market makers, acting as specialists in the market, quote their prices 
which are fixed for a given period of time and for a particular asset. They 
undertake to buy an asset at the quoted bid price and similarly they 
undertake to sell an asset at the quoted ask price. It is common practice 
that the price is quoted for a standard volume of the respective asset. 
This first change in the financial market concerns the evolution from the 
'call markets', which means trading synchronously at pre-established 
discrete times, to 'continuous markets', implying asynchronous trading 
during continuous intervals of time. 
The market makers (specialists) earn their living on the bid-ask spread 
which is their return of offering their services of continuous trading. 
In order to ensure such a service they often hold their own portfolio which 
seems to be important considering uncertainty about the order flow and the 
future market price. 
The specialist hopes, of course, to realize a profit on inventory turnover. 
She would like to acquire inventory at low prices and resell at high prices 
and to do so very rapidly. 
One of the earliest analysis of the bid-ask spread was carried out by 
Demsetz (1968). In his general approach he analyzes the cost of transaction 
at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and he examines the determinants of 
the bid-ask spread in a dealership market. 
19 
The major aim of his paper is to investigate the extent to which 
transaction costs are affected by the scale of trading. He argues that the 
inclusion of the bid-ask spread in transaction costs can be understood best 
by considering the neglected problem of 'immediacy' in supply and demand 
analysis. On the grounds that waiting costs are important cost for trading 
in organized markets, it is obvious that they dominate the determination of 
the spread. In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that waiting costs 
will be reduced most' rapidly when the transaction rate is small and 
increasing. 
The bid-ask spread is then the markup that is paid for predictable 
immediacy of exchange in organized markets. 
price 
per share 
of XA 
B 
Lres of X 
Figure 1.1.: Cost of immediacy 
Figure 1.1. represents the price formation in an asset market. If a buy and 
a sell order arrive at the same time, with dealers having a demand (buying) 
function of D and a supply (selling) function of S, then the equilibrium 
quantity is X. The average of the bid and the ask price is E. 
However, most of the time orders do not coincide in time. Therefore, 
dealers are prepared to offer a service of immediacy, but at new demand and 
supply curves of D' S'. By trading a quantity X the equilibrium prices are 
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at A for selling and B for buying. The difference between A and B is the 
bid-ask spread. 
Regarding the spread, Demsetz argues that, even though scale economies are 
present in the specialist's trading activities, there is little likelihood 
of her maintaining spread much above the cost of waiting. Competition of 
several types will keep the observed spread close to cost. Furthermore he 
defines that the main types of competition emanate from 1) rivalry for the 
specialist's job, 2) competing markets, 3) outsiders, who submit limit 
orders rather than market orders, 4) floor traders who may bypass the 
specialist by crossing buy and sell orders themselves, and 5) other 
specialists. 
He predicts that the cost of exchanging a security declines as trading 
activity in that security increases which is based on the assumption that 
the market is in a competitive situation. 
Garbade and Silber (1976) enlarge this approach by arguing that the nature 
of the exchange process has been ignored. For many goods we can observe 
competing inventory specialists who stand ready to buy and/or sell on 
demand at prices they have posted. Such quotes will be dispersed over some 
range, giving an incentive for search by public transactors. This phenomena 
of price dispersion search, and bid-ask spreads are alien to a Walrasian 
world but appear pervasive in the real world. 
Garbade and Silber are examining the dispersion of quotations made by the 
dealers. They point out that it is of interest to note that the presence of 
a dealer market is itself an efficient response to the greater price 
dispersion which would exist in its absence. 
For a security traded in the market with competing specialists, the 
expected round trip cost is the expected transaction spread (pat+l pbt) 
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with pat+l being the ask price at time t+1 and pbt being the bid price at 
time t, plus a term which reflects the cost and extent of searching for 
favorable quotations. If the volume of the transaction is sufficiently 
large, the investor may choose to contact every dealer, so that if there 
are n market makers the cost of liquidity is min (pa) - max (Pb) + 2nC/V 
whereby C is the cost of search and V is the volume of the transaction. In 
the limit as V increases, the cost of liquidity services converges to the 
spread between the best quotes on either side of the market. On the other 
hand, for small-volume transactions or for investors entering the market 
only infrequently the expected cost of liquidity may be substantially 
greater. Garbade and Silber comment that this suggests that those investors 
who are concerned with the cost of liquidity services, will, ceteris 
paribus, restrict their investment to issues which trade on narrow spreads 
and which are characterized by compact dispersions. The larger volume of 
trading in these issues will tend to further reduce both the spread and the 
dispersion as well. This implies that there is simultaneity between trading 
volume and dispersion as well as between trading volume and spreads. 
If we turn now to the market makers behaviour in respect of price 
dispersion we can say that there are five major reasons for the difference 
in prices: different inventory policies, heterogeneous expectations of 
future security prices, instability in supply-demand conditions, different 
cost functions, and ignorance of other dealer quotes. 
Garbade and Silber extended the concept of the cost of transacting to 
include search costs in a dealer market. Dealers quote different prices 
because they are ignorant of the quotations of other dealers. This could 
lead to the extreme case, that one dealer may be bidding on an issue above 
another dealer's asked price. However, the more trading, and hence search, 
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the greater the probability that some investor will uncover the arbitrage. 
Such arbitrage limits the range of dispersion of quotations. 
In addition, the dispersion of quotations in a dealer market leads to 
transactional inefficiencies as well as the imposition of search costs. 
Furthermore, interdealer transactions allow dealers to adjust their 
inventory positions efficiently and thereby limit the dispersion of their 
quotations. 
In a subsequent paper, an interesting aspect of risk in the financial 
market has been taken up by Garbade and Silber (1979). Their key variable 
is the liquidity of the financial market which they link to the clearing 
frequency in the market. The longer an asset has to be carried in the 
inventory position the bigger the risk about the future price of this asset 
taken by the market maker. The measure of risk is defined as the variance 
of the difference between the equilibrium value of an asset and its value 
at the time a market participant decides to trade and the time when the 
trade is reversed. 
The price variance can be divided into two parts. The first part includes 
the risk run by the investor that the equilibrium price may change from the 
moment the investor decides to trade until the time the trade is completed. 
The second part of the liquidity risk is the variance of the difference 
between contemporaneous transactions prices and equilibrium values. Hence, 
the clearing prices will usually differ from the equilibrium price derived 
from a Walrasian auction. It ' follows that the longer the time between 
clearings, the greater the number of participants in the clearing. 
As a consequence of above results we can derive the optimal clearing 
frequency which is the time interval that minimizes the liquidity risk. 
Furthermore, Garbade and Silber show that dealer participation reduces the 
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liquidity risk born by the public transactor. 
An empirical investigation of Tinic (1972) in the market of the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) shows that 
1. The price of liquidity service increases as a direct function of the 
price of the asset and the level of trading concentration. 
2. Liquidity costs are lower for issues that experience continuous and 
heavy trading activity. 
3. Dealers can make better markets in which there are greater opportunities 
for self-equating block transactions. Therefore, assets with a larger 
number of institutional investors possess better marketability than others 
in which only a few investors hold very large blocks. 
4. Sample findings indicate that units registered in more numerous 
securities charge higher prices, on the average, for their liquidity 
services. 
5. Prices for liquidity services are more stable for stocks that experience 
continuous trading activity, a larger number of transactions, and lower 
prices. 
In another paper issued by Tinic and West (1972) we can find the 
examination of the influence of competition among dealers on the bid-ask 
spread. Their basic hypothesis is that the spread behaviour is a function 
of 1) a stock's trading volume, 2) its price level, 3) a measure of its 
price volatility, and 4) the extent of competition among dealers. Based on 
their results they conclude that the explanatory variables such as price, 
trading activity, and the intensity of competition are probably the basic 
determinants of the size of bid-ask spreads. 
Their principal conclusion is that increases in the amount of interdealer 
competition in this market tends to reduce the price of dealer services 
24 a; 
s, 
:. 
(reduce spreads) and thus, tends to increase the marketability of issues. 
This conclusion suggests that dealership activities in the OTC stocks do 
not entail economies of scale as significant as those that have been 
reported by Demsetz and the NYSE for the exchanges. 
In the same line of argumentation are Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb 
(1981). Based on their empirical investigation they conclude that thinner 
securities will, ceteris paribus, have larger equilibrium market spreads. 
They come to this result by carrying out the following analysis. 
They have established that with transaction costs the probability of a 
limit order executing does not rise to unity as the price at which the 
order is placed gets infinitesimally close to a counterpart market quote. 
This can be explained by examining the investor's behaviour. We assume that 
an investor places a limit order to buy with a price below the market order 
price. If these two prices move closer together then, at a certain point, 
the investor has to consider whether a small increase in the price is more 
desirable which means to trade a market order instead of waiting until the 
limit order is executed. Hence, the closer the prices of limit and market 
orders 1 the more likely it is that the investor trades a market order 
instead of a limit order. This situation is referred to as the 
"gravitational pull effect". 
This means, essentially, in the neighborhood of the current market bid and 
ask quotations, what would have otherwise been limit orders, are instead 
submitted as market orders (at slightly less desirable prices) so as to 
With a limit order the dealer places an order at a certain (limit) price 
in the order book. The execution of such an order is not certain. On the 
other hand, the market order clears the limit order at the market price and 
thus the execution of a market order is certain. 
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achieve certainty of execution. 
Such market orders trigger trades which clear limit orders off the book, 
widening the market spread. The gravitational pull effect explains why 
market spreads may be substantial even in markets composed of many traders. 
Thus they have shown that the market bid-ask spread (equilibrium spread) is 
positively related to a security's thinness (measured inversely by the 
order arrival rate). 
Their policy recommendations are to expand the extent and frequency with 
which investors interact with the market by minimizing various transaction 
costs. For example, decreasing variable transaction cost will decrease 
individual spreads and generate a greater order flow. 
Overall, these models show that a bid-ask spread exists because of 
transaction costs in the market. We observe that the size of the spread is 
linked to the market liquidity. However, none of the studies establishes 
the level of liquidity in equilibrium. This is analysed in the next 
section. 
1.2.1. Market Liquidity 
Grossman and Miller (1988) examined the liquidity and the market structure 
by formulating a simple model which captures the essence of market 
liquidity. Exogenous liquidity events coupled with the risk of delayed 
trades create demand for immediacy. However, in the long run the number of 
market makers adjusts to equate the demand and supply for immediacy. This 
determines the equilibrium level of liquidity in the market. They argue 
that the lower is the autocorrelation in rate of returns, the higher is the 
equilibrium level of liquidity. 
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The basic feature of their model is discussed in order to describe their 
predictions. There are two groups of market participants, market makers and 
outside customers, with identical risk tolerance. The model incorporates 
three dates (1,2, and 3) which is illustrated in figure 1.2. below. 
At date 1, a liquidity event occurs which creates a temporary order 
imbalance of size i. Market makers offset this temporary imbalance by 
taking trading positions which they hold until the next date 2. 
At date 2, the market makers offset their positions as other outside 
customers arrive to offset the imbalance. 
Date 3 is introduced only as a terminal condition for valuing the 
securities as of date 2. 
(1) (2) (3) 
-BI ý BI 
t P2 z P3 
xt x 
Figure 1.2. : Time sequence of events 
Furthermore, two assets are considered, a risk free asset (cash with zero 
rate of return) and a risky asset with liquidation value P3. It is assumed, 
that at times t=1,2 the customer chooses asset holdings xt and a risk free 
asset position B1 to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth (i. e. 
at date 3) 
EU(W3) 
subject to the constraints 
W3 = B2 +x3P3 (= B2 + P3x2 + iP3) 
P2x2 + BZ W2 = Bt + 
P2xt 
PtiI + B1 = Wt = Ptit + W0 
where it represents the excess holding of the asset on top of the initial 
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endowment of the asset 2 and WO represents other wealth with il =i and x3 
= x2 These constraints say that the only gain in wealth comes from trading 
in this asset. 
By elimination of Bt and B2 we get 
W3 = W0 + (PZ - 
P1)(Rl 
- 11) + (P3 - 2)(x2 - 
i1) + T$ 
3i 
where xt - il is the excess demand for the asset with t=1,2. 
Dealers are assumed to maximise 
EU(W3) = EU(W0 + (P2 - PI)X1 + (P3 - 
P2)X2 + P3i) 
The utility function is defined as U(W) _ -e 
aW (a = constant absolute risk 
aversion coefficient). 
In addition, it is assumed that Pt is normally distributed and that the 
dealers have mean-variance utilities. The optimisation problem is solved by 
backward induction. 
We define x`12 to be the optimal value of x2 (chosen at date 2). Hence, the 
maximisation of E(U) over x2 is 
max E2U(W2 - Peil + (P3 - P2)X2 + P3i) and by solving it we get 
X`d2 = 
[(E2P3 
- P2)/a var2(P3)] -i 
Under the assumption that all the customers are identical except in respect 
of i, x`d2 represents the aggregate demand of the customers. 
In addition, M is defined as the number of market makers who do not have 
any endowment of the risky asset at time 1, i=0. 
Hence, the excess demand per market maker -is Xmd2 and the total excess 
demand of all the market makers in period 2 is: 
211 is regarded as an excess holding of the asset in respect of the 
customer's preference of an optimal inventory level. 
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M xmd2 =M 
[(E2P3 
- P2)/a var2(P)] 
The service of immediacy is required by the asynchronisation of trades. 
The imbalance of period 1 is offset in period 2. Only due to this 
asynchronisation of trades market makers enter the market otherwise there 
would not be any trade. 
Thus, above excess demand in period 2 is counterbalanced in period 1 by an 
"excess demand" of opposite sign of new customers which is 
[(E2P3 
- P2)/a var2P3] + 
i. 
The market clearing condition is that the various demands should sum to 
zero which is: 
[(E2P3 
- P2)/a var2P3] -i+M 
[(E2P3 
- P2)/a var2P3] 
+ 
[(E2P3 
- P2)/a var2P3 I+i=0 
As period 3 is regarded as only a terminal condition it follows that 
(E2P3 - P2) = 
0. 
Thus, the equilibrium excess demand at date 2 of the customer arriving at 
the market at date 1 is: 
cd X= -1 . 2 
For the market makers, clearing at date 1 requires Mxlm + x`d = 0. 
The date 1 demand for the customer can be derived from the maximisation 
over xl 
max EIU(W0 + xI(P3 - P1) +i E2P3) 
The respective excess demands of the customers and the market makers become 
xcdI = 
[(E1P3 
- Pl)/a varl(EA)] -i and xmdI = 
[(E1P3 
- PI)/a varI(E2P3)] 
The market clearing condition at date 1 is: M Xmdt + xcd1 = 0. By 
substitution the clearing condition can be expressed as 
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[(E1P3 - Pl)/a varl(E2A3)] = [i/(1 + M)]. 
Let r= P2/(p1 - 1) be the excess return earned by the market makers, then 
E1r = Pi i/[(I+M)aVar 1(7)] 
E1 deviates from zero due to the asynchronization of the order flow and 
the finite risk bearing capacity of market makers. In determining the 
number of market makers, we can say that the gain from being in the market 
is the ability to trade at price Pl. Thus free entry of market makers will 
occur until 
EU(Wä c+ (P2 P1)xlm) = EU(W0) 
with c being the dealer's opportunity cost of being in the market. 
The results in equilibrium show that the lower the cost of maintaining a 
market presence, the greater the number of market makers in equilibrium. 
That number would also be larger, the smaller the risk aversion coefficient 
"a" for the market makers. 
Hence, the opportunity cost of maintaining a presence in the market is very 
important in determining the supply for immediacy and the services for 
market making. The contribution of the market makers can be found in the 
correlation between successive price changes. Grossman and Miller prove 
that the correlation between successive price changes is negative and is 
determined by the cost of being in the market. Therefore, the demand for 
immediacy depends on the volatility of the underlying price and the 
diversifiability of the risk of an adverse price move. 
Finally, we can say that the greater the demand for immediacy and the lower 
the cost to market makers of maintaining a continuous position in the 
market, the larger the proportion of the transactions between ultimate 
customer effected initially through market makers, and hence, the more 
liquid the market. In such a liquid market, the spread is expected to be 
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small. 
The amount of immediacy provided in equilibrium can be measured by the 
amount of customer trade, since the total size of the trade desired is -i, 
the fraction completed in period 1 is determined by M. When M is very large 
the transaction is executed immediately and the market is said to be 
liquid. 
We have discussed the model of Grossman and Miller in the context of the 
spot market, but it is equally applicable for an analysis of trading in 
futures. However, there is little attention given to their model in respect 
of the interaction of the spot and futures market although they show the 
influence of trading in futures on the spot prices. 
Another approach has been taken by Pagano (1989) for examining market 
thinness and and stock price volatility. Generally, thin markets are 
characterized by small numbers of transactors per unit time, and 
subsequently their prices are more sensitive to the impact of individual 
trader's demand shocks. This leads to the observed relationship between 
market size and price volatility, by taking market size as the exogenous 
factor. The market size is measured by the amount of orders and the ability 
to absorb, for instant, large bulk orders without an increase in the price 
volatility. 
However, in this study, Pagano argues that the volatility of a speculative 
market may feed back on its size, in the sense that the high liquidation 
risk implied by very volatile prices can induce potential entrants to keep 
out of the market. Thus, thinness and the related price volatility may 
become joint self-perpetuating features of a market, irrespective of the 
volatility of the asset fundamentals. 
The paper shows that in a stock market with transaction costs, this 
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interaction between thinness and volatility can produce multiple 
steady-state equilibria, some characterized by low trade and high 
volatility, and others by high trade and low volatility. If expectations 
are formed on the basis of the previous history of the market, its thinness 
or depth will become a self-perpetuating feature. 
An important extension of the model is the introduction of imperfect 
competition. It stresses that there are two distinct ways by which entry of 
additional traders can be said to make a market more liquid. This can be 
done either by reducing the price volatility due to uncorrelated demand 
shocks or by decreasing the adverse price response to the order flow. 
Until now, we discussed the issue of transaction costs in the market. We 
analysed models which explain the existence of a bid-ask spread which is 
regarded as a return to market makers who provide a service of immediacy of 
trading a risky asset. In turn, the supply of immediacy is dependent on the 
market activity such as the trading volume which again feeds back to market 
liquidity. Thus, the bid-ask spread is a crucial factor in sustaining a 
proper market functioning. 
If the bid-ask spread is large less customers are attracted and trading is 
not very active. This thinness of the market increases the risk for market 
makers to supply immediacy and also the price volatility. 
Hence, the next issue which we examine is the analysis of the determinants 
of the bid-ask spread. 
1.3. Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread 
The literature about the bid ask spread can mainly be divided into three 
groups. The first group contains models concerned with the market maker's 
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pricing strategies and the 'optimal' inventory level. These models assume 
that market makers maximize their expected profits which consists of the 
gains from trading and the profits from their portfolio. The second group 
examines the effects of uncertainty, and risk on the bid-ask spread. The 
third group considers the influence of asymmetry of information on the 
bid-ask spread. 
1.3.1. Pricing Strategies and 'Optimal' Inventory Level 
A first fully developed issue of explaining the pricing behaviour of 
traders in an auction and in a dealership market has been presented by 
Garman (1976) 3 
His objective is to describe the 'temporal microstructure' of one shot 
trading activities in asset markets. He departs from the usual approach of 
the theory of exchange by (1) making the assumption of asynchronous, 
temporally discrete market activities on the part of market agents and (2) 
adopting a viewpoint which treats the temporal microstructure, i. e. moment 
to moment aggregate exchange behavior, as an important descriptive aspect 
of such markets. Garman's definition of demand and supply functions is set 
in a stochastic framework which gives rise to the concept of temporal 
imperfections. 
A stochastic process is defined { N(t), tc [0, -)I_ with N. (t) e {0,1,... } 
being the cumulative number of discrete points in time where the good has 
been demanded up to time t. Furthermore, Y. 
in 
(t 
in 
) is the amount demanded by 
3We restrict our discussion to the case of the dealership market which 
includes all the relevant issues on the determinants of the bid-ask spread. 
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customer i at the n'th point in time, given that it occurs at time tin. The 
total amount demanded by the i'th customer in the interval [0, t] is 
N. (0 
X. (t) = Y. (t. ). 
On the assumptions: 
1. that there are a large number of market agents, 2. that agents act 
independently in selecting the timing of their orders, 3. that no small 
subset of agents dominates overall order generation, 4. that no agent can 
generate an infinite number of orders in a finite period of time. Garman 
defines the superposition of the individual demand processes as X(t) 
MNi 
(t) 
11 Yin(tin) which converges to a Poisson process as M (the number of 
i=io_i 
individual market agents) becomes very large. 4 
In addition, the mean-value function of X(t) is E[X(t)] _ ýB(t) =Z2 (t) I Bi 
with ?. being the Poisson rate. 
S(p. 
t) 
(p, 0 
0x* 
Figure 1.3. : Type of equilibrium 
The Poisson rates XX(p, t) and A, u(p, t) 
for the supply and the demand side 
respectively (given in figure 1.2. ) are instantaneous rates. These rates 
are mean-value functions which depend on the price p and t. 
4What has been assumed so far is equally valid for the supply side. 
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Garman describes the rates as follows: S 
... these rates are 
'on the average' amounts and do not necessarily have 
specific physical realizations in the marketplace; we acknowledge that 
there will be sampling fluctuations of actual demand and supply within a 
continuous market. This leads * 
in jurn to a different interpretation of the 
market 'equilibrium' point (p , 
X) as it now represents a 'stochastic' 
equilibrium in which actual prices and quantities may fluctuate randomly, 
even under conditions of stationarity in the stochastic order process. 
Furthermore, the stochastic demand can be expressed by aggregate price 
probability functions. This concept is similar to traditional theory where 
it is assumed that there are several "latent" demands, given that the 
market price is at an arbitrary price p at time t which means that the 
demand rate will be X(p, t). Usually the price p is the equilibrium price at 
time t. At this point in time t, only this demand rate is active and the 
remainder of the demand rate function is not coming into force. The actions 
of the customers are influenced by a range of latent demand and supply 
functions. 
In the stochastic case, we do not need this scenario. Instead, we define 
aggregate price probability functions. So, the probability that an incoming 
order may be traded at price p at time t is defined as the price 
probability function. 
For a dealer dominated market (monopoly situation), Garman makes the 
following additional assumptions: 6 
1. Arrivals of buy and sell orders to the market are Poisson distributed in 
time, with stationary rate functions XB(p) and. %S(p); q (order quantity) is 
assumed equal to 1. 
2. All exchanges are made through a single 'central market maker', who 
possesses a monopoly on all trading. No direct exchanges between buyers and 
5Garman pp. 260/261 
6Garman pp. 263 
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sellers are permitted. 
3. The market maker is a price setter, in the sense that he may control the 
price probability functions for aggregate demand and supply. Specifically 
it is assumed that he sets a price pB at which he will fill buy orders and 
correspondingly a price pS for sell orders, yielding the resultant order 
rates XB(PB) and as(ps), respectively. 
4. At time zero, the central market maker has cash and stock inventories of 
Ic(0) and Is(0), respectively. Subsequent negative inventories imply the 
market maker's failure, i. e. inability to continue in his role. 
5. The market maker seeks to maximize expected profit per unit time, 
subject to the avoidance of certain ultimate failure. 
6. There are no transaction costs for the market maker. 
In such a setting, all the trade has to be executed through the market 
maker who has the opportunity to control the price probability functions. 
Garman then describes the actual exchange process within such a framework 
for a dealership market and an auction market. We restrict our analysis to 
the dealership market. 
In such a market, the assumption is that there is a centralised market 
maker who dominates the trading. The aggregate demand and supply, which we 
can also regard as orders, is exogenous to the market maker who only reacts 
to the incoming orders. 
The problem to solve is to find the ultimate failure probabilities. We do 
that by formulating the inventories of cash and the asset to be: 
IC(t) = IC(0) + psNB(t) - pbNS(t) and 
Is(t) = IS(0) + NN(t) - Nb(t) 
where NB(t) and NS(t) are the cumulative numbers of bids and offers which 
have been executed by time t. 
However, calculating an exact solution for the ultimate failure 
probabilities turns out to be complicated due to the fact that there are 
two interrelated state variables which requires the solution of polynomial 
order pB+ps. 
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As an alternative, Garman derived the ultimate failure probability as a 
function of the market maker's pricing strategy as an approximation to that 
problem. By deriving approximate ultimate failure probabilities, it 
is 
shown that, in order to avoid any failure, the monopolistic market maker 
must set pB and ps in such a way that the following simultaneous conditions 
hold: 
PBXB(PB) > Ps%s(Ps) and 
%s(Ps) > %B(PB)" 
It is evident that the prices set by the market maker need not necessarily 
straddle the equilibrium price p* where the condition must hold that the 
expected sell order equals the expected buy order which is XB(p«)=%s(p~ ). 
The market maker may be prepared to increase the inventory position and 
thus she increases both the bid and ask price which may be above p* as 
illustrated in figure 1.4.. 
P 
PB 
PS 
P 
S 
Figure 1.4. : Equilibrium prices 
If we change assumption 4 to allow the market maker's inventories to be 
essentially infinite and interpret assumption 5 in the sense that the 
market maker takes profits in cash by permitting no upward drift in his 
stock inventory, i. e. she will keep a "preferred" inventory position, and 
put these altered assumptions together with the limiting conditions derived 
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0 ?. ýs 
above, then it turns out that the market maker will set the prices pB and 
ps which will equate the rates of her incoming buy and sell orders at some 
value V=XB X S* 
Thus, the market maker's profit rate is shown in figure 1.5.. 
price 
PB 
P 
PS 
order arrival rates 
Figure 1.5. : Order arrival rate and equilibrium 
The shaded area in figure 1.5. represents the profit rate per unit of the 
market maker. 
In respect of implications on the inventory, by assuming that pB ps=p and 
by canceling assumption 5, Garman shows that the expected time to failure 
is maximized when the market maker divides his wealth equally between stock 
and cash. This proves that the market maker has to take into account her 
inventory position by setting her prices in order to avoid any ultimate 
failure. 
Unlike Garman, Amihud and Mendelson (1980) consider a more dynamic 
approach, in so far that they allow the market maker to make price 
adjustments over time. They derive an optimal pricing policy of the market 
maker in a similar dealership market. They assume a monopoly, but the 
market maker is subject to constraints on short and long stock' inventory 
positions. The inventory is assumed to have an upper bound by some constant 
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L and a lower bound of -K. The stock inventory levels are {-K, -K+1, 
-K+2,..., L-2, L-1, L} which are renumbered as {0,1,2,..., M-1, M} with M 
=L+KandM>3. 
They slightly change the third assumption of Garman's model and formulate 
it as for a given pair of prices, Pa and Pb' the next incoming order will 
be a buy order with probability D(pa)/(D(pa)+S(Pb)), or a sell order with 
probability. S(Pb )/(D(Pa)+S(Pb))* The time until the next arriving order has 
an exponential distribution with mean 1/(D(Pa)+S(Pb)). 
The dynamic process is characterized by the order arrival rates which are 
Poisson rates and the inventory development process which is a birth and 
death process with Xk being the birth rate in state k and µk being the 
death rate in state k. Since ? =S(Pbk) is a monotone increasing function of 
Pbk' there is a one-to-one correspondence between Xk and Pbk and as µk is a 
monotone decreasing function of Pak there is also a one-to-one 
correspondence between µk and Pak. Hence Xk and µk are used as decision 
variables in state k. The characteristics of the Poisson process are the 
independent exponentially distributed interarrival times whose mean is ti 
a= 
1/D(pb) and 'cb = 1/S(pa). The market maker's revenue from sales and cost 
from purchases are given by 
R(p. ) = gPa(N. ) = gD-1(µ) and 
C(%) , XP(k) = . S-1(X) 
whereby the regularity assumption are 
1. R(. ) is strictly concave (R"(µ) < 0) 
2. C(. ) is strictly convex (C"(X) > 0) 
3. R'(0) > C(0), R'(-) < C'(-). 
Furthermore µ0 ==0. qk is the earning rate (R(µk)-C(%k)) in state k. 
Their model stipulates the objective of the market maker as the 
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maximization of his expected average profit per unit time. 
Profit is defined as net cash inflow. The objective function can be 
M 
expressed as the expected return i. e. g(%, µ)=kI0 kqk where 
Ok is the 
limiting probability of state k and 7=(X o, ..... 'M-1) and g=(µl, ..., µM). 
When the dealer sets her price in state k which results in an arrival rate 
of X k, at 
the same time she affects the arrival rate on the other side of 
the market of state k+l which we can formulate as XA = µk+lok+l' This 
yields 0k = Oa(IIVrIµ). 
The optimal market maker's behaviour can be derived from the objective 
function and the necessary conditions are: 
MM 
E ý. ýR(µ )-C(ý ))- ýkC'( )=g(ß, µ) E ý. and 
j k+1 =k+1 
J 
µk E4 J[R(µj)-C( i)1-µk4kR'(µk)=g(), µ) ý j=k j=k 
If we subtract the (k+1)st equation of the FOC of Xk from the kth equation 
of the FOC for µk and using the condition Xkk = µk+lk+l we get R'(µk+l) = 
C'(Y for k=0,1,.., M-1. Since pa(. k+l) > 
R'(µk+l) = C'(ýk) > pb(Xk) it 
follows from the optimality condition that a loop of transitions starting 
from any state k, traversing other states and returning to state k yields a 
positive profit with probability one. 
M-1 
Consequently, as long as the market maker's resources exceed E pbk, the 
k=0 
probability of cash failure is zero, even in the worst possible case. 
Considering that the market maker tries to avoid a drift in his inventory 
position he will set prices in order to equate the rates of buy and sell 
orders, i. e. µ=X, this regardless of his inventory position. Furthermore, 
it is shown that the optimal relation (Xk, µk) and hence, the optimal 
relation between the bid and the ask prices, are aligned along the curve 
defined as [R(µ) - µR' (µ)] - [C(? ) - XC' (? )] =g which is a downward 
40 
sloping function. 
The analysis on the bid-ask spread shows that the optimal bid and ask 
prices are monotone decreasing functions of the stock in hand and in 
addition, that the bid-ask spread is always positive. 
Amihud and Mendelson argue that the profits of this monopolist are lower 
than the profits of a market maker who does not restrict to p=A.. Yet the 
market maker has constraints on the long and short positions which he can 
take, whereas Garman's monopolist has no such constraints. 
In addition, the profit maximizing market-maker will never choose to 
refrain from making buy and sell transactions. This implies that if the 
constraints are relaxed by expanding the allowed short or long positions 
the market maker's profit would be increased. Thus the existence of 
positive costs of providing dealership services leads to a positive spread 
which straddles the expected price pe. 
To compare the studies of Garman and Amihud/Mendelson we can look at how 
their results differ. The difference occurs through the choice of different 
birth and death rates to obtain the optimal inventory level. This can be 
illustrated as follows: 
µI 
(0, µM) 
S r*, r* 
) 
'µi T (ý ,µ) I450 (ý''µ 
l) 
k 
(X 
0 'O) %1 
Figure 1.6. : "Optimal" pricing policies 
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By examining the optimal pricing policy, it is shown that such a policy 
produces a "preferred" inventory position J(%., µ. ) which is located away 
from the limiting positions 0 and M. At such a position J, ?, and µ are 
approximately equal. They are exactly equal at (X !,. t') where the curve 
intersects with the 450 line. For comparison purposes, r* is the optimal 
rate of Garman. The preferred rates (X., µ. ), derived by Amihud and 
Mendelson, are both less than or equal to Garman's rates (r*, r*), thus they 
are contained in the segment s1, s2 
A disadvantage of the studies of Garman as well as of Amihud and Mendelson 
is that, although they recognize the existence of competition among market 
makers, they base their models on a monopoly market maker. In such a 
setting, the monopoly market maker may face capacity constraints. 
However, with several competing dealers, this assumption seems no longer of 
importance. Next, we discuss some models which include a dealer's risk 
aversion as an important factor of the bid-ask spread determination. The 
following section supplements the previously discussed models by analysing 
the pricing behaviour of risk averse market makers in a competitive market. 
1.3.2. Bid-Ask Spread, Risk Considerations, and Uncertainty 
Unlike the studies discussed, Ho and Stoll (1980) consider a bid-ask spread 
model taking into account the risk taken by a dealer. The model formulates 
trading under competition with more than one dealer. This model is an 
extension to a previously developed model (by Stoll [1979]) with one market 
maker only who is trading in one asset. A new aspect, going along with the 
extension to multi dealers trading, is the inter-dealer trading which is 
examined in this work. 
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The model defines the situation in which each dealer has his own strategy 
that maximizes his expected utility of terminal wealth taking into account 
all the future actions of his competitors as well. 
The solution, obtained from a dynamic programming problem, indicates the 
optimal reservation selling fee a and an optimal reservation buying fee b. 
The reservation fee represents the minimum fee for the dealer with which 
she is willing to trade without lowering her expected utility of terminal 
wealth. 
In other words, the reservation fee represents the cost to the deale r which 
she faces if she enters a transaction that changes her optimal 
("preferred") inventory position in a way that is non-optimal and includes 
higher risk for the dealer. 
Furthermore, if we define p to be the true price of the stock in the 
opinion of the dealer which is common to all dealers, she then would earn 
the fee by buying at p-b=pb, the bid price, and selling at p+a=pa, the ask 
price. The quantity of the order is fixed and is defined to be Q. 
The expected utility of a dealer is: 7 
EU = (p + a)Q + p(I-Q) -(R/2)d2p(I-Q)2 for selling and 
EU = (p - b)Q + p(I+Q -(R/2)a2p(I+Q2 for buying. The respective fees a 
and b are derived under the assumption that the expected utility of a 
dealer should be at least equal to her expected utility without any trade 
which is EU =p+ pI - (R/2)ß2P I2. 
Thus, the fees are: 
a= Ra2((Q/2) - I) (1) 
b= R62((Q/2) + I) (2) 
7Expected utility is derived by assuming mean-variance preferences. 
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Which dealer makes the next transaction and what amount she will charge 
over the reservation fee depends on the relative position of the two 
competing dealers. 
In the one period model and for two dealers the reservation fees are: 
Dealer A: a=Ra21((1/2)Q-I) b=Ra21((1/2)Q+I) 
Dealer B: ä =R°a2_((1/2)Q-I°) b°=R°a2_((1/2)Q+I0) 
where R is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion; a21 is the per period 
variance of the stock's return; Q is the fixed transaction size; I is the 
dealer's inventory holding of stock. Dealer B's parameters are indicated by 
the superscript °. It is assumed that a transaction can occur in the next 
instance. A dealer purchase or sale can occur with equal probability A,; or 
there may be no transaction with probability 1-2a,. Furthermore, investors 
are assumed to interrogate dealers to elaborate the maximum buying price 
(p-b) and minimum selling price (p+a) that dealers are willing to bid. This 
is like a Bertrand price competition which eventually drives any monopoly 
profits to zero. 
There could be the situation that a dealer may earn a profit over her 
reservation fee -a producer surplus- because the dealer is in an 
advantageous inventory position with respect to her competitor and 
therefore, she can slightly outbid her and still earn a profit. 
In respect of trading patterns and pricing behavior and assuming no 
inter-dealer trading, we can argue that if 1=10 and if a transaction 
occurs, A will trade if R<R°. In the other case B will trade. 
In other words, if the inventory positions and price expectations are 
identical the less risk averse dealer can offer the lower buying or selling 
fee. However, this does not mean that the less risk averse dealer does have 
a natural monopoly as, in addition, she must have a sufficiently large 
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inventory position or is allowed to go short in inventory. On the other 
hand, the dealer with the lower reservation fee has no . 
incentive to quote 
that fee. It is more advantageous for her to quote the reservation fee of 
her competitor less a small amount, of course. 
The conclusion is that the reservation spread can be negative which depends 
on the inventory position of the dealer and the respective size of the 
order. If ((Q/2) - I) is negative the respective fee is negative and the 
resulting reservation spread is negative as well. This situation can be 
interpreted that the dealer is willing to pay a fee in order to trade and 
thus to reduce the risk exposure coming from holding the inventory 
position. However, the market spread is always positive. The reason is that 
the lower bound on the market spread is the reservation spread of the 
"worst" dealer. The worst dealer is the one with the greatest risk 
aversion. 
Under the assumption of inter-dealer trading each dealer must calculate the 
utility of trading with the other dealer at the quoted price compared with 
the utility of trading with the next market order with probability X. 
Dealers are assumed to be identical except in their inventory positions. 
In the one period case, assuming that dealer A is holding the larger 
inventory than dealer B (other things identical), A has two options, either 
to sell to a market order with probability X to earn a fee of ä or to sell 
to dealer B paying to dealer Ba fee of it. 
Hence, A's expected utility under option one can be expressed as 
EU = U(W) + U'AW + 1/2U"a2(W) + R(I-I°)A, 621U'Q (3) 
where the first three terms on the right hand side of (3) represent the 
expected utility of total of the end-of-period wealth in the absence of any 
transactions and given the underlying return dynamics that make uncertain 
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the future wealth. U(W) is the dealer's basic utility function which has 
first and second derivatives of U' and U" and W defines the dealer's total 
wealth. The last term of (3) represents the expected utility of the profit 
from a sale transaction. It is obvious that if A has to sell to the market 
(which means that (I-I°)=0) there is no additional profit to the expected 
utility as A has to sell at her reservation price. 
The expected utility of option two is derived by changing the inventory of 
A and B to become (I-Q) and (I°+Q) respectively. The return of A is only 
Q(1-II). Therefore, A will only trade if the following condition is met 
Z21 
II<W61 [I-Q(2 +?. )] (4) 
_ with 
Z being a random variable such that Z- N(0, a2) and whereby 
Z 
Cr I W 
represents the return uncertainty. 
If inter-dealer trading is allowed at market quotes only, then II is the 
buying fee which is set by A (11=b) and the buying fee is given by (2). If 
we substitute these two values into (4) we see that this condition can 
never be met. In this case, no inter-dealer trading would occur, in a two 
dealer scenario as, even if the probability 2. is zero, A will not sell to B 
and pay the market buying fee to reduce inventory. 
However, if X>O, then A has the additional possibility of selling to a 
market order and earning a fee. There is a negotiated fee at which A would 
sell to B rather to take a chance on a market order. In this case I> Q(1/2 
+ X). If we relax the assumption of two dealers only and consider more than 
two dealers, inter-dealer trading becomes possible. The reason is that the 
market buying fee is not determined by the dealer who intends to sell at 
the market price. 
There is a so called "gravitational pull effect" which means that 
inter-dealer trading will take place which can be described best by an 
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example as given by Ho and Stoll: 8 
'Suppose that there are three dealers with identical R; and suppose dealers 
B and C also have ide ntical inventory of I <I, A's inventory. Therefore, B 
and C set the market bid and ask price. Because they have the smaller 
inventory, B and C are in the better position to buy. Because they compete, 
they will be forced to offer to buy at their reservation bid price. A has 
the larger inventory an d is in the better position to sell. Since there is 
no competition on the sell side, A is able to quote the higher reservation 
ask price of B and C rather than his own reservation ask price'. Condition 
(4) can now be met at the market bid since the market bid is not A's 
reservation bid. Indeed, in this example II is given by (2) with a subscript 
"0" which refers to the dealer setting the market bid price (B or Q. Thus, 
(4) becomes R° ((Q/2)+I°)<Ra[I-Q(1/2 + X)] and because R°=R in this 
example this becomes 1° +Q< XQ. If the market inventory (i. e. of B or C) 
after an inter-dealer transaction, Q+1°, is less than A's expected 
inventory without an inter-dealer transaction, I-XQ, an inter-dealer trade 
will occur. ' 
A further development of the model under competition to a model of 
equilibrium has been carried out by Ho and Stoll (1983). This time, they 
are concerned with behaviour and interaction of individual competing 
dealers and with the determination of the market bid-ask spread. 
The model of equilibrium examines markets with several dealers and several 
assets within several periods. 
The formulation of the model restricts to two dealers A and B who are 
active in two stocks. The two dealers have homogeneous expectation about 
the "true" future price (p) of the stocks. 
The expected utility of terminal wealth is defined as U(W0) with 
Wo=Fo+Y0+M0+No 
whereby Wo is the terminal wealth, F0 is the initial cash position, Y0 is 
the base wealth, and M and No are the inventories of the stocks. 
The first step in the model is to examine the quotes under a one period 
8Ho and Stoll pp. 264 
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horizon as only under this assumption does the bid and the ask quote not 
depend on the inventory position. The dynamics of the dealer are given by: 
1. Inventory: The value of the inventories of the two stocks 
-1=(1+rM)[Mt+gM(Q, -Q)]+[ML+qM(Q; 
Q]ZM and M t 
+q )[N =(1+r +g (Q, -Q)]+[N (Q'-Q)jZ N N t N c x N c-1 
where M, N are the dollar values of the dealer's inventory of stock M or N, 
t is the subscript which gives the number of periods remaining to the 
horizon date and r , i=M, N is the dealer's expected per period rate of I 
return in stock i in the absence of a bid or ask fee. 
Z- N(0, (YI), i=M, N is the stochastic component in the return in stock i. 
Q is the dollar transaction size in each stock 
-Q if b. < b°, 0 otherwise 
q. (Q, -Q `. -- Qif a. <ä ,0 otherwise 
1-2k. -0 
Xi=M, N is the probability of a public sale (dealer purchase) of Q dollars 
or of a public purchase (dealer sale) of -Q dollars in each period where 
the Bertrand price competition condition is included, i. e. that only the 
dealer with the lowest reservation fee will get the market orders. 
a, b., i=M, N is the dealer's proportional reservation selling fee and 
proportional reservation buying fee, respectively. 
The superscript 
"011 
means the variable of dealer B. 
2. -Cash position 
F 
1=(l+r)[F +qM(-Q+b 
Q, Q+a Q+q (-Q+b QQ+a Q)] 
1 t M M N N N 
3. Base wealth 
Yt_1=(l+rY)Yt+YtZY 
where ry is the expected return on base wealth and Z - N(O, c, ) Y 
The respective objective function for the dealer is defined as 
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J(t, M, N, Y, F°, M°, N°, Y°)= max Eu(W° I t, F, M, N, Y°, F°M°, N°Y) 
aM'bM 
aN, bN 
Based on above formulation, the optimal spread is shown not to depend on 
the inventory level within a one period framework. The reservation buying 
and selling fee are given by b (1/2)a2R(Q + 2IM) and aM=(1/2)(MR(Q - 2IM 
where IM =M+ PNMN and ßNM aNM/aM and ßM is the variance of the return of 
the stock M and aNm is the covariance of return between stock M and N. R is 
a discounted coefficient of absolute risk aversion defined as 
-U" (W) 
R= 
(l +r) U' (W) 
The market bid-ask spread with several dealers is derived by examining 
which dealer trades the next transaction. 
The question of which trader makes the next transaction and what market fee 
above the reservation fee can be charged depends on the relative positions 
of the dealers. 
Ho and Stoll show that the dealer with the lowest reservation fee does not 
quote this fee, but instead the fee of the second best dealer plus a small 
amount. This means that the next-best dealer sets the market spread. 
Furthermore, the equilibrium market spread is limited when dealers have 
identical coefficients of absolute risk aversion and identical opinions of 
the true price of the stock. 
It is shown that under homogeneous preferences and opinions, the 
equilibrium market bid-ask spread satisfies the following conditions: 
Two dealers: s> R62Q 
Three dealers: s= R62Q 
More than three dealers: 0<s< Rc2Q 
If the assumption of heterogeneous opinions is considered then the market 
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bid-ask spread, will still be independent of inventory, as long as the risk 
behaviour of the dealers is the same. 
This finding is somehow obvious as it is assumed that the market order is 
executed by the same dealer on the selling side as well as on the buying 
side. 
Ho and Stoll argue that since the inventory obviously does not matter in 
the one period horizon, it follows that the degree of diversification of 
the dealer's inventory has no effect on the dealer's reservation spread. 
This is not true for the market spread which is determined by two different 
dealers on each side of the market which means that their inventories are 
not the same. In such a case with two or several dealers in the market, the 
market bid-ask spread depends on the inventories of the market makers. 
To show that we assume that the inventories of the two dealers are denoted 
by I and 1° with I< I°. If both dealers have identical risk aversion and 
price expectation then the dealer with I will buy the order of size Q 
(assuming that only one order arrives within the period considered). In the 
next period, the inventories are (I+Q) and I°. Only if (I+Q) > 10 the same 
dealer executes the next order which we assume is a sale. As a consequence, 
the bid-ask spread does not depend on the inventory level of this dealer. 
However, if the other dealer executes the sale order then the spread 
depends on the difference of the inventory levels. 
In addition, as Ho and Stoll rightly point out, if the transactions in 
different stocks are dependent, the reservation fees and the spread are 
affected by the degree of which the transactions in the dealer's stocks are 
correlated. 
If the model is examined in the context of two periods, assuming one asset 
only (M) and that the dealers have identical absolute risk aversion and 
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identical initial inventory positions, the bid-ask spread at t=2 is derived 
as 
a=1 a2RQ(1-2µ) 2 2(1+r) M 
where t is the market's conditional probability, given a purchase at t=1, 
of a sale by the dealer at t=2. 
The consequences are that the greater the probability of a reverse 
transaction in the following period of trade, the lower the reservation fee 
in period t=l. 
In addition, since actively traded stocks have a larger µ, it follows that 
these stocks have a lower spread than stocks traded not so frequently. 
This study by Ho and Stoll can be regarded as a valuable contribution to 
determining the bid-ask spread in equilibrium. However, their analysis of 
the market under competition is somewhat limited as they assume that the 
same and only dealer executes the market order on both sides of the market. 
How does the bid-ask spread change if different market makers, who have 
heterogeneous price expectations, different degrees of risk aversion and 
differences in their inventory positions, trade on either side of the 
market? We do not get any answer to that problem from their study. 
Furthermore, the examination of the diversification problem does not show 
any influence on the bid-ask spread. This finding may well change if we 
assume that not only the asset prices are correlated, but also the 
transactions of the assets which we actually observe in today's markets. We 
will come back to these issues in the subsequent chapters. 
Another examination of the bid-ask spread in a multi-period framework has 
been done by O'Hara and Oldfield (1986). 
They also look at the influence of risk aversion on the bid-ask spread of 
an asset. However, unlike the previous analyses, they do not specify a 
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particular order flow process nor an intrinsic "known" price of the asset. 
In contrast to the results of Ho and Stoll, they show that within a one 
period horizon, the bid-ask spread is dependent on the inventory. The 
assumption made is that the market maker has constant absolute risk 
aversion and that the market maker maximizes the expected utility of 
trading profits over an infinite horizon of trading days, j=1,2 ... . 
The market maker's order flow includes both limit orders and market orders. 
We can decompose the market order flow into a price dependent component and 
a liquidity induced component for each side, i. e. the ask and the bid side 
separately which is 
L1mt = am - ae" +' for the ask side and 
Bmt= ß`I' + bt4m + £t for the bid side 
where "m" denotes the market order and with am - ay" and Pm + btým being 
the price dependent component and wt and EL being the liquidity induced 
component which are random variables. 
The limit orders in the market maker's order book are described by the 
linear cumulative order functions. These are given by the integrals of the 
incremental orders: 
a 
aL - 'aa =S q(a)da which is the limit buy function 
a 
b 
ßL + ýLbt =S gb(b)db which is the limit sell function 
b 
with aL, pL, y' and ýL being parameters of the cumulative order flow 
functions. a and b1 are the ask and bid prices. ä is the highest buying 
reservation price and b is the lowest selling reservation price. 
Furthermore, qa(a) and qb(b) are the incremental quantities for buying and 
selling at the ask or bid prices. The solution of above integral gives the 
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incremental orders q(a) = 'yt' and qb(b) = 4L. 
A period's total order flows for the ask and the bid side are Ät andt 
which are 
At =a-aty+wt if aL-at-ý >0 
am - atye' + wt otherwise 
Bt =(3+b0 t 
+E 
t 
ifpL+bO 
tL>0 
PM + btOm + Et otherwise 
where a=aL+a°; ß=ßL+ßm; and O=OL+Om 
In addition the following constraints are to be imposed: 
aL-at, ' > 0, ßL+btoL >0 which means that the market maker does not accept 
limit orders for negative quantities. Furthermore, the market makers are 
not allowed to buy at the sell price or to sell at the buy price. 
The dealers optimization problem is defined as 
00 o 
max E [E a' U(E (i t))], j=o t=1 
where U represents a von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function which is 
increasing concave, bounded and twice differentiable (U"<O); a is a 
discount rate 0<a<1 and n is the trading profit in period t of day j. 
Based on above assumptions the market maker may end up with a positive or 
negative inventory from trading. 
In addition it is assumed that each day has n trading periods. Since the 
current inventory is the basis for trading in the next period, inventory 
represents the state variable of this dynamic system. 
Thus, the market makers infinite horizon problem as stated above, can be 
written as 
max E(U(E(Rt)) + V(T )) 
t-i 
whereby In is the market maker's inventory position at the end of the day 
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and V is the market maker's derived value for inventory. This value 
function represents the market maker's utility of the . 
inventory position 
taken into the next trading day. The overall utility of the market maker is 
the cash position plus such an inventory value. 
Unlike the previously discussed studies, the expectation of the future 
asset price is included in the value function and thus the future value of 
the inventory will be determined endogenously. 
At the end of the day, the trader has to determine which bid price bo and 
which ask price an he will set which affect the volume of trades in period 
n. Under above assumptions, the market maker faces a constrained 
maximization defined as 
max E [UfElnt+ao(a-aoy+wo)-bo(ß+boo+so) + rp(Io 1+ß+bo4+eö 
a+aoy w)) 
{u 
,n} nn 
+V(I 
a- I 
+(3+bo4+E-(x+a 
0 
y-w0)]; 
subject to: aL-aoyL > 0; ßL+bnýL >0. 
The optimal bid and ask prices can be derived and the interpretation of the 
terms gives the following evidence: 
ao = a/2y + E(U' ö)/E(U')2y+rE(U'p)/2E(U')+E(V')/2E(U') 
bo = -ß/24-E(U'E )/E(U')24+rE(U'p)/2E(U')+E(V')/2E(U') 
The first expression is determined from the limit orders and the expected 
market orders. The second term indicates the adjustment due to the 
uncertainty of the market orders. The last two terms represent the 
adjustment of the price level induced by inventory changes. In addition, 
the last term indicates the market maker's expectation of the future price 
which affects both a0 and b0 equally. Derived from above, the optimal 
bid-ask spread is 
54 
an-b 
n 
=(aý+ßy)/2ýy+(0E(w a 
)+yE(E 
n 
)/2yo " 
+(0 cov(U', wn)+y cov(U', En))/24yE(U' ). 
About the determination of the bid-ask spread we can say that the first 
term shows the market maker's total expected supply and demand during 
trading interval n and represents a risk neutral market maker's charge. 
However the market makers are faced with uncertainty which is expressed in 
the third term. The covariance terms show the adjustment to the spread 
depending on the degree of risk aversion of the market maker. The final 
term shows how far the overnight inventory affect the bid-ask spread. 
Summarizing the findings of O'Hara and Oldfield, it is evident that 
inventory has a pervasive influence on the bid-ask spread as well as on the 
bid and ask prices themselves. Furthermore, it is shown that risk aversion 
influences both the spread and the bid and ask prices. In addition it is 
found that if prices from risk neutral traders prevail, a stable trading 
situation implies that the expected overnight price lies between the quoted 
bid and ask. 
In the next section, particular attention is drawn on asymmetric 
information, i. e. it is assumed that the market does not work efficiently 
and that some participants in the market have superior information 
available. 
1.3.3. Dealer Quotes and Asymmetry of Information 
Walter Bagehot (1974) was the first who examined the bid-ask spread with 
respect to asymmetry of information in the dealership market. Under his 
"B-T theory" he stipulates that the dealer gains from liquidity transactors 
and loses from inside information transactors. 
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The fact that a better informed trader has an advantage in the market, 
irrespective of how small such an informational advantage is, has been 
shown by Jaffe and Winkler (1976). They show that a market maker can always 
expect to lose when trading with a rational individual, even if the market 
maker is more knowledgeable and even after the bid-ask spread is included. 
They argue that under the specialist system, speculators have profitable 
opportunities which would not arise in a more perfect market. In their 
model, they define the situation involving one asset, .a 
risk-neutral 
investor called A, and a market maker called B who sets the market price 
PB +T at which A can buy the asset and a price p. -T at which A can sell the 
asset. The spread is 2T. 
Furthermore, p is defined as the value of the asset. Hence the estimates of 
the investor and the market maker can be expressed as pA =p+uA and pB=p+uB, 
where p is the true value of the asset and uAand uB are error terms which 
means that the investor and the market maker have diverse expectations of 
the true price with u= (u A, uB) 
having a bivariate normal distribution. It 
is assumed that E(uA)=E(uB)=0 and 0A 0' B; 
in addition cov(uA, U, )=0 and it 
is assumed that this distribution is known to A. 
If A did not know pB, A's prior distribution for p is a normal distribution 
with mean pA and variance ß2p 
After having learnt the value of pB, A's distribution (posterior) for p is 
2 
a normal distribution with mean p*A and variance ß* A, where 
k2pA+pB 
pA -- 
k2+ 1 
2 k262 
Cr =A A 
k2+1 
with k=6B/ßß 
56 
The expected return to A from buying the asset is p*A (pB+T), so A will buy 
if pA -P B>ßT, with p*A - 
(pB+T) >0 or if 
ß=1+1. 
k2 
As a result we can say that the expected return to A from buying the asset 
is positive when pÄ pB is greater than T by at least T/k2. 
It follows that the smaller k is, the larger the price difference that is 
required before it is advantageous for A to buy the asset. If A is selling 
the asset the situation is analogous and the condition is pB pA> ßT which 
means that considering both cases A will trade whenever 
IpA - pBI > (T. 
These findings imply that any investor who has superior information 
compared to the market maker can make a profit by trading with the market 
maker. However, the probability of trading is inversely related to the 
precision of the forecast of the investor. Hence, the better informed 
investor is more likely to trade and make a profit than an investor with 
only a small amount of information. 
Furthermore, Jaffe and Winkler show that as A's error variance decreases 
relative to the market maker's error variance, A is more likely to trade. 
Based on the results we can conclude that any investor with some 
information can profit by employing a decision rule such as described by 
their model. The volume to be traded is determined by the estimation 
ability of the investor relative to the one of the market maker. 
In such a situation, the market maker would always make a loss if he is 
bound to trade with informed traders only. 
In case there are not any liquidity traders the dealer would then- set T to 
infinity in order to reduce any trading loss. However, this would result in 
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a non-trading situation. This means for liquidity traders that they, in a 
way, subsidize the market. 
A different approach has been chosen by Copeland and Galai (1983). They 
formulate their model in the way that the market maker sets his bid-ask 
spread in order to optimize his position. In this kind of model the 
objective is to maximize expected profits. Hence, the bid-ask spread is 
said to be optimal if it maximizes the difference between expected revenues 
received from liquidity-motivated traders and expected losses to 
information-motivated traders. Informed traders are in possession of 
superior information compared with the information of the public and this 
allows them to have a better estimate of the future price of the asset than 
a dealer or a liquidity trader. 
The cost function of the market maker is 
K 00 pI{ 'K: (S-KA)f(S)dS +S0B (KB S)f(S)dS} 
A 
where the true underlying future price of the asset is S. 
The expected loss of a trader depends on the probability that the next 
trader will be an informed one pi, the dealer's knowledge of the stochastic 
process governing price changes f(S) and on the dealer's ask (KA) and bid 
(KB) prices set. The true underlying future price perceived by the dealer 
is denoted by So, The assumptions of the model are: 
- there are no taxes 
- short selling is not constrained 
- the instantaneous risk-free borrowing and lending rate is constant rf >0 
- the true underlying asset value S, follows a stochastic process f(S) 
which is known (ex ante) to all the market participants. 
- all traders arrive at the market trading post according to a stationary 
stochastic process g(t), which is known to all participants and which has 
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calendar time arrival ti>O and finite mean E(ti) which is the mean arrival 
rate 
- the probability that the next trader is an informed trader is pI(0 < pi < 
1), determined exogenously, and the probability that the next trader is a 
liquidity trader is PL = 1-PI 
- the dealer's quote is limited for a fixed quantity n which will be given 
to the first trader only. 
- the dealer is assumed to be risk neutral and maximizes expected profits 
- the occurrence of trades is a function of the bid-ask spread which means 
that both liquidity and informed trader have price-elastic demand. 
The revenue function shows the revenue coming from the liquidity motivated 
traders who are willing to pay premia of KA -S 0 or receive 
Sö KB as a price 
for immediacy as they do not know the true price S. 
Examining the relation between the bid-ask spread and the probability that 
a liquidity motivated trader will trade, the probability can be defined as 
PBL+pSL pTL(whereby pBL is the probability of a purchase by a liquidity 
trader and pSL is the probability of a sale by a liquidity trader). 
Furthermore, p, 1, L and pNL are the probabilities of trading and non-trading. 
We assume that pBL is a decreasing function of " KA Soand psL is an 
increasing function of Sö KB. 
Therefore, the trader's expected revenue per trade with a liquidity trader 
is (1-p1) (PBL(KA So)+PSL(SO KB)+pNL0). 
With an elastic demand (as assumed above) it is less likely that a trade 
with a liquidity trader occurs the greater the bid-ask spread is. 
We can even argue that if the spread is too wide due to a large number of 
informed traders the market will be shut down unless more information will 
be made available. 
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The optimisation problem of a risk-neutral trader is given by 
max {(1-pI)[PBL(KÄ So)+psL(So KB)] 
KA, KB 
- pI[fK (S-KA)f(S)dS+J" B(KB S)f(S)dS] }>0 
where the first term on the LHS is the revenue received from trading with a 
liquidity trader and the second expression on the LHS represents the cost 
from trading with a dealer with superior information. 
If the trader is in a monopolistic situation, he will maximize the 
difference between the 
ask price K: *. Under 
situation leads to an ask 
equal and the long run 
expected revenue and cost function by setting the 
the assumption of free entry, the competitive 
price of K" where expected costs and revenues are 
a 
profit is zero. Hence, the competitive ask spread 
(Ka -So)* occurs where expected revenue equals expected cost and the 
monopoly ask spread (Kä S0)** occurs where expected profits are maximized. 
This whole analysis is equally applicable on the bid side. 
The situation is shown in figure 1.7. below. 
Loss of 
i nformed 
traders 
cost fro 
informed 
trading 
0 
pL(Ka-So) revenues if 
p L- percentage 
1i quidi ty traders 
expected revenue 
PL pBL(Ka-S0 ) 
ask spread 
(K 
(K .S0 )« (K .s, 
««a- 
S0) 
aa0 
Figure 1.7. : Dealer's optimisation problem 
Only the ask side is illustrated, but the same analysis is valid for the 
bid side. Based on above model three conclusions about the bid-ask spread 
Revenue (all liquidity traders) 
(45°) 
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can be drawn. First, with the movement from the monopoly to the 
competition, the bid-ask spread decreases. Second, with an increase of the 
percentage of informed traders the difference between the monopoly and the 
competitive spread expressed in percentage of the asset price (KÄ*-KA)/So 
decreases. Third, if there is a decrease in the elasticity of demand for 
liquidity trading, other things equal, then the market maker's revenue 
curve will shift to the left which leads to a decrease of the ask price. In 
addition, one prediction of the model is that if pI increases then also the 
bid-ask spread will increase. 
In respect of the bid-ask spread and the trading volume it can be said that 
first, if the asset is not very actively traded, pI may be higher and as a 
consequence there is a negative correlation between the bid-ask spread and 
the volume of trading. Second, it could be possible that pI may increase if 
more information is associated with the size of transaction. 
Under this assumption there will be a positive relationship between the 
bid-ask spread and the volume of transaction. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) present a model which is similar to the model of 
Copeland and Galai (1983). The main difference between the models is that 
Glosten and Milgrom investigate the dynamic properties of the spread and 
transaction prices. In particular, they examine how markets process 
privately available information. In contrast, Copeland and Galai assume 
that private information is revealed immediately after each trade. 
The findings of Glosten and Milgrom are that adverse selection itself 
(coming from asymmetry of information in the market) can be the reason of 
the existence of a bid-ask spread. The average spread depends amongst 
others on the exogenous arrival patterns of insiders and liquidity traders, 
and the quality of the information held by insiders. In their model, 
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transaction prices are informative, and hence spreads tend to decline with 
trade. 
Glosten (1989) examines the effects of the market structure, i. e. monopoly 
or competition, in respect of the spread. Especially, he is looking at 
whether inefficiencies have been created by trading on insider information 
and the institutional reaction to such inefficiencies. 
The result is that market makers reduce the liquidity of the market in 
response to traders with private information. Such change reduces the 
amount of trade and the amount of risk sharing. 
As argued by Ho and Stoll (1983), competitive market makers will tend to 
create a more liquid market, because the bid-ask spread will be smaller 
with competing market makers. On the other hand, monopolistic market makers 
are in the position to average profits over time. One can think of a 
situation where competitive market makers are not quoting at all due to the 
adverse selection problem as irrespective of which price they quote they 
could not break even. The result is that the market shuts down. 
However, the monopolist may have an advantage to keep the market open as he 
still can get some information of the informed traders. Thus, Glosten 
argues that both liquidity traders and informed traders are made better off 
relative to the competing market maker system. 
The major results of this study is that informed trading leads to a welfare 
loss in that it reduces the liquidity of the market. A market maker in a 
monopolistic situation may provide a more liquid market and hence, the 
welfare loss occurred from informed trading may be negated. 
All these models which we presented in this section describe the problem of 
asymmetry of information in the market which is a totally new issue 
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compared to the inventory control model of the previous section. Until now, 
there does not exist a model in the literature which. can explain both 
problems in a setting which determines the bid-ask spread. 
The controversy about both issues may be a reason why such a model has not 
yet been developed. We also think that in a dealership market the inventory 
control aspect is more important than the asymmetry of information problem. 
Our opinion is based on the fact that we find professional market makers in 
a dealership market who very often are linked to a computerised information 
system which provides instantaneous information. We hope that the next 
section will shed some light on this controversy by giving some empirical 
evidence on the determinants of the bid-ask spread. 
1.3.4. Empirical Evidence on the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread 
We can find extensive empirical work about the determinants of the bid-ask 
spread in the literature until today. In order to provide an overview the 
most relevant results shall be presented. 
Together with his approach of "cost of transacting", ' Demsetz (1968) has 
carried out an empirical investigation based on data of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). He found evidence that the spread per share increases in 
proportion to an increase in the price per share. This can be explained 
that the cost of transacting per dollar exchanged will be equalized. 
Furthermore, he proved that the cost of exchanging a security declines as 
trading activity in that security increases. 
Another aspect examined by Demsetz is the effect of competition in the 
market where he concludes that there is no significant evidence that 
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competition will reduce the spread. 
In contradiction to the findings of Demsetz, Tinic and West (1972) show 
that competition tends to reduce the spread. However, it has to be pointed 
out that Tinic and West based their observations on data of the Over the 
Counter (OTC) market. Thus, it is difficult to judge about this 
inconsistency. However, a reason could be the difference in methodology. 
With respect to spreads and the number of dealers, they argue that the 
relationship depends in large part on the extent of economies of scale 
associated in the dealership function. Furthermore, Tinic and West find 
that the spread varies inversely with the trading volume. 
There has been carried out an analysis by Benston and Hagerman (1974) in 
which security markets were examined. Referring to the theory of Bagehot, 
they take risk considerations into account. The argument is that insider 
trading increases the risk which a trader faces. They also examine whether 
dealers are natural monopolists. Both systematic risk and unsystematic risk 
have been examined in respect to the bid-ask spread. The respective risk 
measurements have been derived from the capital asset pricing model. They 
show that there is a positive relation between unsystematic risk and the 
spread which implies that insufficient diversification and insider trading 
increases the risk taken by the dealer. 
Furthermore there is a negative relationship between economies of scale and 
the spread which is consistent with the result of Demsetz, and Tinic and 
West. Another result is that there is a negative relationship between the 
number of dealers and the spread. 
A combination of inventory control and asymmetry of information effect has 
been examined by Hasbrouck (1988). His results show that- there is no 
conclusive evidence for the inventory control effect. Trades for low-volume 
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stocks show negative autocorrelation; whereby for high-volume stocks, there 
is no such evidence. 
On the other hand, the impact of trades on the quote revisions turns out to 
be significantly positive which supports the informational effects of 
volume. Other interesting findings are that effects of dealer inventory 
control behavior on quotes are not significant. However, for high-volume 
stocks, the order size influences the quote revisions which means that 
large orders convey more information. 
Madhavan and Smidt (1991) examine the effects of both trading volume and 
unanticipated information. Their model analyses intraday security price 
movements in a specialist market (like NYSE). They also find strong 
evidence of information asymmetry, but the inventory control effect appears 
to be weak. Furthermore, they show that the degree of information asymmetry 
depends on the specialist participation rate. 
The estimation of a simple model of asymmetric information, done by Glosten 
and Harris (1988), has brought the following insights to the problem of 
measuring the bid-ask spread. Their model breaks the bid-ask spread into a 
transitory component and an adverse-selection component. The results are 
twofold. First, the time-series analysis confirms that the 
adverse-selection component is positive. Second, the cross-section analysis 
brings evidence on the asymmetry of information influence. Furthermore, 
they show that the spread is a function of trade size. 
Finally, Stoll (1989) examined the components of the bid-ask spread and the 
results of the analysis confirm that the spread can be broken down into 
adverse information cost, inventory holding cost, and order processing 
cost. 
Another group of empirical investigation about the bid-ask spread is 
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concerned with the influence of asymmetric information on the spread with 
special consideration of the efficiency of the market. Such analyses have 
been carried out by Goldman and Beja (1979), Roll (1984), French and Roll 
(1986), Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988). 
Especially, Roll has defined a measure of the effective bid-ask spread 
which is "spread=2-cov" (where "cov" is the first order serial covariance 
of price changes). He proved that the serial covariances of returns are 
negatively associated with the square of quoted spreads. 
1.4. Market Structure and Market Organisation 
We have already discussed the relevance of the market structure throughout 
this chapter. By trying to determine the bid-ask spread we note that the 
market liquidity is crucial in finding the equilibrium prices. Market 
liquidity in turn depends on the underlying market structure. Hence, a thin 
market in which trading intervals are long, tends to have larger spreads 
than in more active markets. 
The problems of designing an appropriate market structure (or trading 
mechanism) are stated by Pagano and Röell (1990) as follows: 
9 
Upon designing the mechanisms of a stock exchange, policy makers confront 
four key choices. First, is the exchange to work as an auction market or as 
a dealership market? Second, if one opts for the auction market, should the 
auction to be structured as a sequence of discrete batches, possibly at 
daily intervals, or as a continuous auction? (With a continuous auction, 
the market clears every time at least two orders can be executed against 
each other. A dealership market is inherently continuous. ) Third, should 
one provide incentives or impose rules to favour the concentration of trade 
on a single market, or rather allow off-exchange dealing? Finally, again in 
the context of an auction market, should one allow exchange members to act 
as brokers and to deal on own account? 
9pp. 83 
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The latter point is especially important in markets where mostly banks are 
the market makers and trade also for their own account. There could be a 
conflict of interest by executing orders from the customers and trading for 
their own account. 10 
It is interesting to see how the design of the market structure can 
influence the volatility and volume traded of a stock at the exchange. In a 
comparison between the Paris Bourse, which recently underwent a reform to a 
continuous system, and the London exchange, Pagano and Röell (1993a) 
analysed the effects of the reform. Their results are, that for some 
shares, there is a significant decrease in volatility after the reform of 
the Paris exchange. The trading volume is also lower with continuous 
trading, holding other factors constant. There is some evidence of intense 
competition between the two exchanges. If we analyse the spread of 
cross-listed stocks, their analysis shows that the spread in the London 
market is smaller during the trading hours of the Paris exchange. 
One of the most important points in designing a market structure is the 
decision whether the market should operate as an auction market or a 
dealership market. This problem has been discussed by Pagano and Röell 
(1992b). They make a distinction between market structures and they divide 
them into three main categories: Batch auctions, continuous auctions, and 
pure dealership markets. 
In a batch market, dealers submit their bids to a central auctioneer or 
auction mechanism. The trades are then executed according to a particular 
auction rule at an equilibrium price where all the orders are cleared. Such 
auctions take place in a regular interval, mostly daily. Examples of such 
10 For a detailed analysis see Pagano and Röell (1993b). 
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auctions are, among others, the ones in Paris, New York and Tokyo. 
The continuous auction works through a computerized system. Dealers submit 
their bids to this system where. the best limit orders are displayed and the 
incoming orders are then automatically executed against these limit orders. 
Both these structures allow the submission and advertisement of public 
limit orders. After the execution under the auction procedure the actual 
trade (price and quantities) are displayed so that the dealers observe the 
history of the order flow. 
In an dealership market, market makers quote their prices at which they are 
willing to trade. These prices are set for trade volumes up to a specific 
amount and are displayed on a screen. The actual trade is done over the 
telephone. In contrast to the auction procedure, matching orders of the 
public can not be traded directly, but all the orders have to be executed 
through the designated market makers. The main difference to the auction 
procedure is that the individual trade information is only known to the 
market maker who executed the order unless the last trade information is 
made public immediately on the screen. It is evident that the information 
dissemination is different for the various market structures. The auction 
procedures (both the batch and the continuous auction) ensure that 
information is made public immediately after a trade. However, in a 
dealership market, market makers may have to quote their prices before 
learning about the past trade. This means that there is greater uncertainty 
for market makers in a dealership market and the spread is expected to be 
wider than in an auction market. We can illustrate the problem by ranking 
the trading systems according to transparency: 11 
"Pagano and Röell (1992a) pp. 5 
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AUCTION DEALER MARKET 
Transparent auction 
N 
continuous Dealer market with immediate 
auction lasttrade publ ication 
I 
Batch Dealership without immediate 
auction last trade publication 
Figure 1.8.: Trading systems ranked by decreasing -transparency 
Another important distinction between an auction market and a dealership 
market is the execution risk. In a dealership market the market makers 
stand ready to trade any incoming order instantaneously at the quoted 
prices whereas in an auction market the participants have to bear the risk 
that no matching order arrives. 
Pagano and Röell (1993c) investigated that problem and they find, based on 
a theoretical model, that the dealership market is superior to the auction 
market, i. e. the market makers are in the position to give this insurance 
against execution risk, if the market makers are risk neutral or 
sufficiently less risk averse than their customers. 
1.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter we made an attempt to capture all the relevant issues of 
the literature about financial market structures and financial market 
trading which influence the cost of market making, i. e. the bid-ask spread. 
The earlier works examine the individual dealer's cost within a 
69 
monopolistic market setting. However, soon it has been discovered that 
other market forces, such as competition between dealers in a market and 
more recently, competition between exchanges play an important part in 
determining the costs of transacting in a market. The structure of the 
bid-ask spread models changed in order to take into account the nature of 
competitive markets and the difference of market structures. 
The splitting of the order may be often the case in a dealership market 
where one dealer is not in the position to fulfill the whole market order. 
If dealing costs rise with quantity as in inventory control models, there 
is a natural incentive to share the order. 
Most of the existing bid-ask spread research examine the bid and ask prices 
assuming an indivisible order. There are models in which orders are split, 
but these models are based in a Walrasian world. Examples of such analyses 
are Kyle (1989) and Madhavan (1992). 
The analysis of the different market structures includes the theory about 
auctions. There exist various types of auction procedures with different 
outcomes. However, until today, most of the studies consider an auction 
where bidders compete for an indivisible good. In the same light, all the 
existing models about the bid-ask spread are based on the fact that the 
most competitive market maker gets all the trade and the others get 
nothing. 
Another point which has not been investigated so far is the determination 
of the bid-ask spread in a pure dealership market where dealers do not know 
about the market order size at the time when they quote their prices. Such 
a situation may occur when dealers do not only trade in one market at the 
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same time. The reason for trading in different markets at the same time is 
that the market makers aim for a risk reduction through diversification of 
the portfolio. 
For instance, they may trade in the spot market as well as in the futures 
market. This calls for an investigation of the bid-ask spread by examining 
the interaction of these markets. 
Hence, further research is still required in these areas which are 
investigated in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
In chapter two, we discuss a theoretical study which considers trading in 
an indivisible good in a fragmented market. We then present our model where 
market makers compete for an incoming order of a divisible good which is 
applied to two different market structures, a centralised and a fragmented 
market. 
Another shortcoming of the existing literature is that the interaction 
between different markets, i. e. spot and futures market has not been 
studied in respect of the effect on the bid ask spread. As we have pointed 
out earlier, Ho and Stoll (1983) consider a two asset framework, but they 
fail to fully capture the influence of diversification on the bid-ask 
spread as their spread does not depend on the inventory level. 
Chapter three gives an introduction and overview of the existing literature 
about futures markets. This is followed by the analysis of the bid-ask 
spread in the spot market by simultaneously trading in futures which forms 
chapter four. The empirical investigation of the Italian secondary 
market for government bonds includes an examination of the market 
characteristics, i. e. the analysis of the quoting behaviour of the primary 
dealers and the returns of the various bonds which is presented in chapter 
71 
five. In addition, we investigate the inventory control argument and the 
next best dealer aspect which are the main findings as the determinants of 
the bid-ask spread by Ho and Stoll (1980,1983). This is analysed in 
chapter six. An investigation of the time series properties and the 
relation to the bid-ask spread is given in chapter seven as another 
empirical study examining the nature of the Italian secondary market. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AUCTION MECHANISMS AND DEALERSHIP MARKETS: 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD 
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2.1. Introduction 
The so called theory of the microstructure of market making produced 
several interesting models which analyse the existence of a bid-ask spread 
most of them or almost all of them are set in a centralised auction market. 
Most of the analyses are carried out by considering a monopolistic market 
maker and so do not model appropriately the competition among dealers. An 
exception is the model of Ho and Stoll (1983) 
1. They analyse a market with 
two competing dealers in a centralized market which is described as an 
auction procedure which gives an outcome of second best prices which is 
equivalent to a Vickrey auction (1961). Although they argue that their 
model can be equally applied to a dealership market the application is not 
so straightforward. 
The emphasis of their study is to evaluate the determinants of the bid-ask 
spread where market makers have full information which means that they know 
the incoming order and they have knowledge of each others reservation 
prices. The order will be executed by the market maker with the best price 
(i. e. the lowest quoted ask price or the highest quoted bid price). 
More recent studies (Pagano and Röell [1990,1992,1993]) 2 recognize the 
fact that the market structure is important in evaluating the respective 
cost in the market. 
There are factors such as the market structure, which influence the bid-ask 
spread. These factors of the market structure may be whether the market is 
centralized or fragmented, the transparency of the market, i. e. whether 
IA detailed discussion of their models can be found in the. previous 
chapter. 
2Details are presented in chapter one. 
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market makers have information of each others reservation prices and the 
order flow, and the organisation of the market, i. e. whether the quoted 
prices are transaction prices or the trade is done over the telephone, 
which influence the size of the bid-ask spread. 
These circumstances differ in the fact that the less transparent the market 
and the more fragmented the market the more likely it is that the public or 
private investor is given more power in trading with the market makers. As 
an example we can think of a pure dealership market where dealers quote 
their prices without knowing the order flow and without information about 
the reservation prices of their competitors. Hence, the private investor 
can exploit the situation by choosing the dealers she wants to trade with 
and also the quantity to be traded. 
In his paper, Biais (1993) compares the theories of the "benchmark" market 
structures of an open auction procedure (transparent auction) with full 
information and a dealership market where dealers have only private 
information about their reservation prices and the individual deal traded. 
He analyses the bid-ask spread in a centralised market, where dealers know 
each other's reservation prices and the order flow, and in a fragmented 
market, where dealers know about the size of the incoming order, but they 
do not know the reservation prices of the competitors. Dealers quote their 
prices based on expectations of the reservation prices of their rivals. The 
trading strategies of the dealers can be compared to the bidding- strategies 
of a high bid auction described by Riley and Samuelson (1981). 
Biais also examines the volatility of the asset in both markets as well as 
the liquidity in equilibrium. 
Like all the other bid-ask spread models he assumes that the whole incoming 
order will be executed by the best quoting dealer who is assumed to be the 
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same on both sides of the market. The features of his model are based on Ho 
and Stoll's inventory control model. According to their order arrival 
process only one order arrives within the one period framework which can be 
a purchase or a sale transaction which is known to the dealer before she 
quotes her price. Under the assumption that dealers balance their inventory 
position at the end of the period, the same dealer is assumed to trade the 
transaction in the next period which is of opposite sign. 
Our aim is to add a model which describes a situation where dealers trade 
in a divisible good. We analyse the market situation where risk averse 
dealers are allowed to share the market order, but we assume incomplete 
information in the sense that market makers do not know their rivals' 
reservation prices. We also assume that only one order arrives at a time, 
but the sharing of the order gives a different inventory dynamic in the 
sense that the fact of who executes the next transaction depends on the 
relative inventory positions of the dealers. The bid-ask spread is 
calculated from the bid and ask prices of different dealers. This situation 
is modeled by a discriminating auction procedure which might be socially 
superior to the Vickrey auction. 
The design of markets is an important factor which influences the bid-ask 
spread and hence the cost of trading. 
Risk averse dealers face decreasing returns to scale. Their risk exposure 
increases with the quantity traded. By allowing the splitting of the order 
dealers can quote their prices for a lower quantity or on an average of the 
expected quantity to trade and not on a large trade which is riskier. The 
result is that the bid-ask spread is expected to be smaller due to the 
reduced risk and the market is expected to be more liquid. We present two 
models of which one is set in a centralised market where all the dealers 
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know each others reservation prices and a second one in which dealers only 
know their own reservation price, but they do know the incoming order. 
In section 2.2. we analyse the difference of bid and ask prices and the 
spread between the Ho and Stoll model (abbreviated as HS) and our model 
applied to a centralised market structure. The distinction between the two 
models is the possibility of sharing the incoming order. HS assume trading 
in an indivisible good whereas our model allows the splitting of the 
incoming order. 
In section 2.3., we present the model of Biais which is based on trading in 
an indivisible good and we compare this outcome within a fragmented market 
structure with the centralised market bid and ask spread. An interesting 
extension to Biais model is worked out by assuming heterogeneous price 
expectations among market makers. 
Section 2.4. contains our bid-ask spread model which evaluates the 
determinants of the bid-ask spread in a fragmented market with trading in a 
divisible good which is compared to the corresponding model in the 
centralised market and to the model of Biais. 
The final section gives the summary and the conclusions. 
2.2. Trading in an Indivisible and a Divisible Good within a Centralised 
Market Structure 
2.2.1. The Ho and Stoll Approach 
The model of Ho and Stoll has been presented in the previous survey chapter 
and we only sketch the main features of their model in order to have a 
comparison with the following studies. Their model is a static, one period 
analysis. They assume a single monopolist market maker who deals on both 
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sides of the market, i. e. is the best quoting dealer on the ask side and on 
the bid side. Furthermore, they assume a symmetric market. If an order 
arrives it is equally likely to be a buy or a sell transaction of the same 
quantity. It is assumed that only one order arrives which is observed by 
each dealer. This assumption allows us to deal with the optimization 
problem on each side separately. The dealer's wealth consists of cash and 
the inventory of a risky asset. The dealer is willing to be active in the 
market if the expected utility is not less or equal to the expected utility 
without any trade. 
By assuming mean-variance preferences 3 the resulting reservation ask price 
is pa = E(p) + ycý[Q - 21] and the bid reservation price is 
pb = E(p) - y(ý[Q + 21] with 
E(p) = future price expectation of the risky asset, y= coefficient of risk 
aversion, o? = price variance of the risky asset, Q= order size, I= 
market maker's inventory of the risky asset 
The spread is simply the difference between the ask and bid price which is 
pa -pb=s=2, yCQ 
The equilibrium price, considering a market under competition, is 
determined by the next best dealer argument. Under the assumption that 
dealers know each others reservation prices, the dealer with the best 
reservation price, i. e. the lowest ask and the highest bid price, will not 
quote her own reservation price, but the reservation price of the next best 
dealer plus (minus) a small margin. Thus, the next best dealer is not able 
to raise (lower) her own reservation price without incurring a loss. Hence, 
we have the outcome of a second price auction with certainty about rival 
bids or an English auction. 
3We assume that the expected futures prices are normally distributed and 
that market makers have constant absolute risk aversions (CARA). 
78 
2.2.2. Trading in a Divisible Good 
In this section, we examine the trading procedure of market makers in a 
competitive dealership market. The determination of the equilibrium bid-ask 
spread is based on an inventory control model similar to the one of HS, but 
allowing for splitting of the incoming order. The dealers know the size and 
the nature of the order before they have to quote their prices. We assume 
that only one order arrives within one period. The bid-ask spread is then 
composed of prices from different deal: rs as it is not given that the same 
dealer executes the transaction in the subsequent period. We allow for 
different possible trading situations in the market, for instance, one 
dealer sells all units of the asset and several other dealers buy the 
asset, or there is only one dealer on either side of the market buying or 
selling the asset. 
The difference from the traditional model is that the risk averse dealer is 
confronted with decreasing returns to scale so allowing the splitting of 
the order. A smaller traded quantity means less risk involved for an active 
dealer and hence less costs which may result in a smaller bid-ask spread. 
The approach that we take is to use the basic HS framework of Bertrand 
price competition between market makers but extended to allow for many 
active dealers. 
All trade is at the best price but because of differences in the inventory, 
risk aversion or price expectations of different dealers, ' particular 
dealers can quote better prices than others. 
Let µi be the ith dealers expected future price of the asset and 0.2 . 
his 
P 
view of the variance and yl be the degree of risk aversion of the dealer. 
C. is defined as the cash holding of dealer i. With this notation, the 
expected utility of a dealer who does no buying or selling in interval t is 
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Eu NT= (1 + rt) Cit+ µiIit- YiaPiIit (1) 
The dealer quotes an ask price of pai and a bid price of pbi and secures a 
share k of the market buy order if it arrives and a share l of the market 
sell order if it arrives. 
They also know about the incoming order of size Q and whether this order is 
a purchase or a sale. Hence, as only one order arrives at the time, we can 
examine the bid and the ask prices separately. 
Then expected utility is 
Eu(0,1) = (1 + rt)(C + pa1Q) + µ(I - 1Q) - ß(I - 1Q) 
2 (2) 
for a sale and the expected utility for a purchase is 
Eu(m, O) = (1 + rt)(C - pbmQ) + µ(I + mOJ - (3(I + mQ) 
2 (3) 
where 05rn, 151, ß= y& and we have dropped the subscript i to save P 
notation. 
We also assume that dealers know about the incoming order and the size Q of 
this order. 
We can write pbi 
1µi 
- bi and paj = 
ßµi 
+ ai 
where a and b are the selling and buying fees earned by the dealer. If we 
equate the expected utility of trading with the expected utility of no 
trade (as in (1)) for each side of the market we get reservation fees of. 
a= ß(1Q - 21) (4) 
b= (3(mQ + 21) (5) 
The determination of the optimal share now depends on the assumption that 
dealers try to maximize their expected utility of terminal wealth due to 
their possible advantageous position regarding the price expectation, the 
degree of risk aversion, and the inventory position. 
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2.2.3. Equilibrium Prices 
We base the determination of the equilibrium prices on the process where 
market makers quote their prices simultaneously. 
We restrict our model in the way so that l=Q/k and m=Q/k, hence l=m=Q/k. 
We define the reservation selling price to be 
pai=lµ. -2ß1I1+ß11Q=a. +(3(Q/k) (6a) 
t 
and the reservation buying price 
pb 1= 
1µi 
- 2ßI1 - (31mQ = aý - (3i(Q/k) (6b) 
t 
withal= t. -2ß. l. 
t 
The ask (bid) reservation price increases (decreases) with the share of any 
order that the dealer assumes; a smaller traded quantity reduces the 
dealers inventory risk exposure and so cet par the dealer is prepared to 
trade at closer prices. The amount of gain from trading increases with the 
share traded so long as the trade is at prices better than the reservation 
price. 
In equilibrium, market makers set their prices for a division of Q so that 
none of them wishes to trade a lower or a higher quantity at the quoted 
price and so that the whole market order Q is satisfied which implies that 
we do not have any excess demand from the public. 
For our analysis we assume that the order can be split into discrete bundle 
sizes. Market makers are assumed to quote their prices in a way that they 
either get the whole order or that they will share the order equally 
between them at an identical price or that they do not get anything. The 
best price, i. e. the lowest ask and the highest bid price, are obtained by 
a process of Bertrand price competition which means that dealers undercut 
each other's prices as long as they do not quote below their marginal 
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costs. The equilibrium is a Nash type equilibrium, but as we show below it 
is typically not unique. 
We can define the price quotes as (P1, P2, ..., Pn) and we assume that the 
number of dealers who quote the best price p is k. Thus, each of the best 
quoting dealers gets a market share of Q/k and the other market makers with 
a higher (lower) ask (bid) price do not get anything. 
If dealer i quotes pl<p on the ask side (or p, >p on the bid side) then 
she gets the whole order. Due to their differences in inventory, price 
expectations, -and risk aversions, price quotes are given by 
pi, """, pi-1' pi+l'..., pci 
For simplicity reasons, we carry out the analysis for the selling side, but 
the respective argument is equally valid for the buying side. 
Given k-1 best quotes, dealer i can, in principle, make three choices. If 
the market price is p dealer i can quote the same price pi = p which 
implies that she will share the market order with the other k-1 best 
quoting dealers. Another possibility is that she can quote marginally below 
the market price and attract the whole order p p-e or she can quote above 
the market price pl > p which means that she does not get any trade at all. 
If the market maker decides to quote the same price as the market price 
then she will get a share of Q/k of the market order ( with k best quoting 
dealers). Then, under the assumption of maximisation of expected utility, 
the expected gain of dealer i is given by the difference between the quoted 
price and her reservation price given in (6a) which is 
Q/k[p - a; - 0, (Q/k)] (7) 
If the dealer gets the whole order the expected gain is 
Q[(P-E)-ai-ß1Q (8) 
In the last case where the dealer does not get any trade the expected gain 
naturally is zero. Hence, if p< [a. + (31(Q/k)] then it is best for dealer 
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i to quote pi >p which means that she will not get any trade. 
If p> [a + 0i(Q/k)] then the dealer has to decide whether she wants to 
trade the whole order or whether she prefers to share the order as under 
both options she will still make a profit. 
In order to decide whether to trade Q or Q/k we have to find the critical 
price at a level where the dealer is just indifferent between the two 
choices. 
Such a price level is illustrated as p. in figure 2.1. below. 
P 
Ai 
prefers Q 
Pi 
prefers 
vQ/ k 
Pi 
Figure 2.1. : Trading possibilities 
The price p* can be found by comparing the expected gains as in (7) and 
(8). The dealer is indifferent if she gets the same return for sharing or 
executing the whole order which is 
1/k[p* - al - ßi(Q/k)] = p* -e- ai - ß1Q which means that the return from 
getting a share of (1/k) at the reservation price of (p-a-(3(Q/k)) is equal 
to the return of getting the whole order at the price (p-E-a-PQ). 
If we do some multiplication we get: 
pß(1-(1/k)) = al(1-(1/k)) + 131Q(1-(1/k2)) +c which we can simplify by 
dividing through (1-(1/k)) and finally we have 
p* = ai + [ek/(k-1)] + ß; Q[(k+1)/k] (9) 
At this price p* and with e40, the dealer is indifferent between trading 
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the whole order or sharing the order 4. To summarise: 
If p< ai + ßi(Q/k) dealer i quotes pi >p and gets nothing. 
If ai + (31(Q/k) <p< p`, dealer i quotes p and gets a share of Q/k. 
If p`1 <p dealer i quotes p-e and gets Q. 
The equilibrium conditions to hold for all such quotes derived under 
Bertrand competition which we denote as pl, ..., 
pA are: 
a) that the number of quotes which are identical to p is k and that there 
does not exist a quote which is smaller than those 
b) that for each of these quoters i the following condition holds: 
ai + ßi(Q/k) <p< ai + [ek/(k-1)] +3 Q[(k+1)/k] again with e40 and 
c) that for all other quoters j it is true that p<a. + (3. (Q/k) 
With n dealers we have various possible outcomes where these conditions 
hold, and as a consequence, such a Bertrand/Nash equilibrium exists, but it 
will not be unique. 
To show that we find a non-unique equilibrium we take an example with three 
dealers. 
For example in figure 2.2., we assume that three dealers are in the market. 
Then we may have the situation that on the ask side dealers 1 and 2 share 
the order and on the bid side dealer 3 executes the whole order which we 
denote as case one. Another possible equilibrium situation may occur where 
the market order is shared between the three dealers on the ask side as 
4We do not have the problem of non-existence of a Bertrand/Nash equilibrium 
as we assume a discrete number of shares of the order instead of infinitely 
divisible shares. The issue of non-existence of a Bertrand equilibrium is 
discussed for instance in Tirole (1988). 
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well as on the bid side which is case two. 
We can show these types of equilibrium graphically: 
pa 
ýF 
t 
IX 
a3 
a2 
al 
Q 
Figure 2.2. : Different types of equilibrium 
with x being a possible equilibrium price in case one with the following 
condition to be satisfied: 
ai + 13 (Q/2) <p<a+ ß1Q(3/2) 
and with * being a possible equilibrium price in case two with the 
following condition to be satisfied: 
ai +3 (Q/3) <p< aI + ß. Q(4/3) 
To see that how this relates to the Ho-Stoll framework, we take the case of 
only two dealers. For each dealer i there are two critical values of the 
fees. One is the fee where she is indifferent between not trading and 
sharing an order at the reservation price for sharing which is [a. + 
P (Q/k)] denoted as pa and the critical price p at which she is i ll 
indifferent between executing the who le order and sharing the order which 
is p` = ai + (3Q[(k+l)/k] which we denote as . The 
first. subscript pa ls 
indicates the dealer and the second suscript refers to the type of critical 
price for the decision of not trading and sharing or executing the whole 
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323Z 
order and sharing the order. 
Hence in the two dealer case, the respect 
=1 µi - 2ß. I. + 13. Q(1/2) and pay pa 11 
1 
pbli = "Trt µ. - 2ßI f- 13. Q(1/2) and pbU 
with i=1,2 (dealers). 
ive prices are: 
= µi-2(31I. +(31Q(3/2) 
_ +r µ; - 
2ß; I; - ß. Q(3/2) 
t 
The possible types of equilibrium are: 
(a) Monopoly equilibrium: the same dealer (denoted as dealer 1) is active 
on both sides of the market and she does not share the market. The 
equilibrium prices are 
pall = µl- 2ßI + ß1Q(1/2) and pbll = µl- 2ßI- (31Q(1/2)" 
Only in this case, where the same dealer executes the order on both sides 
of the market, we have independence of the inventory levels and the 
spread. 
(b) Specialised trading equilibrium: one dealer sets the lowest ask price 
and does all the selling; the other dealer sets the highest bid price and 
does all the buying. 
The prices must again be at levels which just prevent either dealer from 
entering the side of the market on which they are inactive. 
If 1 is the seller and 2 is the buyer this gives equilibrium prices of 
pall = µl- 2131I1 + ß1Q(1/2) and pb21 = µ2 2ß2I2 ß2Q(1/2) 
and now, contrary to the Ho and Stoll case, the spread does depend on the 
inventories and other characteristics of the two dealers. 
SIf dealer 1 holds an inventory of I and dealer 2 holds an inventory of 1° 
with I< I° then (other things equal) dealer 1 is the buyer and we assume 
that she executes the whole order. At the time of the next incoming order, 
the inventory position of dealer 1 is (I+Q) and I° for dealer 2. Only if 
(I+Q) > I° (other things equal) dealer 1 again will be active and will 
sell. 
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(c) Shared trading equilibrium: both traders set identical bid and ask 
prices; the prices must be set so as to give no incentive for either dealer 
to either meet all the orders on one side of the market or to drop out of 
either side of the market. Dealers gain from a wider spread so long as it 
does not disturb the equilibrium trading pattern; consequently the common 
market bid price will be set by the higher of pblland pb21; any further 
reduction in the bid price would make one of the dealers wish to take on 
all the buying. The market ask price will be set by the lower of pa11and 
pa21 for analogous reasons. 
(d) Mixed sharing equilibrium: one dealer shares one side of the market but 
has all the dealing on the other side of the market; the second dealer is 
inactive on the second side of the market but shares trade on the first 
side. For example suppose that dealer 1 is active on both sides of the 
market but dealer 2 only sells. The bid price is set at pb21 while the ask 
price is set at the lower of pa2land pall. 
For a given dealer the reservation prices divide price space into 9 
regions; as in figure 2.3.. However, only if the difference between the 
inventories is relatively large compared to the order size is situation 4 
possible. 
pbi 
pb3 
pa3 pal 
Figure 2.3. : Trading patterns 
Table 2.1. gives the trading pattern for each region: 
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Table 2.1.: Trading combinations 
Sole Buyer Share Buying No Buying 
Sole seller 463 
Share selling 578 
No Selling 291 
Within such a setting we have shown that the equilibrium outcome is a 
Bertrand/Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is based on the assumption 
that market makers differ in their inventory positions degree of risk 
aversion and price expectations. Under the assumption of decreasing returns 
to scale and risk averse dealers, we have shown that a dealer always 
prefers to share the order. This means that the dealer faces a reduced risk 
exposure by trading a smaller quantity and therefore she will quote a lower 
spread. 
The sharing of the order gives more than one possible equilibrium outcome 
which can be obtained by a Bertrand price competition among market makers. 
The process of reaching such an equilibrium can be described by a first 
price auction. Under the assumption that the dealers have full information 
including the knowledge of each others' reservation prices there can be 
collusion among the best quoting dealers. The result is that all of them 
quote the same price which is just slightly below (above) the next best 
dealer's ask (bid) price. 
Such a market structure can be implemented through appropriate trading 
rules. Such a rule is that the best quoting dealers get an equal share of 
the market order. 
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2.3. Trading within a Fragmented Market Structure 
In this section, we analyse the pricing behaviour of dealers where the 
reservation prices are private information to the dealers. However, the 
dealers have knowledge about the incoming order which will be executed by 
the best quoting dealer which means by the dealer with the lowest ask price 
and the highest bid price. Also this time, only one order arrives at the 
time which is known to the dealers. 
2.3.1. The Model of Biais with Trading in an Indivisible Good 
Biais (1993) assumes a market for one risky security with two types of 
agents, the liquidity traders who are the public and who demand liquidity, 
and the risk averse agents who supply liquidity. 
In a centralised market, these agents are limit order traders, also called 
market makers. In a fragmented market, these agents are the dealers. As 
discussed above, in the centralised market, market makers can observe price 
quotes and actual trades, whereas in fragmented markets, dealers do not 
have such information. They only know the distribution of the other 
dealers' inventories of the risky security, denoted as G(. ) (the cumulative 
d. f. ). It is assumed that all dealers inventories are identically 
distributed. 
All agents are assumed to have constant coefficients of absolute risk 
aversion and homogeneous expectations about the final value of the 
security, i. e. E(P). The realisation of the final value P can be written as 
P= (l+z) with z- N(O, d2). So the problem is reduced to a mean-variance 
analysis. 
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The model is broken down into the following stages: 
6 
"1. N out of M agents decide whether to become liquidity suppliers, at a 
given cost [F]. 
2. All M agents receive inventory positions [I. ] in the risky security. 
3. With probability. % the liquidity shock on the risk exposure of the 
public occurs. In this case the public places one market order.... []. 
This is modeled as a random inventory position... []. If the liquidity 
shock occurs, the risk averse outside investor is endowed with a long 
position +L, with probability 1/2, or with a short position -L, with 
probability 1/2. 
4. The N suppliers of liquidity compete for the order flow from the public. 
The buy (sell) market order is executed at the best ask (bid) price, 
... [] denoted 
by- A. and B.... 0 the agent i serves the market order to 
buy (sell), if his inventory is larger (lower) than those of his 
competitors (I). The probability that this is the case is P(I. >I. ) _ 
lt. or P(I, Q ,)= it 
5. The final value of the security is realised. It is denoted by P. It can 
be thought of as the liquidation value of the asset. At that point in 
time, all uncertainty about the payoff of the asset is assumed to be 
resolved. " 
The M agents have identical utility functions with constant absolute risk 
aversion parameter A: U(X) = -e ,Vx 
With the expected final value to be E(P) we can write the ask and bid 
quotes as Al = E(P)(1+a. ) and B. = E(P)(l+b. ). In the following analysis 
E(P) is normalised to one. In such a setting, Biais assumes that the 
dealers only differ in their inventory positions which is quite crucial for 
the-outcome of this analysis. 
Hence, due to different initial inventory endowments, agents want to trade 
with different intensities which results in different inventory positions. 
Thus bidding strategies are assumed to be decreasing functions of the 
agents' inventories and we can write a. = a1(I1 .) and 
b. = b. (I) which 1111 
implies that we have a symmetric equilibrium with common bidding functions 
which are assumed to be monotone. Furthermore, we define (I. *) to 
6Biais (1993) pp. 160/161 
7They are also endowed with a cash position of C.. 
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be the set of order statistics which are formed from the inventories 
(I. ). 
- 
(IN *) is the agent with the longest inventory, and (I N-1 
*) is 
the agent with the second longest inventory and so on. 
2.3.2. Price Quotes in Equilibrium 
The dealer, endowed with cash C. and inventory Ii, pays a cost F to be in 
the market. Thus the final wealth of a dealer who is not trading is 
W1(0) = C. -F+I. (1+z) (10) 
where the risk free rate of interest is normalised to zero. 
If the dealer sells a quantity Q at a price l+a, the final wealth is 
WI(a, ) = Cl -F+I. (1+z) + (ai-z)Q (11) 
for the selling side and 
W. (b. ) = C. -F+I. (1+z) + (b. +z)Q (12) 
for the buying side. 
Expected utility of trading has to be at least equal to expected utility of 
no trading otherwise the dealer does not want to trade. 
E(U[)V; (O)] 1I; ) < E. U(w; (a; )) , E. U(W; (b. )) 
which results in the following reservation fees, given the above 
assumptions: 
a 
r. =a 
(I. ) = (A& /2)(Q - 2I. ) (13) 
and b. = br(Ii) = (Au/2)(Q + 2I, ) (14) 
which are the same as the ones of Ho and Stoll. 
Now, what are the optimal prices to quote for a dealer in such a fragmented 
market? We know that n. = P(I. > max(T . 
)) 8= G(I. )N-1 where -i denotes 
everybody but i, and we define G(Ii)N-1 = H(I. ). The common bidding 
8Generally a- means a random variable. 
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strategy of each dealer is (P+a. ) = (P+a. (I. )) and (P+b. ) = (P+b. (I. )). 
As we assume a symmetric market where the size of the purchases is 
identical to the size of a sale and it is equally likely that a buy or a 
sell transaction occurs, only the ask side of the market is analysed. 
When a dealer quotes his price he does not know about the competitors' 
inventories. The dealer forms expectations about it. He knows that he will 
execute the order from the liquidity traders if his ask price is lowest 
compared to the others. Thus, the dealer computes the probability of his 
ask price being lower than the ones of the competitors which we denote as 
n. 9. The expected utility before trade but after knowing the private 
all 
inventory shock is 
E [U(W. (0)) + naj [U(W. (a. )) - U(W. (0))] ý ýj and he solves 
max 7t . 
(E[U('w. (a. )) I. ] - E[U(W. (0))I]) (15) 
We can write: 
E[U(W. (a. )) III] = E[U(Wl(0))e 
A(a1-ar)Q I I. ] (16) 
substituting (16) into (15) we get: 
max naj 
(E[U(W(O))e_Ai_ar)Q I. ] - E[U(W. (0)) I I. ]) 
which is max tt [E[U(W. (0))II][e 
A(a, -ara)Q_1] 
a 
Thus, we can simplify by E[U(Wl(0)) IIi] which is a negative constant and we 
multiply by -1. The maximisation problem can then be expressed as 
maximising the expected surplus from trade which is: 
max nai (1-e 
A(ai ar )Q) 
a. 
We can simplify this expression by using a Taylor approximation. By Taylor 
expansion and by neglecting terms of the magnitude ((a1-a . 
)AQ)2 we get 
9See also point 4 above. 
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max naj 
(A(a. 
a. )Q) 
We solve the maximisation problem and get the first order condition of: 
Sn JSa. (a. -a .)+ it =0 ajIII, 1 S, 1 
Then, &r JSa. =f S&cýJSI. 
I [dlfdal 
= (SH(I. )/SI. )(1/a'. ) 
with a'. being theL derivatiiveL of a(IJi) with respect to I.. 
We then can write the differential equation as 
(5H(IT)/61. )(aj ar. )(1/a'i) + H(I) =0 or 
S [H(Ii)ai ]/5I1 = h(II)at 
where h(. ) is the derivative of H(. ) with respect to I,. 
Now, we integrate H(x)a(x) over the interval between -R and I. which gives 
I1 
[H(x)a(x)] '= JIB h(x)ar(x)dx +c 
R -R 
with c being a constant. The LHS of above equation is zero when we evaluate 
it at I. = -R which results in the RHS being zero as well. 
It follows that a is such that 
I, 
a(I. )H(II) =f ' h(x)ar(x)dx 
-R 
By substituting the reservation fees calculated above and integrating the 
RHS by parts we get optimal fees of 10 
a. = aU. + Aa2r, Ji G(x) N-I dx / G(Ii)N-1] (17) 
LRJ 
and by applying the same procedure to the bid side we get 
bi = bra + AcY2[51 (1-G(x))N-I dx / (1- G(I, ))N-Il (18) 
I, J 
10This result is similar to the optimal bidding strategy in a high bid 
auction of Riley and Samuelson (1981). They also showed that, ' in 
equilibrium, it is optimal for each dealer to adopt the same strategy. 
However, their bidders are assumed to be risk neutral which is not the case 
in Biais model which makes it more appropriate for a dealership market. 
However they all do not investigate the second order condition which is 
always assumed to be satisfied. 
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Under the assumption that the same dealer executes the order on both sides 
of the market, Biais defines the spread as: 
S. =a. +b. =S 1i1I, 1 
+ Aal 
[, l1i G(x)N-1dx/G(Il)N-il+r, (ý (1-G(x))N-ldx/(1-G(I. ))N-il (19) JLýJ 
However this result is not always a valid solution. The reason is simple 
and can be explained by the fact that market makers differ in their 
inventory only. Hence, it may not be possible that the same dealer, among 
several market makers, can bid the best bid price and get the order and, in 
the following period, she bids the best ask price which is, according to 
Biais assumption, a function of the dealer's inventory position. 
For example, we denote the inventories of two dealers as I and 10 and we 
assume that I< 1° which is the only difference between ' the dealers who are 
assumed to have common price expectations and risk aversions. In this 
example the dealer with the inventory I is in the position to bid a better 
buying price and gets the order of size Q. Hence her inventory changes to 
(I + Q). Now, for the next period, it depends on the relative inventory 
positions whether (I + Q) '< I° which of the dealers bids the best price for 
selling. If (I + OJ < 1° then the other dealer does all the selling. On the 
other hand if (I + Q) > 1° then the same dealer executes the sale. Thus, Ho 
and Stoll's and Biais' result gives only one part of the solution which is 
the case where the difference of the inventory positions of two dealers is 
less than the order size. 
Hence, the spread equation may depend on the relative inventory levels of 
the market makers which we express in the case below . 
If we assume an uniform distribution with G(. ) uniform over [-R, R] the 
bidding fees and the spread become 
a= a« + Ade [(R + I)/N] and b, = b« + Aas 
[(R 
- I)/N] 
Si. = a1 .+ 
b1 
.=Sr.. 1 + 
2R(Aa2/N) = Ac ý(Q + (2R/N)) (20) 
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which is in the more general case: 
Si = aril + Aal 
[CR 
+ I1)IN] + bfi2 + Ac? 
[(R 
- I2)IN] 
where dealer 1 its the seller and dealer 2 is the buyer. 
If we compare the spread in the centralised market and in the fragmented 
market we have one important difference which is that in a fragmented 
market, the spread also depends on the number of dealers active in the 
market. We see that as the number of dealers N increases the surplus earned 
in the fragmented market gets smaller and smaller. This can be explained by 
the fact that the divergence of inventories is less with many active 
dealers than with only a small number of dealers which puts competitive 
pressure on the dealers and forces them to narrow the spread which at the 
limit is equal to the spread in the centralised market. 
2.3.3. Modification of Heterogeneous Price Expectations 
Biais assumes that dealers have common price expectations and the same 
degrees of risk aversion. The consequence is that the quoted price strategy 
is a function of the inventory only. If we change this assumption and let 
the quoted price be a function of the reservation price with the price 
expectation and the inventory position being random variables, we get a 
different result. 
As a reminder, the reservation price is pa .= µý + y(ý[Q - 
2T. ]. 
It is obvious that the reservation price is decreasing in inventory, and 
increasing in future price expectation. 
We can define (paR *). 
_1, N 
to be the set of order statistics which is 
formed from the reservation prices (pa', )1-1-N. (paRN*) is the lowest 
reservation price, and (paRN_l*) is the second lowest reservation price and 
so on. We assume the sample of reservation prices is a random draw from a 
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common cumulative distribution function G(. ) and that the quote each dealer 
makes increases with the reservation price. Underlying this we could have a 
common distribution of inventories and price expectations. All dealers use 
the same bidding function pa(pa') where pa is the price quote which is 
increasing. 
We then can express the probability that dealer i wins the ask bid at pal 
as equivalent to the probability that dealer i's reservation price is lower 
than the second lowest reservation price of all the other N-1 dealers of 
which dealer i has some expectations. We can write such a probability as: 
Pr(pa. < pa. iý j) = Pr(paR. < pä ,iý 
j) = (1-G(pa ))N"1. 
(1-G(pa'l)) is the distribution function which describes the probability 
that dealer i wins the bid at pa' . which 
implies that pa'. < paR. with i#j. 
This in turn means that 12 at least one of the following conditions hold: 
I. >I. or. t <µ. 13 
The expected utility is composed of the probability of winning with n(pa'. ) 
= (1-G(paRl))N-1 and the gain from trading which is: 
EU = it(pa ;) 
[U(Q, paI) - U(O)]Q. 
The optimisation problem of dealer i is to maximize: 
max n(pa' .) 
[U(Q, pa) - U(O)]Q 
pa 
and we have [U(Q, pa. ) - U(0)] = (pad paR. )Q 
By differentiation we get the first order condition which is 14 
11The proof can be found in appendix A. 
12We assume that dealers have common degrees of risk aversions. 
13For the bid side, the probability of winning is Pr(pbl > pb) = Pr(pb'i > 
RR N1 Tb 
ý) = 
G(pb) . It also means that at least one of the following 
conditions hold: I. < I. or µl >t 
14 Mathematical methods in Chiang (1984) 
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(5n(pai)/Span )(SpaRJ5pa, )(pa. -pa 
R+ n(paR) =0 
The solution of this maximisation problem gives us reservation prices of 15 
pai = pa' .+[? R 
(21) 
paJ 
and 
Pbl = pbR. - (22 ) 
[sPb'io(x)N-1fo(pbR)N1] 
In contrast to the analysis in the previous section, we have two different 
distribution functions. In order to calculate the bid-ask spread we first 
calculate the extreme values of the distribution functions of the 
inventories and the price expectations. 
We can write the re 
i. e. inventory levels 
pRa µ"ß1+ß(Q/2), but 
dealers. To find the 
; ervation prices with respect to these two parameters, 
and price expectations, as "pRb µ-PT-(3(Q/2) and 
the last term in both equations is common to all 
limits of the distributions we have to examine the 
maximum and the minimum of the possible values which the variables can take 
on. The respective parameter ranges are illustrated in figure 2.4. below. 
I 
R 
IP min 2 
I `ý )OR 1 Pmax 
1µ 
µ1 µ2 
Figure 2.4.: Parameter ranges 
Since (Spa/Spa') >0 the highest ask quote is at the highest reservation 
ask price which is pa'. = µ2ßI1+(3(Q/2) and for the bid side we get the 
15The detailed calculation is presented in appendix A. 
97 
lowest bid price at the lowest bid reservation price which is pb' = 
t1-PI i P(Q/2). These price quotes are the extreme values which give the 
"worst" or largest spread that is possible which is not necessarily the 
market or transaction spread. 
In order to get the mean reservation spread we have to take expectations 
over the random variables in the price quote equations above. ' Our result 
shows that in a rational expectations equilibrium the mean reservation 
quotes in a fragmented market are the same as the average of the prices we 
can expect in the centralised market which is identical to the findings of 
Biais. 
In order to compare our result with the result of Biais, we also assume a 
uniform distribution of paRI and pbR. over the interval [-R, R]. 2 
Now, we have SpbRG(X)N'IdX = fpbR[(X+R)/2R]N-1dX = (1/2R)N-1 fpbR(X+R)N-1dX 
-R -R -R 
R bR 
we have (1/2R)N'1 = (1/2R)N2R and fpb (X+R)N'1 = (1/N)(X+R)N 
pI' 
which 
-R -R 
gives 
R 
(1/2R)N(2R/N)(X + R)N 
ý b' 
_ (2R/N) (1/2R)N[pb + R)]N 
_ (2R/N)[(pb r+ R)/2R] N 
Our expression from the price quote in (21) and (22) is f G(X) N- '/G(pbR) 
which gives us (1/N)(pb rN + R). Thus, 
pb, = pbR. - (1/N)(pb + R). 
If we apply the same procedure to the ask side we get 
'The proof is given in appendix A. 
2G(X)rr-1 
= [(X-(-R))/(R-(-R))]N-t = [(X + R)/2R]N-1. 
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+ (1/N)(R - paR ). pa, = paRi i 
The bid-ask spread at the extremes i. e. at the highest bid and the lowest 
ask price is 
pa, - pb. = (µl - µ2) + 2yc (Q + (Il -1 2) 
+ (1/N) 
[2R 
+ (µ2 - µl) - 2ycý(Q + (1271, ))] (23) 
If we examine the result in respect of the number of dealers, the same is 
true as in Biais' model that in the limiting case, Le. ' when N goes to 
infinity, the expression 
(pa; paR. ) .! 'RR 
(1-G(X))N-idpaRI/(1-G(paRI))N-il and also (pb. - pb' .) 
pa t. 
J 
approaches zero. Thus, in a competitive market with a large number of 
dealers, the differences among dealers get smaller and smaller and the 
spread becomes the same as in the centralised market. 
We extend our analysis to take into account the fact that the underlying 
random variable (pa' , pbR respectively) of the 
distribution function is 
actually composed of two different independent random variables which are 
the price expectations µ and the inventory positions T. In order to 
calculate the joint density of the random variables µ and T we have to 
apply the method of convolution of density functions. We assume that the 
price expectations are uniformly distributed and that the inventories have 
an exponential distribution. 
The exponential distribution in inventories ' can be explained by the 
assumption that the market consists of a large number of small private 
investors and a small number of large investors (for instance international 
banks) which creates the skewness of the distribution. 
Thus we have: 
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pb` =µ- y(ýQ - 2y&T and fµ(µ) = [1/(b-a)] with µ uniform over the 
interval [a, b]. We define A=y+µ= (-2yc2I) + µ. 
The density function of I is fI = Xe with a cumulative distribution 
function of F=f 
IV 
= -(A/l, )e'm 1-e'm on [0, -). 
00 
We can write: y= -2Yd2I on (--, O] so y has a density 
fI = (-y/2Y(ý) (1/2ya) = XeXy (1/2Y(ý) 
b 1nfaý(A µý Thus, fA(A) =S (1/b-a) ae (1/2Ycý)dµ 
a 
_ [V(b-a)](1/2Ya, 
2)e(Xnyaýa fbe( 7o )µ dµ 
2 
= [7ý/(b-a)]eý 
ß (-2YßZ/%)[-e' Yý + e12] > 0. 
Hence A is within the interval(-oe, b]. 
As we have pb` =A- yo2Q we define: 
pb(pbt) = A(pbr + Y&Q 
_ (a/b-a)e4b+YCýQM6i (2Y(ý/a, )[e' 
Xat2YC 
- e'] which is an 
exponential function. 
If we assume that both random variables have a uniform distribution we get 
a density function of the form b(B) = [(pb + yaQ)/(b-a)(4'(a2)2]. 
Under the assumption that the ranges of the two distributions are identical 
we get again a uniform distribution. 
This analysis on the underlying random variables gives us a more general 
application of the price quotes with respect to the form of the respective 
distribution function. 
2.4. Fragmented Markets and Trading in a Divisible Good 
The main difference between this analysis and the model presented in the 
previous section is that we allow for the splitting, of the order. Dealers 
know the whole order size, but they have to form some expectation about the 
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share of the order they will get since they do not know the reservation 
prices and quotes of the other dealers. The trading procedure is modeled in 
the way described below. 
pb, pa M (QCM) time 
E3 EEI E3 
(1) (2) (3) 
Figure 2.5. : Trading procedure 
At date (1) the dealers quote their prices, i. e. submit their bids which we 
denote as pbl, pb2, pb3, ..., pbN. 
After having received the bids, at date (2), a public authority d ecides how 
to share the order Q, i. e. how many shares she will distribute among the 
dealers, which determines the number of winners M. The rule of the market 
is that the investor has to share the order equally between the winners of 
the bidding procedure. The investor has to follow the rules of the market 
which restricts the possibilities of allocating the shares. Such a rule is 
known to all the participants in the market and the price quotes have to be 
public. Such a rule is required as the private investor does not have an 
incentive to share the order as for her it is optimal to give the whole 
order to the best quoting dealer and not to consider the other dealers at 
all. Hence, it will not be possible that the investor can choose the dealer 
with the best price from several possible auctions and give her the whole 
order. Finally, at date (3), the dealers get their share Q/M at their 
quoted prices. 
Such a procedure is similar to a discriminating auction described by Harris 
and Raviv (1981). In our case, dealers maximise their expected gain over 
several possible discriminating auction procedures. The auction is chosen 
by the public authority and the dealers do not know ex ante which 
discriminating auction will be held, nor whether they will be one of the 
winners in the auction. 
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2.4.1. The Basics of the Model 
We assume that the order is of size Q. There are N bidders who bid for Q/M 
of the order. However, the market makers do not know M and thus the share 
they will finally get. The N bidders (or dealers) have reservation prices 
denoted as pbRi with i=1, ..., N. Again, we assume a symmetric market and, 
this time, we consider the buying side only. 
We can write pbR. = p., - 2ya II - ya2(Q/M)] = ai - (3(Q/M) 
3 and allow ac to 
vary between dealers. In this way, we assume that market makers differ in 
their inventories and their price expectations, but that they have common 
risk aversions and hence P. The bidding price is a function of the 
reservation cost a, which we can formulate as pb. = pbi(a). 
Each dealer knows her reservation cost and assumes that each other dealer 
draws her reservation cost from the same distribution of oc with density 
function g and the cumulative distribution function of G(oc. ). The range of 
g is [-R, R]. 
If the private investor chooses M winners, each of the M best bidders get a 
share of Q/M at their own bid price. Then, the probability of being one of 
M winners if the bid is pbi is: 
Pr(pb. > pbN' Pbrr i, ..., pbx cat+i)) = 
F((x 
I, 
M) 
which means that dealer i's bid has to be higher than all N-(M+1) other 
dealers' (who are not one of the M winners) bids. The number of winners M 
can range from 1 to N which is chosen by the private investor. So the 
dealer does not know ex ante which auction is chosen by the private 
investor and hence, which share of the order she will get. 
3The reservation ask price is paRI = µ, - 2ycýI, + ya2(Q/M) = aI + 13(Q/M). 
" 102 
2.4.2. Bid and Ask Prices in Equilibrium 
We assume that the ith dealer believes that the other dealers use the 
common increasing strategy function 4 pb. = pb(a. ) for jýi. 
Now, we can derive the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. 
We assume that we have a uniform distribution for the selection of M which 
means that it is equally likely that the investor holds each of the 
possible auction types. Thus, we can say that the probability of winning 
the auction with M winners with the bid pb, is the probability that ai 
exceeds the N-M order statistic among the N-1 other bidders with M=1,.., N. 
We define y to be the N-M lowest bid of the other N-1 bidders. 
Pr[winning the bid pb. ] = pr[a. > 
= Pr[aI > ä(Nt)-fit-t)] = F(ai, M) 5 
with a being the N-M order statistic among the N-1 reservation 
costs of the other dealers and F(. ) being the cumulative distribution of 
(N-1)-(M-1) order statistic when N-1 random variables are drawn. 
We get the cumulative distribution function by considering all possible 
combinations of winning the auction with M winners, i. e. all possible draws 
made by the private investor out of the sample of N dealers, which is 
F(al, M) _E 
(') 
L 
G(a)rlG(a. )]1 *i (24) 
J 
with j= N-M, ..., N-1. 
Thus, the expected utility of a dealer is given by the probability of 
winning and the gain from trading which is 
4The proof of monotonicity is given in appendix B. 
5On the ask side, the probability of winning the bid pa. is Pr[a. <y] _ 
Pr[aI < a(N-1)-(M-1)] = Fa(ai, M) =E 
(N-1) G(a, )N-1; (1-G((xl)). 
il 
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EUB =rE F(a., M)[a. - pb. - ß(Q/M)] 
](Q/M) (25) 
LM 
with cc, =µ, -2y&IIand (3='ycý 
The expected utility on the ask side is: 
EUS =[E Fa(a1, M))[Pal - al - ß(Q/M)] 
] (QIM) (26) [M 
We can then state the optimization problem for the bid side which is 
max EU. B 
pb. 
I 
The first order condition is: 6 
E [(SF(aM)/S)(Sa/5pb 
i 
)(a - pbi -ß(Q/M))](1/M) - 7- F(a., M)(1/M) =0 
Mi, iiM 
The resulting bidding prices are 7 
pb, =r F(a,, M)[al - ß(Q/M)](1/M)/ F(a., M)(1/M) 
1 
LMaMJ 
-[f' F(X)dX(1/M)/ E F(al, M)(1/M)] (27) 
[M0MJ 
By symmetry, the ask price is: 
Pa. E (Fa(a,, M))[a, + ß(Q/M)](1/M)/ E (Fa((x., M))(1/M)] 
MM 
+rESR (Fa(X))dX(1/M)/ E (F a (ai, M))(1/M)j (28) LMa. M 
with Fa(a., M) G(a. )"-'-J(1-G(al))' being the cumulative 
ýlJ 
distribution function which gives the probability that the ask price of 
dealer i is smaller than the ask prices of all the other dealers who are 
non-winners denoted by j, i. e. Pr(pa < pa. ). 
If we compare this result with the prices of the modified Biais' model we 
can observe that our reservation prices are a weighted average over the 
possible outcomes and also the integral term is such a weighted average. 
6The second order condition is assumed to be satisfied. 
7The mathematics can be found in appendix B. 
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In order to determine which bid-ask spread is smaller we have to compare 
the price quotes for the divisible and the indivisible good case. 
The prices for trading in an indivisible good are: 
pa. d= paRI + 
[s'R(1-G(X))N-'dX/(1-G(paR1))N-1 
and 
pa 
= pbR - 
[JPbRi G(X)N'1dX/G(pbR )N-11. 
0J 
The respective prices for the divisible good case are: 
pad" =[ (Fa(aI, M))[al + ß(Q/M)](1/M)/ (Fa(alM))(1/M)l 
M 
R 
+IS (Fa(X))dX(l/M)/ I (Fa(a,, M))(l/M)1 
LMa, MJ 
pba; 
v =[ 
F(al, M)[al - ß(Q/M)](1/M)/ E F(al, M)(1/M) J MaM 
- Y, J' ' F(X)dX(1/M)/ E F(a., M)(l/M)] and LM 0MJ 
According to our hypothesis trading in a divisible good should yield a 
smaller spread than trading in an indivisible good. Risk averse dealers can 
reduce their risk exposure by trading a smaller quantity under the 
assumption of decreasing returns to scale. As a consequence, they quote a 
lower ask price and a higher bid price which results in a smaller spread. 
Thus we have to show that pa,,, < pains and/or pbd,, > pbina' 
The first term of the price quotes in the divisible good case is a weighted 
average of the reservation prices. On the bid side with a reservation price 
of pb` =a- ß(Q/M), we see that the reservation price is decreasing with a 
higher share of the market order, i. e. (Q/M). Hence, the weighted average 
price is higher than the price in Biais' model with an indivisible good. 
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pb 
pb 
Q/M with M=1,..., N-1 
M=N-1 M=1 
Figure 2.6. : Weighted average of prices 
On the ask side, we have the opposite relation between the size of the 
share and the reservation price and thus the weighted average is smaller 
than the reservation price for trading in an indivisible good. 
The direct comparison of the respective second terms of the price quotes 
will give us the sign of the expression and hence will tell us whether our 
hypothesis is confirmed. 
For our analysis we can express the second term of the price quotes for the 
NN 
divisible case as E am/Y, bM and for the indivisible case as al/b1. 
M=1 M=I 
We can write: 
Y am/Y, bM - al/b1 =[I aM/Z bM - al/bl] blj bM blY. bM 
M- 1 M- _1 
L M- _2 M=2 M=2 M=1 
We can show that our assumption is confirmed by assuming that N=2. 
The proof for the general case is given in appendix C by following the same 
line of argument as we present below. With N=2 we have: 
sign[(a2+a1)/(b2+b1) - (ai/bl)] = sign[(a2/b2) - (al/bl)]. 
By differentiating the respective probabilities of a and b for the bid side 
we get 
S/Sj r [J' G(y)'(1-G(y))N-1']/[G(ai(1-G(a))N-I-j] 
L0 
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a 
=[ [J' 
0 
G(yi(1-G(Y))N1-j][ln[G(Y)/(1-G(Y))] - ln[G(a)/(1-G(a))]]] 
/[G(a)'(1-G(a))N"1'] <0 
and we find that the ratio (alb) is decreasing in respect of N which we can 
write as 
aI/bI > a2/b2. Thus, the expression [(a2/b2) - (aI/bI)] is negative which 
confirms our hypothesis. 8 
Hence, we have established that under our set of assumptions the sharing of 
the market order reduces the bid-ask spread in a fragmented market. 
2.5. Summary and Conclusions 
In section 2.2.1. we have summarized the HS inventory control model for a 
centralised market structure (modeled as a transparent auction with 
Bertrand price competition among dealers). The resulting bid and ask prices 
are the prices of the second best dealer. These prices serve as a benchmark 
for the comparison with the other models. 
One of these models is our approach in section 2.2.2. which explains the 
bid and ask prices in a fragmented market where dealers can share the order 
between them. 
In a centralised market the ask and the bid prices are lower respectively 
higher than the HS prices and the spread is smaller due to the reduced risk 
in trading of a smaller quantity. 
An important difference to the HS model is that, in our model, the bid-ask 
spread depends on the inventory levels of the dealers also within a one 
period framework which is in accordance to the findings of O'Hara and 
8The proof for the ask side can be found in appendix C. 
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Oldfield (1986). In our case, this comes from the fact that due to their 
differences mainly in inventory there are various trading patterns possible 
if dealers can share the market order. 
In addition, we have shown that there exist several types of equilibrium 
as, for instance, we can have the situation that on the selling side two 
dealers share the market whereas on the buying side one dealer buys all of 
the order. In a fragmented market where dealers know the order size but not 
the reservation prices of their competitors the situation is different. 
We have presented the model of Biais which explains the market making in a 
fragmented market in section 2.3.. 
His model is based on the same assumptions as HS which is that the order 
goes to the best quoting dealer who serves both sides of the market. In 
addition, dealers are assumed to have constant absolute risk aversion and 
common price expectations. The resulting bid and ask spread is higher than 
the HS bid-ask spread which means that dealers face an increased risk 
exposure due to incomplete information. In a rational expectations 
equilibrium the expected prices in a fragmented market are identical to the 
average of prices which can be observed in a centralised market. However, 
if we modify Biais' model and let the price expectation vary amongst 
dealers then the result shows that the inventory levels of the dealers 
influences the bid-ask spread. 
Based on Biais' model the bid-ask spread is the same as in a centralised 
market if the number of market makers is very large. We confirm this 
finding based on our modified version. 
Our model in section 2.4. analyses the bidding behaviour of the dealers in 
the case where they cannot observe the reservation prices and the inventory 
positions of their competitors. They know the order flow, but they do not 
know the share of the order they finally will execute. An important 
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difference to Biais' model is that for a given set of quotes dealers face 
equal probabilities of winning the bid and being the sole seller (or buyer) 
or sharing the order with either one, two, or N-1 other bidders. 
We modeled such a. trading procedure as a set of discriminating auctions 
from which a private investor chooses which auction will be held and 
she also decides amongst which dealers she shares the total order. 
The findings are that, compared to Biais' results, the bid-ask spread is 
smaller as the dealer takes a weighted average over the reservation prices 
of the M best dealers. In addition we have shown that the weighted average 
over the second term of the price quote (which represents an incomplete 
information cost) is smaller than in Biais' model which indicates that the 
risk is reduced by sharing the market order. 
The analysis of the bid and ask prices in a centralised and a fragmented 
market includes the analysis about the decision of how to structure and how 
to organise a market. 
First, the market organised as an auction may be socially more favourable 9 
than a pure dealership market where dealers have incomplete information 
about market trading which gives the private investor a more powerful 
position in the trading process. 
Second, based on the characteristics of the traders, i. e. whether there are 
institutional private investors who would like to trade large quantities, 
the auction rules, such as how to share an incoming order, may be an 
important factor in determining the equilibrium prices and hence the 
equilibrium bid-ask spread. 
The conclusion based on above findings is that the design of markets is 
important and influences the bid-ask spread. We have shown that a market 
9 in the Pareto sense 
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designed as an auction with the rule that the order is split in equal parts 
between the best quoting dealers is socially superior to an auction where 
the whole order is allocated to the best quoting dealer. We have given 
evidence that this is true in a centralised and in a fragmented market. 
However, our analysis is based on trading in one risky asset only. If we 
extend the analysis to several assets or to several different markets the 
outcome may be different. 
This problem will be investigated in the subsequent chapters. 
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APPENDIX A 
1. Bidding Price for an Indivisible Good: 
We assume that dealers have different inventories and different price 
expectations: 
We define [U(Q, pa. ) - U(O)]Q = (pa. -pa 
R. )Q and the probability of winning 
the bid is n(paRI) = (1-G(paRI))N'1. 
The optimisation problem of dealer i is to maximize 
max n(paRI)[U(Q, paI) - U(0)] Q. 
pa 
By differentiation we get the first order condition which is 
(8n(paRi)/5paRi)(5paRI/5paý)(paI -pa 
Ri) + ir(paRi) =0 
(sn(paR. )/Spal. )pa. + [lr(paR. )I(SpaR. /Spa. )] = paRi(Sn(paR. )/SpaR. ) 
which we can rewrite as 
(ö r(paRI)/Bpa', )paI + 7C(pe)(5paI/8paR1) = pa'I(&r(pa' . 
)/Span. ) which is 
S/Span. [ n(paRI)pa, 
] 
= paRI(Sn(paRi)/SpaRi) 
Next, we are integrating 10 
1c(paR; )pa, 
RR 
=f 
RR 
paR, (S? C(paR. )/5paRl) +C (where C is a constant) 
pa pa 
First we have to evaluate C at pa'. =R 
J, 
R 
paR. [S(1-G(paR))N-1/6paRIISpaR; = Pa' 7r IRR - 1RR n6PaR; +C 
pa pa pa 
with n(R) = (1-G(R)) N-1 we have n(R) =0 and ir(paR) _ (1-G(paRI))N-1 we 
get 
10 The integration is in the interval [0, R] where R is a real number. 
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= paR n(0) - paR. [(1-G(paR. ))N-1 ]- [paR lr(0) - [paR (1-G(paR"))N-1] = 0. 
Hence the RHS is zero and so is C. 
Thus, we have: 
RR 
npa. (paR. ) IR=1R paR. (Sn(paR. )/Span, ) 
Pa Pa 
By integrating by parts we obtain 
7c(PaR1)Pal(P4 
ýý 
RR= 
PaR; 7t(PaR 
R 
,)(R-RfR 
71(PaR; )SPaR; 
Pa pa pa 
pan(0) - pa. (1-G(paRI))N-i] _ paRl[n(0)-(1-G(paRI))N-1] 
-fRR (1-G(X))N-1dX which is 
pa 
- pa. (1-G(paR. ))N-1) = pa'. (-(1-G(paR. ))N-i) - , 
paR(1-F(X))N-1dX 
0 
by multiplying by -1 and dividing by (1-G(paR. ))N-1 we finally get 
pa, = paR. + fa 
R 
(1-G(X))N-1 dX/(1-G(PaRI))N-I 
01 
2. Proof of Monotonicity: 
From our result we know that pb. > pbR. and that the price quote is a 
function of the reservation price. 
The first order condition of the optimisation problem is: 
[6 (PbR. )/SPbR. ][SPbR/5Pb. ](pbR. - pb) - n(pbRi) =. 0 
n(pbRi) = Pr(pbR. > max pbR) = G(pbR. )N-1 and we define 
G(pbRi)N-1 = H(pbR, ) 
[Sn(PbR. )/SpbR. ] [SpbR, /Spb. ] = [SH(PbR. )/SpbR. ] (1/Pb. ' ) 
with pb. ' being the derivative of pbi with respect to pbR. we get 
[SH(pbR. )/SpbR. ](pbR. - pb, )(1/pb. ') + H(pb' .)=0 which 
is 
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[öH(pbR; )/SpbR; l(pbR - pbI)(l/pb; ') H(pbR. ) after rearranging we get 
Pb, ' [öH(pbR; )/SpbR; li(pbR; )(pbR; - pb 
The sign of Pb, ' is positive as the expression in the first bracket is 
positive and the expression in the last bracket is negative. Hence the 
price quote is an increasing function of the reservation price. Q. E. D. 
3. Expectations in the Fragmented Market: 
We prove that the expected prices in the fragmented market are the same as 
the average of the prices in a centralised market 11, i. e. that 
w* pbR 
E(pbR 
N-1ý 
E 
(pb' 
N- 
[J. 
-R 
N G(x)N ldx]/G(pbR 
N) 
N-1) 
We define pbR as the highest reservation price with the cumulative 
distribution function HN(. ). We have HN(pbR) = G(pbR)''. The expected value 
R 
of pbR is E(pbR N) = .fR pbR 
d(G(pbR)N) (Al) 
If we integrate by parts we get: 
E(pbR 
N) = 
[pbR G(pbR)N I 
RR 
- 1RR G(pbR)rr dpbR 
R 
=R-fR G(pbR)x dpbR (A2) 
The next best, i. e. the second best dealer is j= N-1. The c. d. f. of her 
reservation price is HN 1(. 
) such that HN 1(x) = 
NG(x)N-1 - (N-1)G(x)N. 
The expectation of the second highest reservation price is 
E(pbRN-I) = J'_R xdHN-i(x). 
Integrating by parts yields: 
11 We follow the proof of Biais pp. 76 ff. 
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RR 
E(pbRN_1) _ [xHN-1 (X) IR S- R 
HN_1(x)dx which is 
R 
E(pbRN-1 )=R+fR ((N-1)G(x)N -NG(x)N-')dx (A3) 
This proof shall establish that: 
" 
R 
pb 
E(pbR 
N-i) =E 
(pbR 
N- 
Es- 
RN 
G(x)N-'dx]/G(pbR 
N)N-') 
(A4) 
We have: 
R 
E (- [J ", N G(x)N"'dx]/G(pbR*N)N"1) 
R 
rw 
_- [J, R 
NG(x)N'1d (pbR 
N)N4](dG(PbR N)N) 
/ R /M/ 
N f-R [; 
b N G(X)N idX]g(pbR 
N)dpbR N with 
dGN = gGN-1dpbR N 
If we integrate by parts, this results in: 
R 
RR 
-N L(S-R 
N G(X)N-1dx G(pbR*N) I 
-R 
- . 
TR G(pbR4N)N-1 G(pbR*N)dpbR*N] 
which is 
-NI , TRR 
G(x)N"'dx - 1-R G(x)Ndx] 
Using (A2) and (A2a) we get: 
bR R 
E 
(pb RN- [j'p N G(X)N-1dx]/G(pbR 
NN-1) =R+f -R 
[(N-I)F(X)N 
- NF(x)N-1I dx = E(pbR N-1 
) 
Q. E. D. 
(A2a) 
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APPENDIX B 
1. Calculation of the Bidding Price for a Divisible Good in a Fragmented 
Market: 
The expected utility for the bid side is : 
EU =I [F(a., M)[a. - ß(Q/M) - pb. ](Q/M) with a. = µ. - y&I. and ß= y62. 
M 
The optimisation problem is max EUB 
p b. 
I 
The first order condition is: 
E [(SF(aI M)/5(Xl)(5a1/8pbl)[aI - ß(Q/M) - p-b; ](1/M) +Z F(al, M)(l/M) =0 
Mm 
E [(SF(a., M)/Sa. )(Sa. /Spb. )( a. - ß(Q/M))(1/M) 
-E [(5F(a., M)/5a. )(5(X/5pb. )pb. ](1/M) -E F((x., M)(1/M) =0 
M, iiim 
by dividing through (5ocJ8pb. ) we can rewrite it as 
E [(SF(a., M)/S(x 
1 . 
)pb 
1. 
](1/M) +E F(a'., M)(8pbI/8(X . 
)(1! M) _ 
MM 
I [(SF(a., M)/Sai)( ai - ß(Q/M)](1/M) which is 
E (8/5a. )[F(a., M)P-b, ](1/M) =E [(SF(a., M)/Sai)( a. - ß(Q/M)](1/M) 
MM 
Next, we are integrating 12 
a. a. 
E [F(a., M)pb. ](1/M) =E [f ' a. 1 (SF(a., M)/Sabi)da. ](1/M) +C M'I0M0 
-E [(SF(ai, M)/Sa, ) (3(Q/M)] (1/M) (where C is a constant) 
M 
If we integrate the first term on the RHS by parts we get 
a. a. 
[F(a., M)pb. I' ](1/M) _ a. [F(a., M) I' ](1/M) 
M''0M''0 
12The integral is over [0, a. ]. 
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a. a. 
-I [. f ' F(X) dX] (1/M) +C-F. [F(a, M) I' ß(Q/M)](1/M) 
M0M10 
First we have to evaluate C at a. = 0: 
a. 
E[fa. (SF(a., M)/Sab 
1 . 
)da. 
1] 
(1/M) 
M0 
a. a. 
=Ea. [F(a. 1 M) I' ](1/M) -E [f 
' F(X) dX](1! M) +. C which is 
M0M0 
Z[F(a., M)a. ] (1/M) = E[F(a., M)a. ] (1/M) 
MI1Mi 
- 7, [F(a., M)a. ](1/M) +C which results in (with F(O) = 0) 
M 
F. (0)a. - (0)a. =0 and so is the RHS. Hence, also C is zero at a. = 0. 
Mii1 
Thus, we have: 
a. a. 
[F(a., M)Pb. I' ](UM) =Ea. [F(a., M) I' ](1/M) 
M'0M'0 
a. a. 
-E [S ' F(X) dX](1/M) -E [F(a,, M) I' ß(Q/M)](1/M) 
M0M0 
E [F(a., M)pb 
i 
](1/M) = 7, [F(a., M)( a. - ß(QIM)](l/M) 
MM 
a 
- [f ' F(X) dX](1/M) 
M0 
and finally: pb. =I [E(cc, M)( a. - ß(Q/M)](1/M)/E [F(a., M)(1/M) 
a. 
- [f F(X) dX](1/M)/E [F(a,, M)(1/M) 
M0M 
By following the same procedure, the ask price is: 
pa, =E [(Fa(a1, M))( a1 + ß(Q/M)](1/M)/E [(Fa(a1, M))(1/M) 
MM 
R 
+Ma (Fa(X)) dX] (1/M)/M [(F, (ai, M))(1IM) 
I 
with Fa(a., M) =E 
(N1t) G(a. )"'1 j(1-G(al))' 
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2. Proof of the Monotonicity of the Bidding Function: 
We conduct the proof for the bid side. 
We rewrite the price quote of (27) as 
pb =E F(a, M)(1/M)pbR 
]i[ E F(a, M)(1/M) 
LMM 
+[ Y, (1/M), faF(a, M)dyl/r E F(a, M)(1/M) 
M -R 1LMJ 
with M=1,..., N 
The derivative of the price quote with respect to the reservation price, 
resp. a (with pbR = (x - (3(Q/M)) is 
Spb/Sa =r (E (1/M)(5F/Sa)pbR)(E (1/M)F) - (E (1/M)(5F/&t))(Z (1! M)FpbR)] LMMMM 
1 /[(E (1/M)F)2 
MJ 
+[(I (l/M), TaF(y)dy)(E (1/M)(5F/Sa))] / [(Y_ (1/M)F)2] (A5) 
LM -R Ml LM J 
with F(a, M) =E [(N-1)! /(N-l-j)! j! ]G((x)' 
[1_G(a)]Nand 
F>0, (SF/5a) > 0. 
We want to prove that the price quote is an increasing function in the 
reservation price. The second term in (A5) is composed of probabilities 
only and it is evident that this expression is positive. Thus, it is 
sufficient to show that the first term of (A5) is zero or positive. in order 
to establish the proof. 
Next, we substitute the values of the probabilities into our expression 
which is 
2; (j-(N-1)G) (SF/5a) =E [(N-1)! /(N-l-j)! j! ]gG(a)'-1 
[l_ci(a)] N 
where g is the derivative of G with respect to a. 
MMMM 
1 /[(E (1/M)F)2 
MJ 
+[(Z (1/M)faF(y)dy)(E (1/M)(SF/5a))] / 
[(y (1/M)F)21 (A5) 
LM -R Ml LM J 
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(SF/5a) = gE [(N-1)! /(N-1 j)! j! ]j G(cc'-' 
[1_G(a)]2i 
- g[(N-1)F]/(1-G) 
We define KM = [(N-1)! /(N-1 j)! j! ]j G(a)ý"1 
[lG(a)]21 
and thus 
(SF/5a) = gKM - g[(N-1)F]/(1-G) (A6) 
Now we use the numerator of the first term of (A5) (which we denote as F5) 
and (A6) and we get: 
F5 = [E (1fM)(gKM - g[(N-1)F]/(1-G))PbR][E (1/M)F] 
M 
- [E (1/M)(gKM - g[(N-1)F]/(1-G))][E (1fM)FPbR] 
MM 
= [E (1fM)gKMPbR][Z (1/M)F] - [E (1fM)g[(N-1)F/(1-G)]PbR][E (1/M)F] 
MMMm 
- [E (l/M)gKM] [E (1fM)FpbR] + [E (1fM)g[(N-1)F/(1-G)]] [E (1fM)FpbR] 
MMMM 
= [Y, (1IM)gKMPb' ][E (1IM)F] - g[(N-1)/(1-G)]Y, (1/M)FPbR][ , (1/M)F] MMMM 
- [E (11M)gKM][E (1IM)FPbR] + g[(N-1)/(1-G)]E (1IM)FPbR][E (1/M)F] 
MMMM 
F5 = [E (1/M)gKMpbR][E (1/M)F] - [E (1/M)gKM][E (1/M)FpbR] 
MMMM 
We can write K. as: 
F=ES, and KM =ES j[1/G(1-G)] and pbR =a- ß(Q/M) 
We make the respective substitutions and get: 
F5 =rY, (1/M)g{E S. j[1/G(1-G)}[a - ß(Q/M)]l[E (1/M)F] LMiJM 
-[E (1)b{E S. 1[1/G(1-G)}1[E (1/M)F[a - ß(Q/M)]] 
MjJM 
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= [gßQ/G(1-G)] 
[ [E (11M)E S. 
1 J](a - 
(1/M))[E (l/M)F] 
MjM 
- [E (1/M)E S. j] [E (1/M)F(a - (1/M))], 
MjýM 
_ [gßQ/G(1-G)] 
[ [E (1/M)E b. j][E (1ýM2)F] - [E (1 
2)E s J][E (1/M)F]J 
MjmMjm 
We know that F=ES which we substitute into above equation and this is 
F5 = [gßQ/G(1-G)] 
[[(1/M) E S. j][E E S. (1fM2)] 
Mjimji 
- [E(1/M2)E S. J][E (1/M)E 5.1] 
MjýMjý 
We can write the terms of the sequences as follows: 
F5 = [g3Q/G(1-G)] 
[[(1/1)SN_t(N-1)+(1/2)(SN 
2(N-2)+5N_1(N-1))+... 
] 
[(1/1)8 
N-1+(1I4)(5 N: 1+ 
5 
N-2)+(l/9)(5 N-1+5N-2+5N-3)+... 
] 
-[(1/1)5 N-1(N-1)+(114)(8N 1(N-1)+5 N-2(N-2))+(1/9)(5 N 1(N-1)+8 N-2(N-2))+.. 
] 
[(1/1)5 
N-i 
+(1/2)(5 
N-1+5N-2)+(1/3) 
(SN- 
I+5N-2+8N-3)+... 
] 
=0 
Hence F5 equals zero and we have proven that the price function is 
monotonic and increasing in the reservation price for the bid side. 
Q. E. D. 
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APPENDIX C 
1. Comparison of the Integral Terms: 
Comparison of the integral terms ("information cost term"): 
The difference of the integral terms for the divisible good case and the 
indivisible good case can be written as 
NN 
E aj/E bM - aI/bl. We want to show that this expression is <0 which 
M=1 M=1 
should be valid for both sides of the market. 
We defined 
NNNNNN 
E am/Y, bM - a11b1 =rEa JE bM - al/bll b1E bM/bll bM 
M=1 M=1 L M=2 M=2 J M=2 M=1 
We have shown that aM/bM is decreasing on the bid side. On the ask side we 
get: 
R 
S/Sj =[ [J' G(Y)N-1-j(1-G(Y)il/[G(a)N-1'(1-G(a))'l] 
a 
'R _[ [J G(Y)N-'-i(1-G(Y))ý][1n[(1-G(Y))/G(y)] - ln[(1-G(a))/G(a)]]) 
a 
/[G(a)N-1"'( 1-G(a)? '] <0 
which means that the ratio is also decreasing on the ask side. 
In the general case with M=1, ..., N we have 
(al/bl) > (a2/b2) > (a3/b3) > ... > (aN-l/bN i) > 
(aN/bN). 
We can now formulate the problem for M= 1, ... N as follows: 
NNNN1NN 
am/Y, 
= 
bM - al/bl =IE aM/s bM - a1/b1] bll bM/bIY bM 
M=1 M1 M=2 M=2 M=2 M=1 
=L (E am/Y- bM - a2/b2) + (a2/b2 - a1/b1), E býE bM M_ _2 M_ =2 M=2 M=1 
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NNNNNN 
Za 
m/1 
bM - a2/b2 )E b m/1 
bM + (a2/b2 - a1/b1)l E bM/ bM 
M=3 M=3 M=3 M=2 J M=2 M=1 
_ (E aM/E bM - a2/b2 )E b/E bM + (a2/b2 - al/bl)1 E_ bE bM which 
M=3 M=3 M=3 M=1 J M=2 M=1 
is equivalent to: 
NNNNNN 
= (Z aM/s bM - a3/b3 )Z bM/E bM + (a3/b3 - a2/b2)1: bM/ bM 
M=3 M=3 M=3 M=1 M=3 M=1 
NN 
+ (a 2/b2 - al/bl) 
II bMI bM and next we have 
M=2 M=1 
= L( 
am/7, bM - a3%b3 )2: bM 
E bM, bM ` bM 
M=4 M=4 M=4 M=3 M=3 M=1 
+ (a3lb3 - a2/b2)E bM/E bM + (a/b2 - a1/b1)lI bMI bM 
M=3 M=1 J M=2 M=1 
which we can write as: 
= I1 
[(aN-kIbN-k) 
- (aN-k-1fbN-k-1), 
7 bi / I1 bk 
- 
k _-0 i _N-k k_1 
Knowing that the ratios aMIbM are decreasing we can determine the sign of 
the last expression which is smaller than zero. Hence we showed that our 
hypothesis is true also for the general case. 
Q. E. D. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTERACTION OF SPOT AND FUTURES MARKETS: 
THE THEORY OF STORAGE, FORECAST POWER, 
AND RISK PREMIUMS 
122 
3.1. Introduction 
In recent years we have experienced a fast change in the markets whether 
these may be production or financial markets. Such changes of, for 
instance, market mechanisms or market structure were caused by changes in 
production technology, and the growing concern about the increasing risk of 
trading due to high price volatility. Information as such gets more and 
more important in order to remain competitive in this ever changing 
environment. 
In general, in such markets, the risk is increased by the high price 
volatility and the need for insurance is growing. 
The above scenario may be a reason of the existence and the importance of 
futures markets. Trading in futures started a long time ago primarily in 
agricultural commodities. Since then, the volume of trading in futures is a 
multiple of what it was at the beginning and there is a variety of 
commodities and markets for futures trading today. With the increase of 
trading in futures and the innovation of other financial instruments the 
financial market place gets more complicated and the interaction of the 
different markets whether spot, futures, or options, is quite 
complex. 
An important part of the concern of people is the pervasive role of 
speculation. Nevertheless, it is accepted that futures market provide a 
hedging opportunity for the price risk of commodities [Cootner (1960), 
Houthakker (1968), Telser (1958) and others]. If we take speculation into 
account the cost of hedging may be affected by speculators in the market. 
The question of whether the cost of hedging is increased or decreased with 
speculators in the market is not resolved yet. 
Anderson and Danthine (1983) provide an interesting analysis of the role 
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and influence of the various participants in the futures market and the 
influence of trading on the prices. Another argument 'is that of asymmetry 
of information in the- market. The most prominent model in this respect is 
the model of Kyle (1985). Kumar and Seppi (1992) used Kyle's model and 
examined the problem of manipulating prices by traders who have superior 
information and who trade in the spot and the futures markets. Their 
results are that informed traders make positive profits. In addition, their 
findings are that manipulation generates liquidity transfers from the 
futures market to the cash market which benefit the informed traders and 
the spot noise traders. 
However up-to-date, there exist a few papers only analysing the influence 
of futures trading on the spot market bid-ask spread. For example the paper 
by Holden (1990) which is referred to in Tuckman and Villa (1992). Very 
little is known about the effects or spill overs from other markets on the 
spot market bid-ask spread. The interaction of markets has not yet been 
analysed in respect of effects on trading strategies of market makers and 
the influence on the cost of trading. This will be the subject of the 
subsequent chapter. 
This chapter contains an overview of all the relevant issues related to 
futures trading and the respective influence of it on the spot market 
prices. In section 3.2., we start with a historical summary of the 
evolution of futures markets and the early studies of the relation between 
futures and spot market prices (backwardation and contango). 
It also includes a description of the various theories of the term 
structure of interest rates. Based on such early work, several theories 
have evolved which are described in the subsequent sections which are: in 
section 3.3. the theory of storage, in section 3.4. the concept of risk 
premium, and in section 3.5. the forecast power of prices. 
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The latter section gives the basis for the next theoretical chapter. In 
section 3.5.1., we analyse the model of Anderson and Danthine (1983) which 
explains the determinants of the spot market price considering the 
influence of futures trading. 
We summarise some empirical studies about futures trading in section 3.6. 
and the conclusions are given in the final section 3.7. . 
3.2. The Evolution of Futures Markets 
The beginning of futures or better forward markets (as a forerunner of 
futures markets) has taken place with agricultural commodities. 
Let us consider a merchant who ships grain abroad. She knows that the 
payment is made upon delivery of the commodity when the ship arrives let 
say in three months time. We also assume that the price for grain varies a 
lot and therefore, the merchant prefers to fix the price for the commodity 
already today rather than in three months time. She would even be prepared 
to lower the current price and sell the grain at a price below the current 
price in order to avoid the price risk involved of waiting until the 
delivery date. 
On the other side, there may be a miller who wants to buy grain and she is 
willing to fix the price today for delivery of the commodity in three 
months time, again, the reason is to avoid any price risk. The instrument 
which has been created to meet such a demand and supply is a forward 
contract. 
Such a forward contract is an agreement between a seller and a buyer that 
calls for the seller to deliver to the buyer a specified quantity and grade 
(quality) of an identified commodity, at a fixed time in the future, and at 
a price agreed to when the contract is first entered into. 
125 
It is, of course, not very likely that a seller (also called short hedger) 
and a buyer (called a long hedger) meet at the same time demanding and 
supplying the identical commodity for the same delivery date. 
Therefore, a middleman takes the role of matching demand and supply by 
assuming the price risk and also the default risk. There is a third type of 
participant in the market, a speculator. The speculator expects to make a 
profit from the variation in the price. She is not interested in the 
physical delivery of the merchandise. She trades a forward contract today 
and offsets the position by trading the opposite contract at maturity. 
3.2.1. Institutional Aspects 
Forward markets have developed for several agricultural commodities, but 
for some commodities, the implementation of a forward market failed. The 
reason of such failure could be that the underlying commodity was not 
readily and continuously available to write enough forward contracts and to 
keep the market liquid. Another reason may be that the price variance was 
too small in order to create the need for risk layoff. In addition, with a 
small price variance, the speculator is not willing to participate in the 
market and hence, the market is less liquid. 
In order to make the forward market more liquid and to facilitate the 
trading the forward contracts were standardized. These standardized 
contracts, called futures contracts, are traded at organized exchanges 
which are regulated. The contracts are of fixed size and they have standard 
maturity dates. The qualities of the commodity are agreed and standardized 
as well. Payments are made in form of margins which have to be paid when a 
contract is traded. 
The middlemen (or brokers) do not have to deal with the default risk of all 
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the various market participants, because all the trades are done through a 
clearing house. The clearing house can be part of the futures exchange body 
or it can be a totally separate entity. All futures trades occurring at the 
exchange are reported to the clearing house. 
Each "member firm" who is allowed to trade with the floor broker (who 
execute the order 1 at the exchange) has an account with the clearing 
house. After the trades are reported to the clearing house, each member 
firm is requested to pay the margin requirements according to the balance 
of the account. An initial margin has to be paid upon trading a futures 
contract and a variation margin has to be paid which is calculated and 
adjusted on a daily basis. 
The settlement of a futures contract can be done in different ways. Among 
other possibilities there is the physical delivery of the commodity at 
maturity. Another way is "offsetting" which means that the liquidation of 
the open futures position is to effect an offsetting futures position which 
is the reverse of the initial transaction. The latter is the most common 
one today. The question of regulating the futures market is still not 
resolved, but it is agreed that due to the high leverage and risk in the 
market there could be notorious defaults by traders who are unable to 
fulfill their commitments. In order to create liquid markets futures 
exchanges are regulated. There are, for example, centralized trading in a 
limited number of contracts, and clearing associations guaranteeing 
contract performance (based on the system of margin requirements, capital 
requirements, and mark-to-market accounting procedures). 
'There are different kinds of orders which can be given at an exchange. We 
do not discuss the differences of these orders as for our analysis we 
always consider the market order only. 
127 
3.2.2. The Imbalance of Hedging 
In this section, we are concerned with the question of whether and why a 
difference arises between the current spot price at time T and the futures 
price of a maturing contract at time T (called the "basis"). Under the 
assumption of rational expectations of the market participants we would 
expect that in equilibrium the spot price at time T equals the futures 
price at T for a futures contract maturing at T. 
In our example above, we described the situation of a merchant who is 
willing to sell the commodity today - rather than to wait until the ship 
arrives in three months time. The only problem which exists is that the 
merchant has to find someone who is willing to buy exactly this quantity 
and at this quality level. Hence, the terms of the contracts have to be 
identical. 
Therefore, let us assume that the participants in our example prefer to 
trade standardised contracts which are easier to trade. Hence, we consider 
the trades in a futures market rather than in a forward market. 
It may be that there is an imbalance of the short hedgers and the long 
hedgers in the futures market 2 then the futures price will be different. 
One case is that if a speculator 3 expects that the current futures price 
will be higher in three months time compared to the futures price of today 
then she will buy a futures contract. If the expectation of the speculator 
is correct and we assume that the spot price remains about the same for 
2Short hedgers commit to sell an asset at a future point in time whereas 
long hedgers agree to buy. Both carry inventories of the commodity. 
3A speculator is defined to be a trader who does not hold any physical 
stock of the commodity and her interest is purely in price differences. 
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this period then we have the situation that in three months time the future 
spot price is below the futures price at that point in time (which is the 
price agreed between the speculator and the merchant). This situation where 
the futures price of a maturing contract is above the spot price is called 
contango. 
In the other case the speculator will sell a futures contract if she 
expects the future futures price to be lower than the current futures 
puce. 
Hence, if the expectation of the speculator is correct the futures price of 
a maturing contract is below the future spot price at this future point in 
time. This situation is called backwardation. 
Empirical studies about spot and futures prices reveal that, generally, the 
situation of backwardation is observed in the market. 
One reason for this finding is that hedgers hold large inventories and 
therefore the short hedgers are predominant which results in backwardation. 
Thus, under "normal" conditions the spot price is above the futures price 
because hedgers who are risk averse and hold large . 
inventories would like 
to hedge their inventories, i. e. go short in futures. 
To make it attractive for speculators to be long in futures the futures 
price has to be below the cash price. This fact has been recognized already 
by Keynes (1930) and has been pointed out by Hicks (1939) as follows: 
In "normal" conditions, when demand and supply conditions are expected to 
remain unchanged, and therefore the spot price is expected to be about the 
same in a month's time as it is today, the future price for one month's 
delivery is bound to be below the spot price now ruling. The difference 
between these two prices (the current spot price and the currently fixed 
futures price) is called by Mr Keynes 'normal backwardation'. 
(Hicks, 1939, pp. 138) 
The existence of normal backwardation was examined further by Houthakker 
(1968). He examined the imbalance of hedging in detail. 
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He argues that in a market without any hedgers and only with speculators 
such a bias between spot and futures prices cannot exist. A bias arises 
where hedgers are in the market whose position in the futures market is 
balanced by an opposite position in the cash market. 
In order to have a situation of normal backwardation, i. e. that the spot 
price is above the futures price, hedgers must be net short, so that 
speculators will be net long. But the fact that, in general, hedgers are 
net short in the futures market has first to be proven. The Keynes/Hicks 
theory does not give any satisfactory answer to that problem. 
One argument is that the producer of a commodity needs to look much further 
ahead than the consumer and Hicks argued that the entrepreneur is less 
constrained by the acquisition of inputs than by the completion of the 
output. Hence, the hedge of planned purchases is less important than the 
hedge of planned sales. 
However, this argument is not valid for merchants who are independent of 
any technological considerations and who are the middlemen in most futures 
markets. 
Telser (1958) argued that competition and free market entry result in 
reducing the difference between spot and futures price, even bringing it 
down to zero upon expiration of the futures contract. 
This statement has been criticized by Cootner (1960). He rejected the 
assumption of Telser that the "net open position" (X) of maturing futures 
of a speculator becomes infinite whenever the futures price falls below the 
expected spot price, i. e. X- oo when (p-p')<O (p=futures price at time T, 
p'=weighted average spot price expected by speculators at time T). 
By introducing time preferences of speculators the demand of speculators 
for futures would not be infinite anymore when the futures price falls 
below the spot price. The time preference acts as a transaction cost and 
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speculators would trade only if the difference between the future spot and 
the future futures price is large enough to give them an adequate return 
which means that the return should be at least as high as the adequate rate 
of interest of an alternative investment. 
This argument leads us to the phenomenon of the term structure of interest 
rates. 
3.2.3. The Term Structure of Interest Rates 
The term structure of interest rates describes the relationship between 
interest rates and loan maturity or in other words the relationship between 
the yield-to-maturity and the maturity of a given fixed-income security. 
The usual way of presentation of the term structure is by a plot of the 
yields on default free government securities with different terms to 
maturity, at a given moment in time. Another expression for this 
yield-maturity relationship is the yield curve. 
From such a yield curve we can see, for instance, that the annual interest 
rate of a security is not the same for each year. 
The level and the shape of a yield curve may change even from day to day 
which depends mainly on economic factors. Normally, a security with short 
term maturity carries a lower return than a security with long term 
maturity which results in an upward sloping yield curve. However, the yield 
curve may also be downward sloping or almost horizontal. 
There exist three theories which explain the term structure or the 
relationship between the short term and the long term interest rates: the 
expectations theory, the liquidity preference theory, and the market 
segmentation theory. 
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The expectation theory : 
The expectation theory seems to be the dominant theory of the term 
structure and it says that the expected futures interest rate on a long 
term bond is the same as the observed short term forward rates on a bond 
over the same period. Usually, it is assumed that the investors are risk 
neutral and that under this assumption, the outcome of investing in a long 
term bond is equivalent to investing in a short term bond which will be 
rolled over (renewed for another period) until the same maturity date is 
reached as under the long term bond investment. These two investment 
strategies should give the same return at the end of the period. However, 
due to uncertainty and fluctuation of the interest rates there arise 
arbitrage opportunities which are exploited by professional investors. 
We give a simple example to illustrate the situation '. 
We assume that an investor has the choice to buy either a two year bond of 
£ 100 with a yield of 9 percent per year or a one year bond with a yield of 
8 percent per year. She can then reinvest at the end of one year the £ 108 
in another one year bond. The end of the period yields (Y) of the two cases 
are: 
case one (two year bond): Y=£ 100 (1.09)(1.09) =£ 118.81. 
case two : This yield depends on the investor's expected future rate on the 
one year bond for the second year denoted E(r). 
Y=£ 100 (1.08)[1 + E(r2)] 
According to the expectation theory E(r2) is: 
£118.81 =£ 108[1 + E(r2)] which is 1+ E(r2) = 1.1001 and we get 
E(r2) = 0.1001 = 10.01 % 
4The example is taken from Weston and Copeland (1988) 
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Hence, the current future rate is used to infer the "future" forward rate 
(in our case the forward rate of the second year). If, for instance, the 
actual observed one year forward rate in the second year is 10.5 % the 
investor would be better off to invest in the one year bond than in the two 
year bond which gives a lower pay-off. Hence, the expectation theory 
predicts that market competition forces forward rates to be equal to 
expected future rates over the same period. 
When the long term future rates are above the short term forward rates then 
we have an upward sloping yield curve and short term interest rates are 
expected to rise. The downward sloping yield curve implies that the futures 
rates are below the forward rates and thus, the short term interest rates 
are expected to fall. In reality, yield curves are very often upward 
sloping which is not explained by the expectation theory. We have to 
analyse the term structure within a different environment which is the done 
in the next description of the liquidity preference or liquidity premium 
theory. 
The liquidity preference theory : 
The expectation theory is modified by taking into account the uncertainty 
inherent in the future. With uncertainty the investor prefers to buy a 
short term bond rather than a long term bond. This can be explained by the 
fact that the short term bond is more liquid and the near future seems to 
be easier to predict than the long term future. Hence, a liquidity premium 
must be paid to the investor to induce her to buy a long term bond. 
On the other hand, the borrower is interested in long term borrowing as the 
longer the period the lower the risk of having to repay at an unfavourable 
moment in time under averse conditions. Thus, the borrower is also prepared 
to pay a risk premium to the investor for long term bonds. 
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Therefore, the yield curve is not flat anymore under constant expected 
returns, but upward sloping. We can say that we have an upward biased yield 
curve under the expectation theory. However, it seems that there is still 
another influence on. the term structure of interest rates which is the 
market segmentation hypothesis. 
The market segmentation hypothesis : 
This theory is also called the hedging pressure theory. The assumption 
implied in the expectation theory is that the investor is indifferent 
between the short term bond and the long term bond, except for any 
differences of expected yield based on maturity. 
The liquidity preference theory assumes that investors prefer short term 
bonds and borrowers favour long term bonds due to the uncertainty involved. 
The market segmentation theory argues that there exist some investors, for 
example insurance companies, who prefer long term investment due to their 
long term liabilities. Also in case of the borrowers, they adjust their 
borrowing requirements according to the maturity structure of their assets. 
Thus, the market is segmented with participants who exhibit strong maturity 
preferences whith each maturity as a separate segment. The market 
segmentation theory implies that the bonds with different maturities are 
not substitutes and the expectations play no role. 
Researchers agree that all these different theories are important to 
explain the term structure of interest rate. 
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of the interaction of markets on 
the prices. Today, we can divide the theory about futures markets into 
three major categories which we just briefly summarize. We will analyze 
them in detail thereafter. One of them is the theory of storage. It 
analyses the role of the futures market which provides an opportunity to 
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manage risk and hedge a commodity position which has been acquired in the 
cash market. The marginal cost of hedging includes the interest forgone, 
for the period between purchase and sale, the marginal warehousing cost, 
and the marginal convenience yield. This theory contradicts the notion of 
"normal backwardation". Hedgers are always prepared to reduce the risk of 
their inventory position by accepting that the current futures sale price 
is lower than the current spot sale price. 
A different aspect of the futures market is that of risk shifting. Through 
futures markets hedgers are able to shift some of the risk involved of 
holding a position to speculators who are willing to take that risk. The 
futures price is a composite of the price expectation and a risk premium 
which the hedger pays to be able to shift the risk to the speculator. 
Another view is the discovery role of futures prices which examines the 
forecast power of futures prices and how far futures prices improve the 
information available in the cash market. There exists a separate strand of 
papers examining the information aggregation process in a rational 
expectations equilibrium. However, we restrict our analysis to the 
determinants of cash and futures prices by examining the role of the 
different agents in the market, particularly the speculators who convey 
information into the market place. 
3.3. The Theory of Storage 
All concepts mentioned above try to explain the difference between the 
current spot price and the futures price, i. e. the spot price at time t and 
the maturing futures contract price at time t. Throughout our analysis, we 
assume, unless it is mentioned otherwise, that market participants are risk 
averse. 
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The early works about the theory of storage are Keynes (1930), Kaldor 
(1939), Hicks (1946), Working (1948), Brennan (1958), Telser (1958), and 
Cootner (1960). 
The theory of storage predicts that the total return from a purchase of a 
commodity at t and selling it for delivery at T equals the interest forgone 
for the period (T-t), plus marginal storage cost, less the marginal 
convenience yield from an additional unit of inventory. We assume that the 
futures contract matures after one period. Hence we can write: 
F(pT) - S(pT) = S(pT)R + MS -C (1) 
where: 
(F(pTT) - S(pT)): total return 
S(pT)R: interest forgone 
MS: marginal storage cost 
C: marginal convenience yield 
and F(pTT) = futures price at time T for delivery at T 
S(pT) = spot price at time T 
F(pTT) - S(pT) is the basis. 
The convenience yield can be explained as being a return for holding 
inventory, for example, to cover unexpected demand. 
The theory makes it evident that there is a negative relationship between 
the size of inventories and the marginal convenience yield. 5 
However, the theory of storage does not take into account the activities of 
the speculators in the market and therefore, does not explain the 
determinants of the futures price in an equilibrium. 
5Studies of Brennan (1958) and Telser (1958) give some evidence about that 
for several agricultural commodities. 
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3.4. The Concept of Risk Premium 
The existence of futures markets enables hedgers to manage their price 
risk. Together with the notion of risk premium goes the definition of the 
"expectation" of the future cash price. The expected spot price is formed 
by the expectations of each dealer about the cash price which will prevail 
at some point in the future. Our exposition about the expected spot price 
and the concept of risk premium is mainly based on the description of 
Edwards and Ma (1992). 6 The first major contribution in this area were 
Dusak (1973), and Breeden (1980). 
As a starting point, we assume that there are no speculators in the market. 
The relationship between spot and futures price can be explained by 
examining the respective demand and supply functions of the short and long 
hedgers. As a reminder, short hedgers are traders who wish to sell futures 
(supply) and long hedgers wish to buy futures (demand). 
futures price 
A 
exp (ST) 
FT 
0 
Qd QS 
Figure 3.1. Net short hedging imbalance 
quantity of 
futures contracts 
In figure 3.1. an exogenously given net short hedging imbalance is 
illustrated which shows the demand (DD') and the supply (SS') with the 
6pages 106-113 
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quantities of futures contracts on the X-axis and the futures prices on the 
Y-axis. 
This figure depicts the situation of a net short hedging imbalance (QS Qa), 
where the supply of, futures contracts (Q$) exceeds the demand of futures 
contracts (Qd). (Qs) and (Qd) are exogenously given. 
The short hedgers total inventory is Qs which they are willing to sell. 
However, if the futures price falls below the spot price they are more and 
more reluctant to sell which is depicted in MSS. 
On the other hand, long hedgers, with a total of future commitments of QD, 
purchase futures as long as the futures price is below the spot price. 
However, they are less willing to buy futures if the futures price is above 
the spot price which can be seen along line MDD. 
The equilibrium and thus the futures price is determined by the 
intersection of SS' and DD' at E where the futures price is below the spot 
puce. 
Figure 3.2. below illustrates the opposite case, a long hedging imbalance 
(Qd Qs) with the futures price exceeding the expected price. 7 
futures price 
A S' 
D 
FT 
exp(ST) 
0 
-n 
RP 
v Ms 
S 
Qs Qd 
Figure 3.2. Net long hedging imbalance 
7We still assume that there are no speculators. 
Md 
quantity of 
futures contracts 
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As we can see, in both cases there exists a risk premium which either short 
hedgers or long hedgers have to pay. It is evident that the situation of no 
imbalance and zero risk premium is very unlikely, because the futures price 
must then be equal to the expected future spot price. 
If we take into account that speculators are also in the market we can show 
that the risk premium decreases as, for example in the net short balance 
case, the demand function will be shifted from DD' to DD" (see figure 3.3. ) 
by adding the demand of the speculators. The speculators enter the market 
when the futures price is below the expected spot price which results in an 
aggregation of the demand functions of the hedgers and the speculators 
below MD from D' to D". Hence, the risk premium is reduced to RP'. 
futures price 
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D S, 
exp (ST) 
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Figure 3.3. Short hedging imbalance with speculation 
Similarly, the analogous process can be applied for the case of the net 
long hedging imbalance and the results is that the risk premium is reduced 
as well. The speculators believe that the expected price really occurs in 
the future, or better at some time in the future, and therefore, overall, 
they expect to make profits from their trading. 
In contrast to the theory of storage, the concept of risk premium does 
account for the influence of speculation in the futures market. One 
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drawback is that the analysis is based on an imbalance of hedging which is 
exogenously given. In our opinion, there are interactions between the 
determination of the futures price and the optimal futures positions of the 
short and long hedgers and thus, the imbalance of hedging should be treated 
as being endogenous. 
3.4.1. Risk Premium and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The existence of a risk premium has been analysed by Dusak (1973) within 
the framework of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
Her risk premium depends on the extent to which the variation in prices are 
systematically related to variations in the return of total wealth. Hence, 
an important determinant is the degree of correlation between the markets. 
This is different from the earlier literature where the risk premium 
depends on the price variability only. The idea behind her model is that 
futures can be included in a portfolio like any other asset. Hence, in the 
CAPM framework, returns on any risky asset, including futures market 
assets, are governed by that asset's contribution to the risk of a large 
and well diversified portfolio of assets. 
The basic formula is: 
I (RW R d] 5CF(RW) 
E( 
.)= 
Rf + ------ -- 
(2) 
a() Sx. Wi 
where: 
random rate of return on asset i 
E(R. ) : mathematical expectation of R, 
Rf : pure time return to capital 
(riskiess rate of interest) 
RW random rate of return on a portfolio 
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E(F, ) : mathematical expectation of . 
WW 
ß(RW) standard deviation of fW 
X.: proportions of all the existing assets 
[86(f 
W)]/Sxi 
marginal contribution of asset i to the 
risk of the return of the portfolio which 
can also be expressed as cov(R, RW)/var(RW) 
The influence of the risk factor can be shown in the following way: 
(N 
a(R) =I E- 7, x x. cov( ., 
R. )J 
w L" 
=1 1JJ 1= 
N 
Sß(f, 
W)/Sxi =E 
xi cov(. )] which equals 
j=1 
1/6( 
[x. 
a2(R) - x, 
#i 
with E x. cov(R., ) to be written as cov(ffl, ). 
j#; 
Hence, (2) can be rewritten as 
(RW - Rf) cov(R.,. W) 
ß(PW) ß(zW ) 
or equivalent to the CAPM formulation: 
E(RI) - Rf = [E(RW) - R11 ßi where ß, = cov(R,, RW)/a2(P W). 
Thus, in equilibrium, the expected rate of return on any asset i will be 
equal to the riskless rate of interest plus a risk premium proportional to 
the contribution of the asset to the risk of the return on the portfolio. 
The crucial point is which asset to choose as a benchmark to the futures 
asset. The problem is that there is no capital investment in 'trading a 
futures contract (besides a margin which is relatively small) that could be 
interpreted as a "rate of return". 
In the case of a futures contract, the return is the percentage change in 
the futures price. The corresponding return to R, is the return (net of 
storage cost) that a holder of a spot commodity would earn. Such a return 
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includes the interest on the capital invested in the commodity plus a 
return (which could be positive or negative) over and above pure interest 
due to the unanticipated change in the price of the commodity. The expected 
return on any asset i can be expressed as: 
E(R) = (1 - ß; )Rf + PE(R) (3) 
where: ßi = cov(Rl, RW)&(RW) 
If we rewrite E(R) in terms of period 0 and period 1 prices for the asset 
as 
E(P1) = [E(P,, i) - 
P;, 
o]IP;, o ' 
the equilibrium risk-return relation is: 
P;. 
o = 
[EP11) 
- [E(PW) - Rf]P. OP. 
/(l + Rf) (4) 
It means that the current price of any asset (assuming no storage cost) i 
is the discounted value (at the riskless rate of interest) of its expected 
period one price. This value is adjusted downward for risk by the factor 
[E(P, 
W) - 
Rf]P;, 
oß; 
For a futures contract with no payment at time 0, but with a commitment for 
period 1, the current price for the futures is given by PLO (1 + Rf) which 
means that the purchaser must pay a one-period interest rate of P. O 
Rf in 
addition to P. 0 
(on a credit so to speak) because the transaction is made 
at time 0, but consummated at time 1. 
If we multiply both side of equation (4) by (1 + Rf) we get: 
P. 
0 
(1 + Rf) = 
[E11 
)- [E(PW) - Rf]P;, oß; 
(5) 
which represents a futures contract where -asset 
i refers to the spot 
commodity. We can see that the expression on the right hand side of (5) is 
the current futures price for delivery and payment of the spot commodity 
one period later, and E(P. 1) can 
be seen as the spot price expected to 
prevail at time 1. 
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Setting Pfo = P., o 
(1 + Rf) for the futures value and rearranging terms, 
we get 
[E(P; 
1) - 
Pfo]/P;. 
o = 
ß; [E(RW) - Rf] (6) 
Equation 6 states the risk premium on the spot commodity which is expressed 
as the deviation of the expected futures price from the current futures 
price divided by the period 0 spot price. 
The essential point in Dusak's model is that buying a futures contract is 
like buying a capital asset on credit where the capital asset in this case 
is the spot commodity. By hedging a commodity position the holder converts 
the position into a riskless asset on which she earns the riskless rate Rf 
only. 
On the other side, the speculator, who takes over the risk, does not invest 
any capital in the futures contract earns only the return over and above 
pure interest which is (L-Rd. Several studies support the view that 
speculation plays an important role in today's futures markets. Edwards and 
Ma show speculation as a percentage of open interest 8 in various markets. 
For instance, there is speculation of 32.8 % at the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange in Eurodollars, 53.5 % at the Chicago Board of Trade in oats, and 
58 % at the New York Cotton Exchange in NYSE composite index. 9 
These findings lead us to the third theory about the futures prices, the 
interaction of markets and the influence of speculation on the market 
prices. 
8Speculative open interest as a percentage of total month-end open 
interest: mean of monthly percentages over the year. 
9Figures are taken from the table at pp. 466 
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3.5. Interaction of Markets and Forecast Power of Prices 
Very often the term "the price discovery role of the futures markets" is 
used. Speculators are. believed to provide information about the future cash 
price which will lead to an efficient market place. As we have shown above, 
speculators help to reduce the cost of hedging by reducing the risk 
premium. 
At the same time, they convey information into the market as they speculate 
on the expected cash price, based on their private information. Thus, the 
price expectations are more informative with speculators than without them. 
Some researchers criticise that speculators do not base their expectations 
on the fundamentals of the commodity, but on other more short-term 
"chartist" facts. However, Froot et al. (1992) show that, although this 
argument may be true, prices are still more informative than without 
speculators in the long run. 
The informational aspect includes a variety of different issues. One main 
area of research is the analysis of the information aggregation process of 
futures trading in a rational expectations equilibrium. 
The most prominent papers are, Grossman (1976), Kyle (1985), and Bray 
(1981). The question to be answered in these models is whether speculation 
and noise trading in the futures market affects the efficiency of the 
financial markets. 
We do not analyse these kind of models in detail as we are particularly 
interested in the determinants of the spot and futures prices. However, for 
reasons of completeness, we include a brief overview of the literature. 
An important feature in these models is that, in equilibrium the prices are 
not fully revealing. Hence, an informed trader can make profits by trading 
in futures markets. These profits, of course, depend on how well the 
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futures price interacts and predicts the expected spot price, i. e. it is 
important to what extent the markets are correlated. The correlation 
between the spot and futures prices leads us to another problem. That is 
whether futures trading stabilizes or destabilizes spot prices. This 
question has been studied, amongst others, by Danthine (1978), Turnovsky 
(1979), and Newbery (1987). 
There is no clear answer to that. If we consider that speculators assume 
risks by trading futures the consequence is that the risk is reduced for 
hedgers and hence, the price variability in the spot market may decrease. 
However, there exists a counterargument that hedgers, by being able to 
shift some risk, are less reluctant to undertake riskier transactions and 
thus increase the overall risk in the market and also the price variance. 
On the other hand, if we look at the informational role of futures prices 
we can see that speculation may cause a high volatility in futures prices 
and, depending on the correlation of spot and futures market, consequently 
may induce higher volatility in the spot market. 
There is an interesting paper of Kumar and Seppi (1992) regarding 
manipulation of prices. Their model combines various aspects mentioned 
earlier. They examine manipulation of prices by using a modification of 
Kyle's model (1985). In their two period model with asymmetric information 
amongst dealers, trade occurs first in the futures market and subsequently 
in the spot market. 
Four types of investors are defined: 
-a strategic risk-neutral informed trader 
-a group of uninformed noise traders 
-a group of risk-neutral floor traders and specialists who set competitive 
futures and spot prices 
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-a risk-neutral uninformed manipulator who only if it is expected to be 
profitable strategically submits an order in the futures market and in the 
spot market. 
Manipulation is interpreted as a form of endogenous noise trading. 
Exogenous spot noise trading is not essential for the functioning of the 
spot market, but futures noise trading is needed. The reason is the same as 
in Kyle (1985) as futures noise trading is used as a camouflage for the 
speculators to be able to participate in the market without full 
information disclosure through prices. 
Within such a setting, Kumar and Seppi show that uninformed traders are 
still in the position to make positive profits by establishing a futures 
position and then trading in the spot market to manipulate the spot price 
which will determine the cash settlement at delivery date. 
Another aspect of their model is that manipulation transfers liquidity from 
futures to cash market which benefits the informed traders and the spot 
noise traders. With more manipulators, in the limit, profits from 
manipulation disappear, but price liquidity effects persist. 
An interesting finding is that, with imperfect information linkage between 
spot and futures market, spot market traders are unlikely to observe all 
order related futures information which creates a temporary "price 
pressure" in the futures price. This effect is unique in the sense that 
previously identified factors such as market maker risk aversion or 
inventory control effects are absent here. 
There are some studies which analyse precisely such factors and these are 
described in detail in the next section. 
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3.5.1. Determinants of Spot and Futures Prices 
We are going to describe the paper of Anderson and Danthine (1983) in which 
they study the relationship between spot and futures prices in a 
"microstructure" setting. The open argument whether there exists a bias 
between spot and futures prices (a so called "basis risk", or risk premium) 
is examined in a rational expectations equilibrium. In other words, they 
analyse whether the Keyne's/Hicks argument of "normal backwardation" is 
valid. 
Anderson and Danthine's model is elaborate and allows us to analyse 
different aspects (within the same model) which have been examined in 
previous papers, such as Stein (1979), Holthausen (1979), and Rolfo (1980), 
but not in such a general context. They allow for price and quantity risk 
(like Rolfo), but they consider the bias reflected in equilibrium futures 
prices by analysing the expected utility maximization problems of the 
individual producers and users of the good traded on the futures market. 
There are three types of goods in the market: primary, secondary and final 
where the secondary good is traded in both markets, the spot and the 
futures market. In addition there are two trading dates. At time t, the 
futures trading occurs and the spot trading of the primary good. 
At time (t+l), the secondary and the final goods are traded. The unknowns, 
at time t, are the time (t+l) supply of the secondary good and the prices 
of the secondary and the final goods. 
The participants in the market place are speculators, producers of the 
secondary good (farmers), processors of the secondary good, and when the 
secondary good is storable, storage companies. 
We can illustrate the structure of the model as follows: 
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It t+1 
spot futures spot spot 
p. g. i. g. - i. g. f. g. 
(spot i. g. if the secondary good is storable) 
Figure 3.4.: Structure of the "Anderson and Danthine model" 
where: 
p. g. = primary good 
i. g. = intermediate or secondary good 
f. g. = final good 
Next, we examine the role of each participant in the market and we make the 
assumption that there is no basis risk. 
a) Speculator: 
The speculator is not active in the spot market and hence, does not trade 
in the primary good. She only acquires a futures position at time t and 
closes out the position with an offsetting trade at time (t+l) in the 
secondary good. The net revenue function of the speculator is given by 
is = (pf - p)fs (7) 
where: 
pf : futures price of the secondary good at time t 
spot price of the secondary good at time (t+l) 
f: 
5 
number of futures contracts sold by the speculator at time t 
If fS >0 the speculators is short in futures, and vice versa. 
The speculator solves her maximization problem by choosing f, at time t, 
so as to maximize expected utility of net revenue EU(it ). 
S 
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b) Producer (farmer): 
The primary activity of the farmer is to purchase primary goods for input 
at time t and she then transforms them according to a production function 
which results in the secondary good which is available at time (t+l). The 
farmer may also trade in futures this means that, at time t, the farmer is 
active in the spot market and trades the primary good and she is also 
active in futures by trading the secondary good. At time t+l, the farmer 
sells the secondary good in the spot market. Hence, the net revenue 
function is 
of = Pg(xf, E) + rxf + (pf - p)ff (8) 
where: 
p spot price of the intermediate good at time t+l 
pf : futures price of the intermediate good at time t 
xf : position size in the primary good (xf<O for a purchase) 
r: price of the primary good 
gQ : production function which depends on the primary input and a 
production shock E 
ff : number of futures contracts at time t 
The farmer's maximization problem is to choose xf and ff so as to maximize 
EU(nf). 
It is evident that the farmer faces price uncertainty (p) and quantity 
uncertainty (i). 
c) Processor: 
The processor purchases the intermediate good and transforms it into the 
final good. She may also trade in futures. Thus, at time t, she trades in 
futures for the intermediate good and, at time t+l, she trades in the spot 
market for the secondary and the final good. Hence, the net revenue 
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function is 
RP = gh(yp) + FP + (Pf -p (9) 
where: 
spot price of the intermediate good at time t+1 
pf : futures price of the intermediate good at time t 
q: period (t+l) price of the final good 
yp : the processor's position in the intermediate good (with yp<0 for 
purchases) 
h() : processor's production function 
The processor has to deal with uncertainty in both input and output. It is 
important to note that the processor's purchases of the intermediate good 
is a random variable at time t. 
This implies that the processor may determine inputs at time (t+1) given 
knowledge of the intermediate good price. That can result in an asymmetry 
in the problems of the producer and the processor. 
d) Storage Company: 
When the intermediate good is storable the storage company can purchase the 
good at time t and carry it forward until (t+1). The storage company may 
also trade in futures. The net revenue function is given by 
= pc(i) - Rp i+ (pf - p)f (10) 
where: 
p1 : spot price of the intermediate good at time t 
R: one plus the interest rate 
i: inventory of the intermediate good held by the storage company 
co : carry out function which results in the amount of the 
intermediate good brought forward to time (t+1) net of wastage and cost of 
storage 
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The company's maximization problem at time t is to choose f and iC so as 
to maximize EU(nd. 
From equations (7) to (10) we see that all participants except the 
speculator are hedgers who have a quantity commitment. However, the 
speculator's problem appears in each other participants optimization 
problem. Thus, each hedger has a speculative term and a hedging term in 
their utility function. 
Anderson and Danthine's analysis defines a rational expectations 
equilibrium for three different market structures which are: 
A: There is a perishable intermediate good (without any storage) and 
hedger's sales and purchases decisions are made under spot price risk (no 
quantity uncertainty). Processors are assumed to be inflexible in their 
inputs. 
B: In this scenario, processors are flexible in their input decision and 
producers have to deal with additional quantity uncertainty. 
C: A storage company comes into the market with the assumption that the 
intermediate good is storable, otherwise the condition under A apply. 
Market Equilibrium A: 
We assume that there is no production and no processing uncertainty in this 
equilibrium scenario. Processors are technologically constrained to choose 
input levels at the same time as their futures choice. 
In equilibrium, demand equals supply and by assuming that the intermediate 
good is perishable we get the following market clearing condition: 
offf +n 
pfp 
+n 
sfs =0 
(11) 
with nf identical producers, np identical processors, and ns identical 
speculators. 
A result from the structure of the model (i. e. ns = (pf - p)fs) is that the 
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speculator will go long in futures when she expects that the futures price 
p will rise and she will go short in futures when she expects that the 
futures price will fall. This is obvious as the speculator does not have 
any interest in physical stock and therefore trades futures based on 
expected price differences which can be proved in the following way. The 
necessary condition for the optimal fs is 
EU'(RS)(pf - p) =0 (12) 
By knowing that the utility function is concave which gives 
EU"(i')(pf - p) <0 above condition (12) is also sufficient. 
Hence, the second order condition corresponding to (11) implies that f 
f* as EU' [(pf - p)f ] 
ý- 0 with f, * as the optimal futures position, and by 
having f=0 as a reference we get the result: 
S 
fs0 if and only if pf 
ýEp. 
This result implies that speculators will sell futures when a futures price 
exceeds the expected cash price and, speculators will buy futures when the 
futures price is below the expected cash price. 
Now we analyse the situation for the farmer. 
The assumption of no basis risk simplifies the analysis in so far that the 
optimal output can be chosen depending on the input and futures prices only 
(there is no quantity risk, i. e. e=0). Thus, the producer's expectations 
and risk aversion are not important. 
We assume that U(. ) and g(. ) are strictly concave which implies that the 
following first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for the 
maximization of EU(7tf), where of is given by (8): 
EU'(itý)[pgl(xf) + r] >_ 0 (=0 if Xf < 0) (13) 
EU' (nd(pf - p) =0 (14) 
Since we assume that e is non-stochastic and that there is no basis risk 
(p=pf) we obtain (for an interior solution xf < 0): 
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A 
l(xf) +r=0 
(15) 
with gl = 5g/5xf 
This means that the farmer determines her input level by equating the input 
price with the marginal revenue product evaluated at the futures price pf, 
without depending on her degree of risk aversion or price expectation. 
However, this separation result breaks down if we assume quantity 
uncertainty which will be shown in the next equilibrium case. 
If we define x*f as the optimal input of the farmer and rewrite the revenue 
function we get 
of =nf+ (pf - p)Sf (16) 
where 7c of = pfg(x*f, E) + rxf, Sf = ff - g(x*f 
Sf can be defined as the amount by which the producer's futures position 
differs from a fully hedged one; it is her speculative decision variable. 
Given x`f the producer's futures position depends on the speculative term 
only and the optimal sf is the solution to the maximization of EU(nf) where 
ltf is given in (16). 
Now, we can see that we have the identical problem to the speculator's case 
except for the presence of a non-zero hedgeable net revenue. 
As a natural corollary to the speculator's result above we get 
Sf 
=0 if and only if pf 
ý- E. 
If we examine the expected utility of the processor we know that she must 
decide at time t about the input purchase at time (t+l). It turns out that, 
under this assumption of inflexibility in inputs, the processor's problem 
is very similar to the producer's so that hedging activity tends to be very 
symmetrical. 
The maximum can be obtained for the processor by using (9): 
EU'(ip)[gh'(yp) +-p] ?0 (=0 if yP < 0) (17) 
EU'(np)(Pf - P) =0 (18) 
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Also in this case, with q being non-stochastic, we have the separation 
result like in the farmer's case. (17) and (18) imply , for an 
interior 
solution: 
-9hß 
(Yp) = Pf (19) 
It is clear that the input is determined independently from the futures 
position. We can write 
= qh(y* P)+ Pf y* P+ (Pf - P)sP 
(20) 
P 
where y* p 
is the optimal purchase of the intermediate good and sP=fP-y*P is 
the amount of deviation from the routine hedge. 
This separation result means that the choice of the optimal deviations from 
the routine hedge is exactly identical to the speculators problem. 
Consequently, we obtain as a corollary to the speculator's result: 
s=0 if and only if pf 
ý- Ep. 
P 
Now, we can substitute these separation results into the equilibrium 
condition (11) and we get: 
nfF(pf/r) + npP(pf/q) = -(nfsf +npsp+ nsf) (21) 
FO is the solution of (15) and P() is the solution of (19). 
We can define the left hand side of (21) as the total net hedging (T. N. H. ) 
and the expression in the parenthesis at the right hand side of (21) as the 
total net speculation (T. N. S. ). This result and the assumption of 
homogeneous price expectations leads to "proposition 2": 
T. N. S. Z- 0 as pf 
ý- Ep and T. N. H. 
=0 
as pf 
ý- Ep 
Anderson-and Danthine discuss this result as follows: 
The latter part of the proposition clearly - links the position of the 
futures price relative to the expected cash price to the next excess of 
producer's output plans over processor's purchase plans. Traditionally, 
backwardation has been interpreted as the price to be paid for risk 
transfer. Proposition 2 that the aptness of this interpretation depends on 
the direction of the transfer. When total planned output exceeds total 
planned input an incentive is indeed needed to induce other agents 
(speculators) to commit themselves to receive this excess (net) planned 
output. The incentive is provided by a futures price below the expected 
cash price, i. e. backwardation. However, when total planned output falls 
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short of total planned input, the incentive needed to induce speculators to 
be net short is a futures price in excess of the expected cash price, i. e. 
contango. Thus, backwardation is 'normal' only in markets where hedging 
activity is systematically dominated by suppliers of the commodity 
specified in the contracts (short hedgers). '° 
As a next step we assume rational expectations among - participants which 
means that they have complete knowledge of next date's cash market 
structure. In this case, the cash price equilibrium condition for time 
(t+1) is: 
nfF(pf/r) + nPP(pf/q) + D(p, ti) =0 (22) 
where D(p, ti) is the external net supply function which is generated by 
for instance, additional participants entering the market and 'ti 
representing a sort of a noise factor. It follows that the equilibrium cash 
price at t+l depends upon pf and c: 
P* = C(Pf, t) (23) 
It is assumed that, in period t, external demand is unknown and therefore i 
and thus p* are random variables. Furthermore, we assume that the 
cumulative distribution function of i J(. ) is known. Hence, for rational 
participants the distribution of p* is fully specified, conditional on pf, 
by equation (23) and J(. ). The final result is summarized in: 
nfF(p*f/r) + nPP(Pif/q) nfsf[P*f, C(p . ), J(")] 
+nPsP [P*f, C(Phf, "), J(")] + nsfs[p 
t, C(Ptf,. ), J(. )] (24) 
Based on the above result we can say that if there is no excess demand or 
excess supply of the secondary good no additional participant is needed for 
reallocation of the risks of the producers and the processors. " Thus the 
futures market provides a costless opportunity- to reduce risk for both the 
product and the input. If there is a excess demand of the intermediary good 
which is unhedged producers will have a planned output larger than a 
10 pp 383/384 
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planned input of the processors. To induce speculators to come into the 
market to absorb the risk of the surplus a risk premium has to be paid 
which will lead to backwardation. Similarly, we find a risk premium in the 
market if there is excess supply which leads to a "contango situation" 
(i. e. that the futures price is above the expected cash price). 
Market Equilibrium B: 
Under the assumption of quantity uncertainty (c > 0) and with X as the 
producer's coefficient of absolute risk aversion, the first order condition 
is: 
E(Pgl) +r-X 
[cov(Pg, 
Pgl) - ffcov(P, Pg1)] =0 (25) 
where ff = Yf + [cov(P, PY)/var ]+ [(Pf - Ep)/Xvarp] (26) 
with g(x, E), gl = gl(X, E, yf = Eg(x, E), and 
Y=g-Yf 
By substitution of (26) into (25) and rewriting the result is: " 
E(Pg1) + [(Pf - Ep)cov(P, PjI)/varp] +r 
- X[cov(Fj, Pj, )varp - cov(F, Fi, )cov(F, Fi)]/varp =0 (27) 
This time, in contrast to the certainty case, we have an additional term, 
the last one on the left hand side which is a risk premium. Now, the 
farmer's risk aversion together with the price expectation plays a role in 
the decision making process. Hence, the separation result is no longer 
valid. 
The situation of the processor changes with the assumption of input 
" flexibility. The decision of yP will be made at time (t+l) so as to 
maximize profits given prices p and q. 
11Detailed calculation is given in appendix. 
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We define yP= P(p/q) where P'>0. It implies that at time tyPp, and q are 
random variables. Using (9) we get after rearranging: 
fP= [(pf - Ep)/Xvar ]+yp+ cov[P, P(yP -y 
P)]/varp 
+ [cov(p, gi)/varp] (28) 
where yp= P(pf/q), q= Eq, and z= h(yP). 
If we compare the hedging position of the processor (28) with the one of 
the farmer (26) we can see that the processor's hedging adjustment term is 
composed of two parts; namely one coming from the uncertainty of the input 
and the other from the uncertainty of the output. 
Hence, we can write the market clearing condition as: 
nfyf + nfP [cov(p, py)/varp] + npyfp 
+ 
[cov[p, 
p(yp -y 
p)]/varp + np[cov(p, gz)/varp] 
_ -(nfsf + npsp + n3f) (29) 
where sf and sp are (pf - Ep)/Xvarp. 
This expression may be interpreted as in the previous equilibrium case 
T. N. H. =-T. N. S. with T. N. S. having the same qualitative properties as in 
the previous case, but not so T. N. H. 
T. N. H. can no longer be regarded as simply the excess of planned supply 
over planned demand. 
Expectations are important now, on the left hand side as well as on the 
right hand side of the market clearing condition. 
Like in the previous case backwardation or contango arises this time caused 
either from an imbalance of plans or from an -asymmetry in the adjustments 
or a mixture of the two. 
For a rational expectations equilibrium, the distribution of p must reflect 
the period (t+l) cash market clearing condition, 
nfyf + npyp =0 which implies a link between yf and yp: 
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nfyf =-npp which in turn implies that 
nfcov(p, pyf) = -nPCOV(p, 
pyP) 
Hence, the future market clearing condition becomes: 
nP [cov(p, gz)/varp] = -(nfsf + npsP + nSf) (30) 
This time, there is backwardation, martingale, or contango according to 
whether cov(p, gz) 
= 0. 
Hence, with an asymmetrical hedging problem of processors, either 
backwardation or contango are possible in a rational expectations 
equilibrium. This finding contradicts the Keynes/Hicks argument of 'normal' 
backwardation in this kind of market structure. 
Market Equilibrium C: 
If there are nC identical storage companies the clearing condition is: 
nfff + npfp +nCf+nSf=0 (31) 
Considering the assumptions made we can rewrite it as 
nfyf +nPyP+ nCc(iC) _ -(nfsf +nPsP+ nCsC + n9fs) (32) 
This expression is equivalent with T. N. H. _ -T. N. S. under the market 
equilibrium A except that this time T. N. H. is the excess of output and 
storage plans over input plans. 
In a rational expectations equilibrium the following condition holds: 
nfyf + npyP + nCc(iC) - nCic2 + D(p, e) =0 (33) 
Compared to (22) there are two additional terms coming from the storage 
company. Again D(p, E) represents external "unhedged" net supply. Also the 
storage company's future demand for the commodity - nCic2 is unhedged today 
because it will be determined by the next period's futures-cash spread. 
This is part of the storage company's arbitrage activity which induces a 
tendency towards backwardation with ice>_ 0. 
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If E[D(p, e)] =0 there is a backwardation in a rational expectation 
equilibrium. This conclusion is in agreement with Stein (1979) who finds 
that, with large inventories, short hedging will dominate long hedging and 
backwardation will result. However, we have no basis risk in the model 
which actually makes the model trivial. So there is no real evidence of 
"normal backwardation". 
3.6. Empirical Evidence 
Several studies mentioned earlier have given empirical evidence. However, 
some of them are controversial because of the estimation techniques and the 
lack of adequate data available. 
Dusak (1973) examined futures commodity contracts of wheat, corn, and 
soybeans and she finds that returns and portfolio risk are both close to 
zero during the sample period. This is the case, although variability in 
prices and hence risk is high. 
Fama and French (1987) find that the theory of storage is supported by 
their analysis. In the same paper, they also try to find significant 
coefficients indicating a risk premium. They fail to produce a result which 
would confirm a positive risk premium. 
In contrast, Yoo and Maddala (1991) test the hypothesis that large hedgers 
consistently lose money in the futures market. This means that they pay a 
risk premium to speculators who take the risk by providing the opportunity 
for hedging. They find that large speculators as a whole consistently make 
profit on the average which supports their hypothesis. That gives a reason 
why large speculators continue to stay in the market. It has to be noted 
that the analysis is based on aggregate figures and does not say anything 
about individual large speculator's profits. 
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3.7. Summary and Conclusions 
Our task has been to give an overview of the theories of futures markets 
and of existing work about the interaction of spot and futures markets. 
Most of the studies are' concerned with the relation between spot and 
futures prices, the so called backwardation and contango. In the first 
case, the current futures price is below the current spot price; whereas 
contango means that the current futures price is above the current spot 
price. 
We have shown that there are three main lines of argument explaining this 
bias. These are the theory of storage, the concept of risk premium, and the 
informational role of futures prices, also called the price discovery role. 
All these theories capture some or all of the aspects arising from trading 
in spot and futures markets. The outcome of the study of all these theories 
is that we can not say unambigously whether trading in futures and spot 
market results in the situation of backwardation or contango. The 
interaction of the markets is quite complex and there is another line of 
literature which focuses on the informational asymmetry among participants. 
These theories examine how information is integrated in the spot market 
price from trading in futures. 
However, there is no consent whether, in a rational expectations 
equilibrium, information aggregation stabilizes or destabilizes asset 
prices. We did not discuss this part of the literature because It is not 
our primary concern and, in addition, it is worth an examination on its 
own. 
The determinants of the spot prices are the current asset holdings of the 
traders plus their degree of risk aversion and their price expectations. 
In respect of the bid and ask prices and consequently the spread, in the 
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spot market the determinants have been studied by Ho and Stoll within a 
"microstructure of market making framework" for the spot market. However, 
their analysis is within one market only. Although they examine the 
determinants of the bid-ask spread in a model with two assets [Ho and Stoll 
(1983)] they do not find a different result which could mean that 
diversification into different assets does not affect the bid-ask spread of 
a market maker. This is not a convincing result as most of the assets are 
correlated and we expect an influence coming from -diversification. 
The analogous case for the spot and the futures market analysis is the 
paper of Anderson and Danthine (1983) which we discussed in detail in 
this chapter. 
The main difference between the studies of Ho/Stoll, and Anderson/Danthine 
is that the latter does not examine the effects on the spot market bid-ask 
spread. The analysis focuses on the determination of the bias between spot 
and futures prices. 
There does not exist any analysis which examines the influence of the 
interaction between spot and futures market and the effect on the bid-ask 
spread. 
One question which will be interesting to examine is whether market makers 
are in the position to reinsure their inventory of the risky asset and at 
what cost. We would expect that the costs in the spot market would decrease 
as a consequence of this reinsurance. 
This shortcoming will be our concern in the next chapter. 
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APPENDIX 
Derivation of the result in equation (27): 
lrf=Pg(xfE)+rxf+(Pf- P)f 
E(nf) = E(Pg) + E(Pf - P)ff 
var(nf) = var(Pg) + var(P)ff - 2cov(Pg, P) f 
EU(nf) =E-X (var) 
The first order conditions are: 
SEU/Sxf = E(pjI) +r- X[Svar(pg)/Sxf - 2ff(Scov(pg, p)/Sxf)1 =0 
with cov(p, p1) = cov(p, p(j - Eg)) = cov(p, pg) - E(g)cov(p, p) 
= cov(p, pg) - E(g)var(p) 
We can also write: 
var(5j) = E[(Pj) - E(5g)]2 = J'[Pg - E(Pg)]2dF and 
Svar(5j)/Sxf = S2[pg - E(PS)][PgI - (SE(pg)/Sxf)]df 
_ $[2P2go - 2(E(Pg))Pgl - 2Pg(5E(Pg)/8xf) + 2E(Pg)(5E(Pg)/5xf]dF 
= 2, f[P290, - E(Pb)Pb1]dF 01 
whereas: cov(5j, 5gi) =E 
[[Pj 
- E(Pg)][Pg1 - E(Pgl)]] 
= E[Pg - E(5g)]5g1 
which is Svar(Fg)/Sxf = cov(pg, Fgl) = E[Fg - E(Fg)]Fg1. 
On the other side we have: 
SEU(zcf)/Sff = E(pgl) +r- X2ffvar(p) + X2cov(5g, 5) =0 
f= (cov(Pb, P)/var(P)) + ((Pf - E5)/2Xvar(P)) 
We want to show that this is equal to: 
Eg + [cov(P, P(g - Eg))/var(P)] + ((Pf - Ep)/Xvar(P)) 
which is : Eg + [cov(p, pg) - Egvar(p)]/var(p) 
= Ei + cov(p, pg)/var(p) - Egvar(p)/var(p) 
= (cov(Pg, P)/var(P)) + ((Pf - Ep)/Xvar(P)) 
Q. E. D. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE BID - ASK SPREAD AND FUTURES TRADING 
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4.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to account for the shortfall in the theory about 
the interaction of financial markets with particular concern of the effects 
of such interaction on the bid-ask spread. The traditional bid-ask spread 
theory, for instance Ho and Stoll [HS] (1983), describe the determinants of 
the bid-ask spread within one market. Although HS examine the case with two 
risky stocks, their result shows that the spread is independent of the 
inventory (within a one period horizon) and hence, the spread is not 
affected by any diversification into several stocks as the spread is only 
changed by the deviation from the optimal inventory level. The deviation 
from the optimal inventory level is caused by the fact that dealers have to 
trade at their quoted prices if an order arrives. Such an inventory level 
is composed of different assets. As long as the transactions of the various 
assets are independent the spread does not change. Their model is based on 
an order arrival rate which is the same for each stock and the transactions 
(i. e. order arrivals) are independent. HS point out that the result of no 
influence of diversification on the bid-ask spread is no longer true if the 
transactions of the stocks are dependent. 
Our bid-ask spread model includes trading in the spot and the futures 
market at the same time. Up-to-date, futures trading has been investigated 
along the lines which we described in the previous chapter. The most recent 
studies deal with the informational aspect, i. e. the discovery. role of 
prices. Although this line of argument is, without any doubt, the most 
important one in the primary markets today, we like to analyse the effects 
of futures trading on the spot market bid-ask spread which is based on an 
analysis similar to Anderson and Danthine (1983), which we described in 
some length in the literature survey chapter. 
They investigate futures trading decisions for various types of 
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participants and they show the effects of futures trading on the spot 
market prices in a rational expectations equilibrium. 
In our opinion, the investigation of the spot market bid-ask spread has 
been neglected. Especially in dealership markets, the cost of market 
making, i. e. the bid-ask spread, may reveal the influence of futures 
trading and, in general, may give some insight into the interaction of spot 
markets with futures markets. Furthermore, by applying a "microstructure" 
model in the spot market, identical to the model in a centralized market 
with full information for an indivisible good, like the HS model, we are 
able to show the determinants of the bid-ask spread of traders who also 
trade in futures. This kind of model is analysed in section 4.2. 
Overall, assuming no asymmetry of information among market makers, we 
expect that the bid-ask spread in the spot market decreases by trading in 
futures. This is based on the argument that by trading in futures the 
market maker who holds an inventory of the asset in the spot market is able 
to reduce the risk inherent in the price uncertainty of the asset. 
Under the assumption of risk averse traders and the fact that they can 
reduce the risk by trading in futures, and thus hedge the risky position, 
the market maker is able to narrow the spread. 
In section 4.3., we then change the structure of the model by assuming that 
the market maker in the spot market does not know the order flow and hence, 
the kind of transaction she enters into. Such a situation represents a 
dealership market. Dealers faces not only the price uncertainty, but also 
the transaction uncertainty. The latter kind 'of uncertainty leads us to 
considering two possible subcases. 
First, we assume that the dealer knows that there is symmetry in the 
quantity demanded and quantity supplied. Second, we change the assumption 
of symmetry and we allow for differences in demand and supply. For both 
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subcases, we derive the influence of the futures trading on the spot 
bid-ask spread. 
Furthermore, in section 4.4., based on the symmetric model in section 4.3., 
we investigate whether and how the dealer's decision about the optimal 
futures position changes if there is the possibility of adjustment of the 
futures position in a subsequent second period. Thus, we analyse the 
intertemporal effects of futures trading on the spot bid-ask spread in a 
two period model. However, for simplicity, the dealer trades in the futures 
market only in the second period which means that after having learnt about 
the kind of spot market transaction (whether it is a purchase or a sale) 
she adjusts the futures position accordingly. 
Finally, section 4.5. contains the summary of the various results and the 
conclusions. 
4.2. The Features of a Model without Quantity Uncertainty in the Spot 
Market Trading 
4.2.1. The Spot Market Structure 
The spot market is modeled as a dealership market with Bertrand 
oligopolistic competition among market makers which means that all trade is 
at the "best" price. The market maker with the lowest ask quote gets all 
the sell orders and the market maker with the highest bid quote gets all 
the buy orders. 
The dealer's initial wealth (V), consists of a cash position (c) and the 
holding of a risky asset (I): 
Vý=cý+pIc 
t 
(1) 
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Market makers are risk averse and we assume mean variance utility. 
1 
Dealers maximize expected utility of terminal wealth which is: 
V= Vt+l = ct+i + pt+lIt+i (2) 
Expected utility: 
E(U) = E(V) - k/2(VAR(V)) (3) 
where 
k: coefficient of risk aversion 
U(. ): Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
In the spot market, the dealer faces uncertainty which is the price 
uncertainty. 
For the spot trading, we assume a probability ) that a buy order arrives in 
the market in one period. An equal probability of X is assumed for the 
arrival of a sell order. The respective probability that no order arrives 
is (1-2? ). 
However, we assume that the dealers know about the public orders before 
they have to quote their prices and, in addition, we assume that the 
dealers know each others' reservation prices. Thus, we base on the same 
structure as the one of the centralised market model with trading in a 
divisible good, which is described in chapter two above. 
All orders that arrive are of a fixed size X. 
The market maker sets her bid and ask prices knowing the current futures 
price. The dealer optimizes the futures position (in our case N), after 
learning the kind of order, i. e whether it is a sale or a purchase, in 
period t, given the current cash (Ct) and current inventory consisting of a 
risky asset (It). Then, the dealer, taking into account the futures 
'This could be justified as an approximation of a Taylor's series 'expansion 
of the utility of a risk averse dealer with constant absolute risk 
aversion. We also assume that the utility is normally distributed. 
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trading, sets her bid-ask spread accordingly. 
We can illustrate this sequence of events as follows: 
afaf pcpcp t+1 p t+i 
X (pa-pb) 
N 
t t+l 
Figure 4.1.: Sequence of events with known X in period t 
Based on above assumptions we can define the expected utilities for the 
dealers. 
4.2.2 Determination of the Spot Bid-Ask Spread with Futures Trading 
For simplicity, and to facilitate the analysis, we consider the case where 
the same dealer is in the position to quote the best price whichever order 
arrives. We call her a monopoly dealer. The dealer maximizes expected 
utility of terminal wealth. 
The dealer is willing to trade if there is a profit making opportunity; 
that is if her terminal expected utility is at least equal to her initial 
utility: 
E(U)1 > E(U)o (4) 
The terminal wealth for a dealer can be written as: 
Wl =V+ futures which is: 
Wl = (l+r)ct+, + ps c+tlc+l + 
(p f 
t+I - pft)N 
(5) 
with r= risk free interest rate; c, 
+l = 
cash' holding in period t+l; pft+1 
= spot asset price at t+1; It+1 = the inventory of the risky asset at t+l; 
p t+1 = futures price at t+l; pt= current futures price at t; N= net 
purchase futures position committed at t and maturing at t+l. 
We will write the subscripts t+1 as 1 and t as 0. 
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Furthermore, we define pa as the dealer's ask price quote, pb as the 
dealer's bid price quote, and X as the fixed order size. 
Hence for a spot purchase we can write: 
E(W1) = (cö pbX) + µs(ö+X) + (µf p 
ö)N (6) 
where µ$ E(psl) and µf = E(pfI) and 
V(W 
1) 
= V(psl)( O+X)2 + V(pfl_pfdN2 
+ 2cov[p'1, (pf 1-p 
0)](1 
0 +X)N 
(7) 
We define: V(p'1)=ap 2. As pö is known the variance of (pf 1-p o) 
is 
s 
V(pf 
1)=6 
2 
Pf 
Consequently, expected utility coming from a spot purchase of X at pb is 
EUB(W! ) = (cö pbX) + µs( ö+X) + (µf p o)N 
-k/2 
[2(J+x)2+2Nz+2cOV[PS1, 
(PfI-Pf 
o)](ö+X)N 
(8) 
The optimal futures position is found by maximizing expected utility over 
N: 
SEUB(WI)/SN = (µf p 0) -k apf 
2N 
- kcov()(ö+X)=0 
where cov() = cov[p'1, (pfl-p 0)] 
from equation (8) 
Thus, NB = (µf p 0)/kap 
2- 
CoV()(0+X)/a 
2 (9) 
Pff 
The "no trade" expected utility EU(W0) includes the initial wealth of the 
dealer plus an optimal trading position in futures: 
EU(W0) = co + µ3(Io) - (k/2) ap 
2(10)2 
+ 1/2[(µf P 
0)2/k6pf 
]- (µf P 
0)coVO(I0)/(; 
2- 
Pf 
+ (1/2) kcov()2(I0)2/csp 2 (10) 
f 
Similar to Anderson and Danthine (1983) we have two different terms in N; 
the first one on the RHS of (9) is a pure speculative term, and the second 
169 
one is a hedging term. By substituting the optimal N back into (8) we get 
an expected utility of a buyer which is: 2 
EUB(Wl) = (co pbX) + µs( ä+X) - (k/2) 6 
a2( 
ö+X)Z + 1/2[(Nf pf0)2/k Pf 
- (00)COVO(0+X)/CrP2 
f+ 
(1/2) kcoVo 2(0-i-X)2/a 2 (11) 
If we set EUB(WI) = EU(W0) we obtain the reservation bid price which is 
pb = µs -k ßp 
32 
[I0 + (1/2)Xl - (µf pfo)cov()/ßpf 
2 
+ kcov()2[Io + (1/2)X]/6 
f2 
(h a) 
The first two expressions on the RHS ' of (11a) come from the spot market 
activity. The other terms on the RHS come from futures trading. Here again, 
we can distinguish a pure speculative term (the third), and a hedging term 
(the fourth). 
Similarly, the expected utility of a spot seller is: 
EUS(W1) _ (ö+paX) + µs(Iö-X) + (µf p ö)N 
- k/2 
[a2IoX2+a2N2+2cov[PsiPf1P1o] 
(I0 X)N (12) 
sf 
Again, if we maximize expected utility over N the optimal futures position 
is: 
NS = (µf P0 )/6pf 
2- 
covO(Io-X)/6 
f2 
(13) 
where cov() = cov[p'1, (pfl-pf0)] from equation (12) 
By substituting the optimal futures position into expected utility we get: 3 
EUS(WI) = (ö+paX) + µs(Iö-X) - (k/2) ap 
2(Io X)2 
3 
+ 1/2[(µf Pf0)2/kßpf ]- (µf P 
0)Cov()(ID X)/6pf2 
+ (1/2) kcovO2(Iö X)2/a 2 (14) 
f 
2Detailed calculation can be found in appendix A 
3Details see appendix A 
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By setting EUs(W1) = EU(W0) we get 
pa = µs - ka p 32[Io 
- (1/2)X] - (µf-f P 
0)cov()/apf2 
+ kcov()2[Io - (1/2)X]/a 
2 (14a) 
f 
In order to calculate the reservation spread we have 
EU(WI) = EUs(WL) + EUB(W1) (15) 
By substituting (10) and (13) into (14) we get 
4 
EU(W1) _ (pa-pb)X - kap 
2X2 + kcov()ZX2/6 2 
Sf 
+ 0+µ, (Io)-(k/2» 
: 
2(Io)2 + 1/2[(µf p ö)Z/kapf ] 
- (µf p 
o)covO(Io)/apf + 1/2 kcov()2(Io)2/a f (16) 
According to our assumption that E(U)1 > E(U)o the spread equation is: 
(pa-pb) = k? PS 
X- kcovO2X/o-2 
Pf 
(17) 
which we can express as: 
(pa-pb) = kXcps 
rl 
- pl (18) 
with p= cov()2/a 
26 2 
pa Pf 
This spread is a kind of counterfactual spread as the dealer quotes only 
one side of the market at the time (under the assumption that the dealer 
knows the order at the time she has to quote her price). 
In this situation, we see that the bid-ask spread depends on the degree of 
risk aversion, the fixed order size of spot trading, the price variance of 
the spot price and the correlation of the spot and the futures prices. 
Proposition I: The spot market bid-ask spread is always smaller if a 
market maker in the spot market can trade in futures as well. 
4The detailed mathematics are given in appendix B. 
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It is evident that with futures trading the spot spread is smaller as long 
as the covariance between the spot and futures prices is not equal to zero. 
This finding confirms our intuitive assumption that the dealer, by trading 
in futures, is in the. position to hedge her inventory and thus to reduce 
the price risk which enables her to narrow the spot spread. 
If we change the assumption of a monopoly dealer and assume that there are 
two dealers in the market, we have to enlarge our analysis and take into 
account that the dealers may have differences in inventory levels, in the 
degree of risk aversion, in price expectations, and consequently in futures 
positions. 
First, we assume the market situation where each dealer is the sole active 
market maker on each side of the market, i. e. dealer one (1) only sells and 
dealer two (2) only buys without any sharing of the orders. 
Furthermore, the dealers are not identical which means that they have 
different inventory levels, different degrees of risk aversion, 
heterogeneous price expectations, and different futures positions. 
Then, we can express the expected utility of the spot seller as: 
EUS(WL) = (col+paX) + µ' (Il-X) + (µf -p 
ö)N1 
-(ki/2){ß 
2(I1-X)2+ap 2N12+2cov(a)(II-X)N1} (19) 
sl fl 
cov(a) = cov[p'1, (pfi-p ö)] and I1=Io of dealer 1 
After multiplying out and setting EUl(W1) = EU0(W0) we get: 
pa =µs1 - klaps 
2[I1 
- (1/2)X] - cov(a)/ßpf 
2(µ8-P 0) 
- kIcov(a)2/a 
2[I1 
- (1/2)X] (20) 
fl 
The bid price can be calculated in the analogous way which results in: 
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pb = µs - k2aPS 
2[IZ + (1/2)X] - cov(b)/a 
2(µf 
-pf0) 
zZ2 
+ k2cov(b)2/a 2[I2 + (1/2)X] (21) f2 
with cov(b) = cov[psl, (pf1-po)] and I2 = Io of dealer 2f 
This time, the bid-ask spread is: 
(pa-pb) = (µs - µg) + X/2 
[k1ß 2+k2ß 2] 
- (k1I1a 
2-k212ß 2) 
12 Psl Pat J psl Pat 
- cov(a)/ßpf 
2I (µf1 p 
0)-cov(a)k1Il+cov(a)k1X/21 
+ cov(b)/a 
fz 
[(fPfO)cov(b)k2I2cov(b)k22] 2 (22) 
In contrast to the bid-ask spread in the monopoly case, this time, the bid 
ask spread depends also on the dealers price expectations, for spot prices 
and for futures prices, and on their inventory levels. 
4.2.2.1. Comparative Statics Analysis 
In order to examine the influence of changes in the various parameters on 
the bid-ask spread we carry out a comparative statics analysis for the ask 
price (20) and for the bid price (21). 
I is, defined as 10 of the respective dealer. 
The first order derivatives for the ask side: 
1. Effects of the risk ave 
Spa/8k = [(X/2)-I] 
rap 2- 
Ls 
with 
la 2- (cov(a)2/6 2' 
ps Pf 
which is cr 
[1 1-r21 >0 
rsion parameter on the ask price: 
(cov(a)2/6 2)] (23) 
II=6P32 
[1-cov(a)2/Q 
P3 
26pf2 
I 
where r2 is the correlation coefficient of pf and ps. 
Hence, the last term in the square brackets on the RHS of (23) is positive. 
But still, equation (23) does not tell us unambiguously the sign of the 
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right hand side. We know that X is positive, but the dealer can be short or 
long in inventory. 
The influence of the risk aversion of a dealer depends on the sign of 
[(X/2)-I]. Hence theoretically, we can get a positive or a negative 
relationship between the k and pa, i. e. 
if [(X/2)-I] > 0, with increasing k pa increases as well. 
If [(X/2)-I] < 0, with increasing k pa decreases. 
Hence, a dealer with increased risk aversion and a large inventory position 
is in a worse position of hedging her inventory and as a result she wants 
to sell and, therefore, she reduces her ask price. 
2. Ask price moves with changing inventory I: 
2)1 (24) Spa/S1 = -k 
[a2 
- (cov(a)2/a 
.I 
We see that a2- (cov(a)2/(T 2) can be positive or negative which means PS Pf 
that with a large spot price variance the expression is positive and hence 
the relationship between the ask price and a change in inventory is 
negative. 
3. Order size influence: 
5pa/SX = k/2 
[ap 
s2 
- (cov(a)2/a pf 
2(25) 
J 
Again, the expression in the square bracket can be positive or negative. If 
the spot price variance is large compared to the covariance and the 
variance in the futures price we get a positive relationship of the order 
size and the ask price. The dealer does not like to take the risk of a 
large transaction size and therefore increases- the ask price in order to 
avoid large transactions. 
4. Effects of the spot price variance: 
Spa/Sa 2=k [(X/2) - Il J 
(26) 
If the order size is relatively small compared to the inventory position, 
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i. e. 
[(X/2) 
- I] <0 we get a negative influence of the price variance on J 
the ask price. 
This makes sense as a risk averse dealer with a high inventory position 
wants to sell the asset if the spot price variance increases (given the 
same hedging conditions in the futures market) and therefore she lo wers the 
ask price. 
5. Effects of the futures price variance: 
)+ kcov(a)[(X/2)I]] Spa/6c 2= -cov(a) 
[(tp (27) 
0 
The influence of a change in the futures price variance is more difficult 
to evaluate and the analysis is not so straightforward compared to the 
derivation of the other parameter effects. 
What we can say is that the covariance of spot and futures prices and the 
expectation about the future price are important. In addition, the sign of 
the second term in the bracket on the right hand side of (27) changes 
depending whether the dealer is short or long in the inventory. 
), and [(X/2)-I] are positive then If we assume that cov(a), (. t-pf the ask o 
price decreases with an increase in the futures price variance. 
This is in line with the findings above. With an increase in the variance 
the dealer prefers to sell today rather than to wait and bear the increased 
futures price risk. 
6. Influence of the future price expectation: 
6pa/Sµf = -cov(a)/ß 
2 (28) 
p f 
It is clear that the price expectation depends on the covariance between 
the spot and the futures prices and the futures price variance. 
If we have a negative covariance between spot and futures prices then we 
get a positive relationship between the futures price expectation and the 
ask price. 
In other words, if the dealer expects the future price to rise, with the 
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negative covariance the spot price is expected to rise and hence, the 
dealer increases the ask price as she is not willing to sell at a lower 
spot price. Similarly, if she expects the future price to rise and assuming 
a positive covariance, the spot price is expected to fall. Now, the dealer 
likes to sell and therefore lowers her ask price. 
7. Role of the covariance of spot and futures prices: 
Spa/Scov(a) = -(1/ßp 
2)(µf-p ö) 
- 2kcov(a)[(X/2)-I] (29) 
f 
This first order derivative does not give any conclusive answer. The 
influence on the ask price depends on the sign of the covariance and the 
signs of (µf-p 0) and [(X/2)-I]. As we generally expect that cov >0 and 
(µf-p ö) >0 and by assuming that [(X/2)-I] >0 we get a negative 
dependence between the ask price and the covariance. 
The first order derivatives for the bid side: 
1. Changes in the risk aversion parameter: 
2] (30) 8pb/8k = [(X/2)+I] 
[(cov(b)2/2) 
-6J 
with [COVtb2/a2) -6 2] =a2 [covb2/a2a1,2 (()- 1I psJ 
which is ßps 2f r2 - 11 <0 
We face the 
L 
same 
J 
situation compared to the ask side analysis. If [(X/2)+I] 
> 0, with increasing k pb decreases. 
If [(X/2)+I] < 0, with increasing k pb increases as well. 
By analysing the first case, where the dealer holds a positive inventory 
position, we show that the dealer lowers the bid price with increasing risk 
aversion as she does not want to buy more of the risky asset. If the dealer 
is short in inventory she increases the bid price with increasing risk 
aversion in order to buy now rather than to wait any longer and hence bear 
the price risk. 
176 
2. Effects of changing inventory position: 
Spb/SI = k[(cov(b)2/ 6 
2) 
-62J1 (31) Pf P. 
The exp ression in the square bracket can be positive or negative. If we 
assume that the sign of this term is negative we get a negative 
relationship between inventory and bid price. It implies that with 
increasing inventory, the dealer lowers the bid price because she does not 
want to buy anymore. 
3. Order size changes: 
21 (32) Spb/SX = k/2 
[(cov(b)2/ 
6 Pf 
2) 
-a Ps J 
Again this t ime the sign of the term in the square bracket can either be 
positive or negative. If the spot price variance is relatively large the 
expression is negative and we obtain a negative relationship which means 
that with increasing order size the dealer lowers the bid price in order to 
induce less trade. 
4. Influence of changes in the spot price variance: 
Spb/Sap 2= -k 
[(x/2) 
+ I] (33) 
.1 
If the dealer is long in the inventory position an increase in the spot 
price variance results in a decrease in the bid price as the dealer does 
not want to buy and does not want to take the spot price risk. 
However, if the dealer has a short inventory position which is large enough 
that [(x/2)+I] <0, the dealer can profit from buying with an increase in the 
spot price variance and hence, the bid price increases. 
5. Effects of the futures price variance: 
2= 
-cov(b) 
[(µf-p ö) 
- kcov(b)[(X/2)+I]] (34) 5pb/Sß Pf LJ 
We encounter a similar problem as in the ask side case. The influence of a 
change in the futures price variance on the bid price is inconclusive and 
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depends on the sign of the covariance, the sign of (µf p ö), and the sign 
of [(X/2)+I]. 
6. Changes of the future price expectation: 
5pb/Sµf = -cov(b)/6 
2 (35) 
f 
Under the assumption of a positive covariance, we get a negative 
relationship between the bid price and the future price expectation. If the 
dealer expects a high future price the spot price fall. The dealer is not 
willing to buy in the spot market and sell the asset in a future point in 
time as it is not profitable. Hence the dealer lowers her spot bid price. 
7. Influence of changes in the covariance of prices: 
f )+ 2kcov(b)[(X/2)+I] (36) 6pb/6cov(b) = -(1/a 
2)(µf-p 
ö f 
Again, we cannot say anything conclusive about the influence. It depends on 
the signs of the covariance, (µf-p ö), and [(X/2)+I]. 
We are particularly interested in the situation where the bid-ask spread 
may be widened through trading in futures. Therefore, we analyse the 
changes in the futures price variance Cr 2 and the futures price Pf 
expectations µf. 
Proposition II : The ask price will be increased if either: 
- there is an increase in a 
2 and cov < 0, (. t p ö) > 0, [(")-1] <0 Pf 
or there is a decrease in a 2 and cov > 0, (µf-p ö) < 0, [(X/2)-I] < 0. p f 
The bid price will be decreased if either: 
- there is an increase in c2 and cov < 0, (µf-p 
ö) < 0, [(X/2)-I] <0 Pf 
or there is a decrease in a 2 and cov < 0, (µf-p ö) > 0, [(X/2)-I] > 0. 
p f 
At the same time, the effects of chang es of the futures price expectation 
give us the following results: 
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Proposition III : There is an increase in the ask price if either: 
- the dealer has an optimistic futures price expectation and cov <0 
or the dealer expects the futures price to fall and cov >0. 
There is a decrease in the bid price if either: 
- the dealer's futures price expectation is optimistic with cov >0 
or the dealer expects the futures price to fall with cov < 0. 
If we take proposition II, both the first cases for the ask price and the 
bid price we have the following situation. 
The selling market maker who is long in the inventory expects an increase 
in the futures price variance. At the same time, she expects the futures 
price to rise. With a negative covariance the spot price is expected to 
fall which means that the dealer expects to make a gain in a distant point 
in time by not selling now. Hence she is not prepared to sell today which 
results in the fact that she increases her ask price. 
On the other side, the buyer who is short in inventory expects the futures 
price variance to rise. In addition, the dealer expects the futures price 
to fall. The result is that the dealer would make a loss by buying now and 
therefore she lowers her bid price. In this situation just described, the 
crucial difference is that the selling dealer is long in inventory and 
expects the futures price to rise whereas the buying dealer is short in 
inventory and she expects a decrease in the futures price. 
4.2.3. Equilibrium Conditions 
In the following section we consider the two dealer case with dealers who 
are not identical and differ in their degrees of risk aversion, their 
inventory levels and their price expectations. 
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4.2.3.1. Spot Market Equilibrium 
The determination of the equilibrium in the spot market is given by the 
individual prices which we derived earlier from equation (20) and (21) which 
are 
pa = µa + klaPS 
2[(1/2)X 
- Il] - [cov(a)/a 
21(µf 
-p 
ö) 
1 fl 1 
- [klcov(a)2/ßp 
2] [(1/2)X - II] and 
fl 
pb = µa -k 2a 
2[12 + (1/2)X] - [cov(b)/a 
21(µf 
-p 
0) 
2 a2 f2 1 
+ [k2cov(b)2/ßpf 
2] [I2 + (1/2)X] 
2 
We can rewrite these prices as 
pa = µ5l + [(1/2)X - II](k1aPS 
2- kIcov(a)2/6pf 2) 
- [cov(a)/ap 
2](µf 
-p 
0) and 
fI 
1 
pb = µ, - [I2 + (1/2)X](k2(7 
2- k2cov(b)2/6 2) 
2 Pat pf2 
- [cov(b)/a 
2](µf 
-p 
0) 
f2 
2 
Under the assumption that market makers are homogeneous except in their 
inventory levels, dealers differ in the second expression on the RHS of the 
price equations only. Thus, if we assume the there are several competing 
dealers in the spot market we get the same Bertrand type equilibrium as HS 
which is that the market prices are determined by the second best dealer's 
prices (bearing in mind that the market makers know each others' 
reservation prices and that the order is indivisible). 
Although the prices themselves are different compared to "pure" spot market 
trading we can still model the process of reaching this equilibrium as a 
second price or Vickrey auction. 
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4.2.3.2. Futures Market Equilibrium 
In order to determine the equilibrium we have to add the analysis of a 
fourth type of market participants which are the speculators who only trade 
in the futures market. 
The speculator also maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth which is: 
EU(Ws) = (µsp -p 
ö)N 
- k/2(02fSP )N2 (37) 
Maximizing expected utility over N results in an optimal futures position 
of the speculator of. 
NSP = (j - pf 0)/ks, aýf 
(38) 
SP 
We assume that the market makers active and non-active in the spot market 
are the only participants in the futures market together with the 
speculators. 
In equilibrium there is no excess demand or supply and therefore, in the 
futures market, the following condition must hold: 
VNB+WNN. 
I, +YNS+ZN5P=0 
(39) 
with VB, WNT, YS, Z5P, being the number of buyers, non-traders, and sellers 
in the spot market and the number of the speculators active in the futures 
market respectively. 
NB, NN, 
I, and 
NS, are the optimal futures positions, derived earlier, for 
the buyers, the non traders, and the sellers in the spot market. 
Substituting the optimal futures positions of equations (9), (13), and the 
optimal futures position of "no trade" which is: 
. 
NNI = (µ NT _p 
0)/kN16f 2- 
cov(NT)I/ßf 
2 
NT rrr 
and the optimal futures position of a speculator into equation (39), we 
finally get the current futures price p ö: s 
5Calculations see appendix C. 
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p0= S[f2 ) [B-kbcovbuB+x] 
+ (W/kNT(Tf ) 
[(-kcov(rrrXI] 
+ (Y/ksafs2)[(µs)-kscov(a)(IS X)] 
+ (Z/ksPßf 
2)(µ & (40) 
SP 
with S= 
[(v/1cf 2)+(w/kNT(If 2)+(Y/kS6f 
s 
2) + (ýSP6f 2)1-1 
B NT SP J 
Let us define: 
M= VB + WNi + YS + Zs, (total number of agents) 
Furthermore, we assume that the dealers have the same degree of risk 
aversion and have homogeneous expectations. The current futures price pö 
is determined by: 6 
pö =µf - (kcov()/M) 
[v(I8+x)ýwý. 
+Y(Ix)J (41) 
Under our assumption for the spot market that only one order arrives at the 
time, equation (41) simplifies as either V or Y is zero depending whether a 
sell order or a buy order is executed in the spot market. 
If we look at today's financial markets with professional market makers 
with sophisticated screen trading and instantaneous information about price 
changes the above assumptions seem reasonable. 
Hence, equation (41) shows us that the futures price is mainly a function 
of the number of dealers in the market, their degree of risk aversion, the 
variance of the futures price, the covariance of the spot and futures 
prices, and the inventory positions of the hedgers. 
6Details see appendix C. 
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4.2.4. Robustness of the Futures Market Equilibrium 
We conduct an analysis of the equilibrium conditions which are given in 
equation (41). The aim is to examine how robust these equilibrium 
conditions are in respect of the number of participants, the differences in 
the inventories of the hedgers, and the influence of the price variances 
and the covariance of spot and futures prices. 
Comparative statics results: 
We define [Y(Is X)+V(IB+X)+WIN. I] to 
be [I]. 
1. Influence of risk aversion: 
Spfo/Sk =- covO[I]/M (42) 
The result is not very clear. The influence of the degree of risk aversion 
on the futures price depends on the sign of the covariance and whether the 
overall inventory position of all dealers in the market is long or short. 
2. Changes in the number of market participants: 
5pfW5M =- kcov()[I] (43) 
Also this time, the dependence is subject to the sign of the covariance and 
the inventory term which includes the proportion of the number of 
sellers, buyers, and non-traders. 
If cov() >0 and [I] >0 we have a negative relationship between M and pfo. 
This finding can be explained by the increased possibility of sharing the 
risk among a higher number of market participants and as a result ' the lower 
cost of trading. 
3. Influence of changes in the covariance: 
5pfo/5cov() =- k[I]/M (44) 
The change in the covariance may have a positive or negative impact on the 
futures price depending on the sign of the inventory term. 
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If [I] >0 we get a negative correlation between the covariance and the 
futures price which is reasonable because with an increase in the 
covariance dealers are in a better position to hedge their long inventory 
and can thereby reduce the risk of holding the asset. 
As a consequence of the higher demand in futures the futures price is 
reduced. 
4. The effect of the inventory positions: 
5pfW5[I] =- kcovO/M (45) 
The sign of the covariance determines the relationship between the futures 
price and the inventory. 
With a positive covariance we get a negative dependence which means that 
with an increasing inventory (assuming the same degree of risk aversion) 
there is an increased demand of hedging by trading futures and hence the 
futures price decreases. 
The results of our comparative statics analysis show that the futures price 
is determined by the covariance between the spot and futures price, the 
degree of risk aversion of dealers, the respective individual (in terms of 
buyers, sellers, "not active traders in the spot market", and speculators) 
inventory positions, as well as the number of market participants. 
However, we have not shown yet how important the respective proportion of 
the various participants is, especially in respect of the speculators. This 
is done in the next analysis. 
Such an analysis examines what happens in equilibrium if one or several 
groups of market participants disappear from the market. 
The tables with the results of the spread sheet analysis are shown in 
appendix D. 7 
7The analysis is based on a spread sheet calculation of the equilibrium 
equation (41). 
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The basis of the analysis is the situation with an equal number of each 
type of agent. If we eliminate one group of participants we can see the 
influence on the current futures price. 
1. If we eliminate the speculators, the current futures price is lowered. 
With an increase in the number of speculators the futures price is 
increased. 
2. The elimination of the buyers (buyers in the spot market) increases the 
futures price. On the other hand, if we increase the number of buyers the 
futures price decreases. 
3. If we assume that there are no traders in the futures market who also do 
not trade in the spot market then we can observe a slight decrease of the 
futures price. With an increasing number of this type of traders the 
futures price increases. 
4. The absence of any sellers in the futures market results in an increase 
of the futures price and the opposite is true that with an increase of the 
number of sellers the futures price falls. 
5. If we increase the number of speculators and buyers simultaneously the 
futures price is increased. On the other hand, if we increase the number of 
speculators and sellers, at the same time, then the the sign of the futures 
price is the same and the size of it is hardly changed. 
These findings show that the proportion of the number of the various agents 
does influence the determination of the equilibrium futures price. 
4.3. The Structure of a Model with Uncertainty in the Order Flow in the 
Spot Market 
The second part of this chapter deals with a different - kind of 
"microstructure model" for the spot market. So far, we assumed that the 
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market makers in the spot market have full information about the inventory 
positions of their competitors and that they also know about the order flow 
before they have to quote their prices. This type of model applies to a 
centralized market. 
Now, we consider an over the counter market where dealers compete without 
complete information about the public orders. We can think of a telephone 
market where dealers quote their prices by telematic circuit. Such price 
quotes are binding, but the trades are done over the phone with subsequent 
adjustment of the screen prices. 
We can illustrate the sequence of events as follows: 
pst pf 1 
(pa-pb) 
t+l 
$ P 
c+1 
Pf 
c+1 
X 
Figure 4.2.: Sequence of events with unknown X 
4.3.1. Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread with Symmetric 
Demand and Supply 
Initially we assume that traders know that the demand and supply functions 
are symmetric. 
The basics of the spot market model are identical to the features we 
discussed in the previous section, except that, for simplicity reasons, we 
assume that the order cannot be split between dealers. 
Also in this case, dealers maximize expected utility of terminal wealth. 
Terminal wealth is composed of. 
W1=c1+p1aI1+(P1f -pfo)N 
with cl : cash holding at time t+1 
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I1 : inventory position of the risky asset at t+l 
N: net futures purchases at t+l 
p13, p11: spot and futures prices respectively at t+1 
Again, we use a mean variance utility with risk averse dealers. 
Expected utility is : 
E(U) = E(WI) - k/2(VAR(Wl)) 
We assume independence between p1 and I. Hence we have: 
E(W1) = E(cl) + E(pl')E(I1) + E(plf-pö )N (46) 
where pö is the futures price at time t. The variance is 
VAR(W1) = Var(cl) + Var(pl'I1) + Var(plf-pof) N2 
+ 2cov(c1, pISI1) + 2cov(cl, (p1-Pö ))N 
+ 2cov(Pl"Il, (Plf-Pof))N (47) 
Still based on the assumptions that the order size is X and the order 
arrival rate is X, we calculate the expectations, the variances, and the 
covariances and we get: 8 
E(cI) = ct + XX(pa-pb) 
E(pl') = µs, var(p13) =a PS 
E(I1) = 10 
E(Plf)=Pf, var(plf)=gyp 
f 
Var(cl) = x, X2 
[(1)(pa2+pb2)+2xpapb] 
Var(II) = 2XX2 
Var(pI'II) = alp (2Ä. X2 + I02) + (µs)22X. X2 
S 
cov(c1, Pi$I1) = -XX2µ, (Pa+Pb) 
cov(C1, (Plf-p0f)) =0 
cov(P1'I1, (PIf-pof)) = cov(pl', p1f)Io 
Now, we can write the expected utility as: 
8The mathematics can be found in appendix E. 
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EU(W1) = c0 + XX(Pa-Pb) + µ, I0 +(µf Pö )N 
- k/2 
[ X2 [(1-, %)(Pa2+pb2)+2), papb] 
] 
- k/2 
[c? 
(2ÄR2 + I02) + (s)22%(2] 
- k/2(a N2) + k74L X2(pa+pb) - kcov(pIs, plf) oN (48) Pf 
The dealer sets her bid and ask prices knowing that she will optimize the 
futures position. Thus we first optimize over N. 
The first order condition of EU(WI) is: 
SEU(WI)/SN = (µf Pö )-kip N- kcov(pl', plf)I0 =0 As a result, 
f 
N= (µf PO )/kopf - coV(pl', pIf)I0& Pf 
(49) 
Compared to the optimal futures position in the previous model, we get an 
identical result. 
If we substitute the optimal position in (49) back into the expected 
utility function given in (48) and rearrange and simplify we end up with: 9 
EU(W1) = ct + AX(pa-pb) + .t 
I0 - (k/2) 
[[. X2 [(1-X)(pa2+pb2)+2Xpapb] ] 
- (k/2) 
[a2 
p 
(2XX2 + I02) + (t )22XX2I +pX2(pa+pb) 
+ (µf p0 )2/2ka2p 
f+ 
kcov(pl', plf)2102/2f 
p f 
' 
[(P_p01)cov(p1p1)I0] 
/apf (50) 
Under the zero profit condition (in a competitive market) the trader sets 
the expected utility EU(WI) equal to the expected utility of terminal 
wealth without any trading in the spot market EU(W0) which is: '° 
EU(W0) = c, + µ, I0 -(k/2)a I02 pa 
+ (µf pö )2/2kd2 + kcov(pl', plf)2I02/2a7 Pf Pf 
- 
[(µf 
p0 )cov(pl', pIf)I0]/c? 
f 
(51) 
J 
9Detailed calculation see appendix E. 
'°Details see appendix E. 
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Hence 
EU(WI) = EU(W0) = XX(pa-pb) - (k/2) 
[xx2 [(1X)(pa2+pb2)ý2Xpapb]] 
- (k/2) 
10ý5 (2, X2) + (R )22A, X2] + 4L X2(pa+pb) (52) 
Equation (52) is purely determined by the expressions coming from the spot 
market trading. Thus, the result shows that there is no influence of 
futures trading on the spot market bid-ask spread. 
Proposition IV : In a market where market makers do not know the order flow 
at the time they have to quote their prices and under the assumption of 
symmetric demand and supply, the bid-ask spread is not affected by trading 
in futures. 
One reason of this outcome could be that the demand and supply of the 
orders are both of the same size X and the resulting expected inventory is 
10 which is identical to the inventory position of a dealer who is not 
trading in the spot market at all. Based on our assumption of mean variance 
preferences and that the sell order is of the same size as the buy order, 
the dealer does not face an increase in risk and therefore the spread is 
unaffected in this setting. 
If it turns out that this assumption of symmetry in sell and buy orders is 
crucial in respect of the influence on the bid-ask spread, the traditional 
model may be a quite restricted versions of the real situation. Especially 
in dealership markets, dealers may not be in the position to close out 
their position ( i. e. balance their books) as 
_quickly 
as they wish to do 
so. There may be several reasons, for instance there is a thin market 'and 
the order arrival is very slow, or the competition among them is very hard. 
Another reason may be that there is a trend in the market. Therefore we 
change this restriction and introduce asymmetry in demand and supply. 
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4.3.2. Influence of Futures Trading with Asymmetry in Demand and Supply 
We assume that a purchase order is of size X and the sale order is of size 
Y. Then the respective expectations, variances, and covariances are: 11 
E(cl) = ct + X(paY-pbX) 
E(pis) = µs 
E(II) =1o+ X(X-Y) 
E(plf) = µf 
Var(cl) = (%-X2)(pa2Y2+pb2X2)-2?, 2paYpbX 
Var(I1) = ß, (X2+Y2) - (1X-ß, Y)2 
Var(P1SI1)=(a2 +(j. t )2) 
[(xx+xY)2_2(X2+Y2)]+0.2 
p'(A(X-Y))2 
cov(cl, pl°II)=-ß'µs 
[paY2+pbX2+(1-X)[A, (paY2+pbX2)-a. XY(pa+pb)]] 
cov(cl, (P1f-Pö )) =0J 
cov(P16I1, (Plf-Pö )) = cov(pl', p11)(ö+X(X-Y))) 
The expected utility can be written as: 
EU(W1) = ct + X(paY-pbX) + µs(I0 + 1(X-Y)) + (µf p0 )N 
- (k/2) 
[(? 2)(a2Y2+b2X2)2X2YbX] 
- (k/2) 
[(gyp 
+(µs)2) 
[(+Y)2 2(X2+YZ)] +az(I+X(X-Y))2 
J Js 
- (k/2)a N2 - kcov(pls, p, 
f)(6+1(X-Y)))N 
Pf 
+ kX, µs 
[paY2+pbX2+( 1-X) [?, (paY2+pbX2)-XXY(pa+pb)]] (53) 
If we take the first order derivative of (53) and optimize over N we get an 
optimal futures position of 
N= (µf po )/kaPf - cov(pl', plf)(ö+%(X-Y)))/a2 Pf 
(54) 
11Calculations are given in appendix F. 
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which differs in the inventory term compared to the futures position we 
derived above. 
Now, we substitute (54) into (53), calculate and simplify and we get an 
expected utility of 12 
EU(W1) = ct + X(paY-pbX) + µ$(Io + A, (X-Y)) 
- (k/2) 
[(2)(Pa2Y2+b2X2)2: Aw2PaYPbX] 
- (k/2) 
[(a2 
+(µg)2) 
[oxýx)2x2(X2+Y2)] 
+Y(0+A, (X-Y))2 
J 
+ klg, 
[paY2+pbX2+( 1-X) [7, (paY2+pbX2)-XXY(pa+pb)]] 
+ (µf pof)2/2k& + kcov(pl', plf)2[Io+ý, (X-Y)]2/2dß 
J 
Pf Pf 
- 
[(1p0)cov(p1p1i)[ 
ö+X(X-Y)]]/a2 (55) 
J 
This time, the %-term differs compared to (48) due to the asymmetric demand 
and supply. The next step is to set EU(W1) = EU(W0) which gives us the 
impact of futures trading on the spot market bid-ask spread. 
EU(W0) is taken from equation (52) and we get 13 
X(paY-pbX) + µs(X(X-Y)) - (k/2) 
[(2)(pa2Y2+pb2X2)2X2paYpbX] 
- (k/2) [(+()2) [(xx+, Y)22(X2+Y2)] 
S 
+ ap [2XIo(X-Y)+ß, 2(X-Y)2]] 
J 
+ kXµs 
[paY2+pbX2+(1-? )[X(paY2+pbX2)-XXY(pa+pb)]] 
=- kcov(p, , plf)2[2XI0(X-Y)+ß, 
2(X-Y)2]/2aß' 
J 
Pf 
+ 
I(gf7p,, )cov(pl', plf)[X(X-Y)]/C2Pf (56) 
J 
The left hand side of (56) shows the terms' which are generated by the 
activity in the spot market whereas the right hand side gives the 
12Calculation are in appendix F. 
13Details see appendix F. 
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expressions derived from futures market trading. 
The spot market bid-ask spread function turns out to be quadratic in pa and 
pb and we find also products of pa, pb in it. Typically, if we solve the 
problem of the bid-ask spread we would get more than one solution. 
This implies that the optimization problem of the bid price and the ask 
price are not independent anymore. The ask price is a function of the bid 
price and the order arrival rate X, and vice versa, the bid price is a 
function of the ask price and the order arrival rate X. 
4.3.2.1. Analysis of Influence on the Spot Bid-Ask Spread 
To facilitate our analysis we can write (56) as F(pa, pb, O) = G(6). The 
calculation under a comparative statics analysis is not so straightforward 
as it has been in the previous section. First, we have to define the 
respective comparative statics equations. 
In order to compare the influence of the various spot and futures market 
parameters on the spot bid and ask prices we have to evaluate the 
derivative of pa and pb in respect of the particular parameter. 
Thus, we have (SF/Spa)dpa + (8F/80)d8 = (5G/59)d9 and 
(SF/Spb)dpb + (8F/56)d9 = (8G/56)d6 with 0 taking the value of the 
respective parameters which are: a, µ,, and X for the spot market and 
s 
CP, µf, and cov(ps)pf) for the futures market. We then can solve for dpa 
f 
and dpb in order to get the marginal change in the spread S= (dpa-dpb). 
dpa = [(5G/80) - (8F/56)]d6/(5F/5pa) and 
dpb = [(5G/58) - (SF/50)]d6/(5F/5pb) so that the change in the spread is 
dS/SA = [(SG/SA) - (8F/60)]dO [1/[(8F/5pa) - (SF/Spb)] 
However, this analysis does not give us any clear evidence of the effects 
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of the various parameters on the bid and ask prices. By differentiating the 
LHS of (56) with respect to pa and pb we get 
(SF/Spa)dpa 
_ [), Y-k%Y2pa+kX2Y2pa+k 
2YpbX+k? 4L Y2+ka, 2J L Y2 
-kVgsy2-kX gsXY+02gSXY] dpa (57) 
(SF/5pb)dpb 
_ [-XX-kXX2pb+]cX2X2pb+kX, 
ZYpaX+kkg X2+kX2. L X2 
-k'23 t X2-': 
VgsXY+Wg, XY] dpb (58) 
These two expressions are too complicated to be evaluated if we try to 
extract the influence, for instance, of the spot price variance on the 
bid-ask spread which is: 
(SF/& 2 )d& = (k/2)[1 + [2 I0(X-Y) + 2% 2 (X-Y) 2 fldca (59) 
5P: 3 
dS = (dpa - dpb) in respect of the parameter 
dP is 
s 
= -[(SF/Sad )daz /(SF/Spa)] + [(SF/6a2 )da /(SF/Spb)] (60) Ps Ps Ps Ps 
With the substitution of dpa and dpb of (57), (58) and (59) into (60) we 
see that the sign of the overall change can not be determined. 
Unfortunately, this is the case for all the various parameters. 
Under the assumption of an asymmetric order flow we show that the futures 
market trading affects the prices in the spot market. However, the 
influence on the bid-ask spread is to complex too evaluate within such a 
framework. 
What we can observe is that the important determinants of the spot bid-ask 
spread are the inventory position, the difference between purchases and 
sales, the order arrival rate, the covariance between the spot and futures 
price, and the difference between the expected futures price and the 
current futures price. 
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4.3.3. Futures Market Equilibrium Conditions 
We examine the equilibrium condition for the asymmetric case. We define: 
N: number of sellers and buyers who are active in the spot and futures 
market. 
M: number of speculators who only trade in futures 
T: total number of dealers in the futures market with 
T=N+M 
To facilitate the analysis we assume that the dealers are homogeneous in 
their expectations and in their degrees of risk aversion. 
In order to have an equilibrium situation the following condition must 
hold: 
N [(1p0)ii-[cov(I0ýx(x-Y)}/c? ] +M 
[(gf 
pof )/ka 
]=0 (61) 
Under the assumption of homogeneous dealers with identical initial 
inventory positions we get a futures price of 
pof = µf - [(kcovI0)/T] [NX(X-Y)] (62) 
Compared to the model in section 4.2., i. e. without any order flow 
uncertainty, we observe an additional parameter which is X, the order flow 
probability. 
However, we do not distinguish between buyer, sellers, or non active 
traders as the dealers do not know what kind of order finally arrives or 
whether they will trade in this period at all. 
4.3.3.1. Equilibrium Analysis 
We analyse the comparative statics of (62) which are: 
1. Changes in the covariance: 
Spo /Scov =- (ld j T) [NX(X-Y)] (63) 
194 
The sign of the impact of changes in the covariance is determined by the 
sign of the inventory Io and of (X-Y). 
2. Influence of the degree of risk aversion: 
5p0 /Sk =- [(covlo)/T] [NA, (X-Y)l (64) 
The dependence is determined by the sign of the covariance, the inventory 
and the difference between purchases and sales in the spot market. 
3. Impact of changes in the inventory: 
Spö /8I0 =- [(kcov)/T] [N), (X-Y)] (65) 
The relationship between the changes in inventory and the futures price 
depends on the sign of the covariance and (X-Y). 
4. Influence of (X-Y): 
Spö /S(X-Y) (XNkcovlo)IT (66) 
What kind of impact (X-Y) has on the futures price is dependent on the sign 
of the covariance and the inventory. 
Hence, the crucial parameters which determine the nature of influence on 
the futures price are the inventory position, the covariance, and the 
difference between purchases and sales in the spot market. 
Until now, we examined and analysed the influence of futures trading on the 
spot bid-ask spread within a one period framework which makes sense as the 
futures trading is settled mark-to-market which means that the futures 
position is valued every day and margin payments have to be made to cover 
the daily open position. 
However, if we look at our model with uncertainty in the order flow in the 
spot trading dealers may change their optimal futures position if they know 
that they can adjust it in the next period after having learnt about the 
spot market trade. 
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Therefore, we extend the model in section 4.3. to a two period model with 
futures trading activity in both periods in order to see whether we find 
some intertemporal effects on the bid-ask spread. 
4.4. Intertemporal Effects of Futures Trading on the Spot Bid-Ask Spread 
For exposition purposes we analyse the symmetric case of the model in 
section 4.3.. In addition, we introduce spot market trading in the first 
period only. The sequence of events will give us an overview about the 
structure of the model. 
sfafaf 
2p 
t+2 
p 
t+2 tptp t+l p c+1 1-1-1 
(pap 
N X-I Nt1 
t+l 2t 
Figure 4.3.: Sequence of events with unknown X for two periods 
We will solve this two period problem by the method of backward induction. 
4.4.1. Influence of Futures Trading on the Spot Bid-Ask Spread 
Grossman and Miller's model (1988) explains the optimal pricing strategies 
of the market participants over two periods. The model is equally 
applicable to the spot and the futures market. However, they do not try to 
link the two markets and to examine the interdependence of the two markets. 
In our model, we investigate the pricing policies in the same line, but we 
take into account the interdependence of the two markets. 
We can write the utility of terminal wealth at the end of the second period 
as: 
W= C1 + P1II1 + (Plf-P0 )Nl + (P2f-pif)(N1+N2) (67) 
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with Nl = net purchase futures committed at t and maturing at t+2; N2 = net 
purchase futures committed at t+l and maturing at t+2. 
In the second period the following variables are known: 
PIf' Pi , X' Ii' po' ci 
The only unknown parameter is p2f. 
As a consequence we can write the expected utility as 
EU2(W) = cl + p1$Il + (p1 -PO )NI + E2(P2f plf)(N1+N2) 
- (k/2) o-2 f 
((N1+N2)2 (68) 
2 
with: 
var(p2f) = UZ f 
First, we derive the optimal futures position N2 which we obtain by 
optimizing EU2(W) over N2: 
5EU2(W)/5N2 = E2(p2f-plf) - ko2f N2 -&f Nl =0 
2z 
N2 = [E 2(p2f-plf)]/& f- 
N1 (69) 
2 
The optimal futures position in (69) is replaced in (68) and after 
rearranging we get: 14 
2 
U*2(W) = cl+pl°I1+(plf-pä )N1+[E2(p2f-plf)1 /2k2f2 (70) 
Moving to the first period we have pof, pa, and pb as the known variables 
and E2(p2f), pif, pl', X and II are the unknown variables. We define the 
expected utility as: EUI = E1(U'2) - (k/2)Varl(U. 
- 
2) 
Hence, we can write 
' E1(U* 
2) 
= E1c1 + ElplsEIII 
2 
E1(pl f-p0 f )NI 
+ E1 [[E2(p2_p1t)] /2k(yz fi 
] 
14Mathematics are given in appendix G. 
(71) 
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Varl(U*2) = Vlcl + V1(pl°II) + V1(plf _p0 )N12 
+ Vl 
[[E2(p2_p1)] 
/2&f 
]+ 
2cov(cl, pl'Il) 
2+ 
2cov[cl, (Plf-P0 )]Nl + 2cov 
[c1[E2(p2'.. 
p1)]2/2kf] 
Z 
+ 2cov[pl'II, (PIf-Po )]N1 + 2cov 
[p1$11, [E2(p2f_p1f)]2/2ka2f] 
1 Nl (72) + 2cov f-Paf), [E2(P2 -PIf )] /2&f2J 
Furthermore, we assume that X and (ý f2 are independent of pI' and p11. Also, 
there is no dependence between cl and the futures prices pIf and p2f which 
results in the fact that cov[cl, (plf pö )]=0 and 
(' 
cov I 
LCl, 
[E2(P2f -Pi )]2 /RCS 
1=0. 
2J 
The resulting expected utility is: 
EUl = Elcl + EIpI'E1I1 + E1(Plf PO )NI + E1 
[[E2(p2f.. 
p1f)]2/2ka21] 
- (k/2) ['v'1c1 + V1(P131) + V1(P1f-P0f)N12] 
1- kcov(cl, pI$11) - (k/2)Vl 
[[E2(p2p1)} /2ka2 
f2 J 
2 
- kcov[P1'I1, (Plf-PO 
f )]NI - kcov 
[1si1, 
[E2(p2fp11)] /2ka2f21 
[(p1fp0f), 
- kcov [ E2(P2f-p if)] 
z 
/2kcý 
1 
IN, (73) 
2 
Now, we can optimise the expected utility over NI in order to get the 
optimal futures position. 
5EUI15N1 = E1(plf-p0) - kaf1N1 - kcov[pl'Il, (PlPOf)] 
[(p1pj)[E2(p2_p11)] 
- kcov 
i 
/2ka2f2J 1=0 
with var(P 
f) 
= 
1 fl 
which gives us: 
Nl = E1(Plf-P0 )/kd2f1 - cov[P1sI1"(PIf-POf)]/C; 
z 
fl 
i 
- coy (Plf Pö), [E2(P2f PIf)] /2&f2J /ýf1 (74) 
L 
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If we compare the optimal futures position in (74) with the respective 
position in the one period model in equation (49) we observe that now we 
have an additional term which* is the covariance between the futures price 
of the first period and the futures price of the second period, a pure 
speculative term which is not dependent of any inventory term. 
If we substitute (74) back into (73) and simplify we get: ls 
EUl = Elcl + E1p1sEII1 + E1 
[[E2(PZf.. 
P1f)}2/2ka2f] 
i 
- (k/2) 
[V1c, 
+ V1(P1'I1) + Vl [[E2(P2-Pi)] /2ka2f 
JJ 2 
- kcov(cl, pl'I, 
) - kcov 
[p, 311, [E2(p2f_p, f)]2/2ko2f] 
2 
+ [E, (Plf-PQ )l2/2kc 
2fI 
- E1(plf-po )cov[P1'I1, (Plf-POf)]/(ý fl 
+kcov[plI,, (pl-pö ))cov 
[p1sI,, [E2(p2f_p1f)]2/2kf ] /hfl 
+ (k/2)cov[P1'I11(Pif Po )]2/(ý f 121 
- E, (Plp0f)cov[pl'Il, [E2(P2f-Pif)] /2kazf 1/a2f 
22zi 
+ (k/2)cov 
[pIsl1, [EZ(P2f Plf)]2 )] /2ka2 f2J 
1 /a2f 
1 
(75) 
L 
If we replace the expressions of expectations, variances and covariances by 
the terms calculated already in the symmetric one period model we can 
rewrite the expected utility as: 16 
EUI = co + AX(pa-pb) + µala - (k/2) 
[[X2 [(lX)(pa2+pb2)ý2Xpapb]] 
- (k/2) 
[a2 (2. X2 + 02) + (µ)22XX2] +Xp X2(pa+pb) 
J 
+ E1(PIf-po )2/2kca'f + kcov(pIS'plf)Z 02/2G2f 
- 
[E1(p1f_p0f)cov(p1s, 
p1f)10]/0.2f 
1- 
+ [E1(Plf Pof)]2/2ko fI + 
E1 [[E2(p2f_p11)]2/2k02f] 
15Details can be found in appendix G. 
16Calculations see appendix G. 
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- (k/2)Vl 
[[E2(P2_P1)]2akaf] 
- kItcov[PI', [E2(P2f Pi )]Z/2kcý faJ 
+ (k/a2fl)Iocov(pl'plf)cov 
[p1tjE2(p2f-p1f)]2flka1] 
2[p11, 
[E2(p2f_p1f)]2/2kaf]2 - [El(P1Po)/a2f]cov 
i 
+ (k/2afI)COV I plf, [E2(p2 Plf )] /2ka2 f212 
(76) 
with: 
17 
cov 
[p1s11, [E2(p2f_p15]2/2ka2f] = 0cov 
[p1s, 
[E2(p2f_p1f)}2/2ka2f] and 
2 
cov 
[(P 
lf-P0 
), [E2(PZ -Plf )] /2kaýf 1= cov Ll plf, 
[E2(P2f Plf)]/2kýf2l 
2 
The last six terms on the right hand side of (79) represent the additional 
expressions for the second period. 
If we examine the optimization problem of a dealer who decides not to be 
active in the spot market for the two periods considered, although holding 
an inventory of the risky asset, then her expected utility is: 
EU2(WO) = cl + p1311 + (p1 -PD )NI + E2(P2f-PI 
)N2 - (k/2)a f2N22 
(77) 
We assume that the futures position NI taken at t matures at t+l; N2 is 
assumed to be taken at t+1 and matures at t+2. We do not have the idea of 
any adjustment, except changes in the futures position due to changes in 
the price expectation, as the dealer does not face any order uncertainty 
without any trade in the spot market. 
The change in the price expectation may come from the fact that the 
inactive dealer learns about the order flow which carries some information 
for the dealer to enable her to adjust her price expectation. 
Following the same procedure as before we derive the optimal futures 
17By symmetry, the result follows from the calculation of 
cov(pI'II, (PII p0 )) in appendix E. 
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position N2, and Nl which are: 18 
N2 = E2(P2f Plf )/kaf (78) 
a 
and Nl = EI(PIf-p0f)/kaf - cov[PI'I1, (Ylf P0f)]/(? f 
[(p1f_p0f), 
- cov[E2(P2f Plf)] /2kC2f 
1/a(79) 
2J 1 
The two optimal futures position are identical to the positions of the 
dealers who are active in the spot market except the adjustment term in N2 
which is missing in the position of the inactive dealer. 
It is easy to see that also this time the futures market terms cancel out 
if we set the expected utility of an active trader equal to the expected 
utility of a trader who does not trade in the spot market. 19 
As a consequence we get the same result as in the one period model that the 
futures trading does not influence the spot bid-ask spread. 
By modifying the model to two periods there are not any effects on the spot 
market bid-ask spread through trading in futures. 
The modification of asymmetric purchases and sales in the spot market 
trading would not change the basic finding of no additional influence of 
futures trading with two periods as the structure of our model does not 
account for spot trading in the second period. 
4.5. Conclusions 
Our analysis of the influence of futures trading on the spot market bid-ask 
spread gives evidence that the organisation of the spot market is 
important. 
18Mathematics can be found in appendix G. 
i9The respective utility EU(W0) is derived in appendix G. 
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If we consider a centralised market in which market makers have full 
information, i. e. the market is transparent, and the traders know the 
public orders then their futures trading may change the spot bid-ask 
spread. 
For the case of a monopoly dealer, for instance a specialist dealer, the 
result of futures trading is always a reduction in the spot bid-ask spread 
as the only parameter coming into the function is the order size X, the 
spot price variance, the degree of risk aversion, and the correlation of 
the spot and the futures prices. The market maker is able to lay off some 
of the price risk, by hedging the inventory, and therefore is in the 
position to narrow the spread. 
We can think of a market where traders are linked through a telematic 
circuit and they are bound to quote their prices on the screen which should 
be committing. Nevertheless, the actual trading occurs over the telephone. 
The reservation quotes on the screen enable the traders to deduce the 
inventory positions of their competitors. 
This allows them to set their prices in a way to get the orders under a 
Bertrand type price competition which means that they are, depending on 
their inventory and risk aversion, in the position to quote the "best" 
prices (which means the lowest ask price and the highest bid price). 
Investors are assumed to call the traders to inquire about the prices. In 
that way, traders learn about the public orders. Such a scenario represents 
our model in section 4.2. with competing dealers. If we analyse such a 
market the influence on the bid-ask spread through futures trading can be 
positive or negative depending on the covariance between the prices, the 
futures price expectations and the inventory positions of the dealers. 
The important factors are the differences in inventories . and the 
heterogeneous expectations among market makers. 
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If, for instance, the seller has a long inventory position and she expects 
the futures price to rise then she will increase the ask price. The dealer 
is less willing to sell today as she expects a higher futures price which 
makes it less attractive to sell today. On the other hand, if the buyer who 
is short in her inventory expects the futures price to fall she will 
decrease her bid price as it is less profitable to buy now. 
If we analyse an over the counter market (which is not transparent at all 
and where the traders do not know about the public order flow) then the 
result changes. 
According to the findings in our model in section 4.3., the futures trading 
does not have any influence on spot market trading if we assume that 
purchases and sales are symmetric. This comes from the fact that the 
expected inventory position with spot market trading is identical to the 
inventory position without any trading in the spot market. Hence there is 
no need for any hedging of the unknown spot market trading amount. 
However, the symmetric order flow and the assumption of mean-variance 
preferences turn out to be very restrictive assumptions. The expected 
inventory of a dealer who is active is the same as the expected inventory 
of a dealer who does not trade at all. Hence, the futures market trading 
does not affect the spot market bid-ask spread. 
In a dealership market, dealers may not be in the position to close out 
their position ( i. e. balance their books) as quickly as they wish to do 
so, and therefore the model with asymmetric purchases and sales seems more 
applicable. 
By changing this assumption for, the over the counter market we again can 
show that futures trading influences the spot bid-ask spread. 
This effect on the spread may be positive or negative which depends on the 
sign of the inventory, the covariance between the spot and the futures 
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price, the futures price expectations, and the difference between purchases 
and sales in the spot market. 
However, the model formulation does not allow us to determine unambiguously 
in which direction the spread is changed through futures trading. 
In case of uncertainty of the order flow, the result is not changed by 
extending the model to two periods. There is no intertemporal effect of 
futures trading observed. 
The conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that the influence of 
futures trading is subject to the organisation and market structure of the 
spot market trading. Depending on the information available in the market 
the spot market trader can set her bid and ask prices accordingly which may 
result in a larger spread if the dealer is also trading in futures. 
We have shown that in both circumstances, full knowledge of the order flow 
or not knowing about the order flow, there is an influence on the bid-ask 
spread of the spot market. In the first case, we even showed that the 
bid-ask spread may be larger with trading in futures due to differences of 
inventories and heterogeneous expectations among competing market makers. 
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APPENDIX A 
Non-Stochastic Order Flow: Section 4.2. 
Calculation of the expected utility of a buyer with 
an optimal futures position of: 
N= (9f 7p 
0)/kapf 2-covO(I+X)/6f 2 
EUB(Wl) _ (cö pbX) + µ9(I+X) - (k/2) ßp 
2(I+X)2 
s 
+ (µf p o) (µf p 0)/ka 
2-cov()(I+X)/a 2 
Pf f 
2 
- k/2 6pf 
l(gf-pf0)/1CUpf 
-COVO(I+X)/6Pf 
- kcov()(I+X) 
[(f)I2coO(I+X)/a2] 
which is: 
EUB(W1) = (cö pbX) +t (I+X) - (k/2) ap 
2(I+X)2 
+ (µf p 
0)2/kap 2-(µf 
pf 
0)cov()(I+X)/ap 
ff 
- 
ka 2(µ -pf )2/2k2(a 
2)2 
pf f0 Pf 
+ 2ka Pf 
2(µf-pf 
0)cov()(I+X)/2k(a pf 
2)2 
- ka 
2cov()2(I+X)2/2(a 2)2 
- k(µf p 
ö)cov()(I+X)/ka 2+ kcov()2(I+X)2/a 2 
Pf Pf 
After rearranging expected utility of a buyer is: 
EU8(WI) = (cö pbX) + .t (I+X) - (k/2) ßp 
2(I+X)2 
+ 1/2[(µf-pf 0 
)2/ka 
pf 
2] 
- (µ f -pf 0 
)cov()(I+X)/a 
pf 
2 
+ 1/2 kcovO2(I+X)2/6 2 
Pf 
Similarly the calculation of the expected utility of a seller is: 
EUS(WI) = (ö+paX) + µs(I-X) - (k/2) Cr 
2(I-X)2 
8 
+ (µf pf 
0) 
[(t. 
pficap 
2-cov()(I-X)/6p 2 
ff 
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- k/2 6pf 
(µf pfd/kßß 
f 
-covQ(I-X)/(Ypf 
2 
- kcov()(I-X) 
[(p_pf)&a2_covo(I_x)/a2] 
Pf f 
which is: 
EUs(W1) _ (0+P )+ µs(I-X) - (k/2) ap 
2(I-X)2 
S 
+ (µf Pf0)2/kap 
2-(µf 
pf 
0)covO(I-X)/ap 
2 
Pf f 
- ka 
2(µ 
-pf )2/2k2(a 
2)2 
Pf f0 Pf 
+ 2ka Pf 
2(µf 
-pf 0)covO(I-X)/2k((y Pf 
2)2 
- ka 
2cov()2(I-X)2/2((T 2)2 
- k(µf p 
ö)covQ(I-X)kap 2+ kcov()2(I-X)2/ap 2 
ff 
Finally we can simplify and we get: 
EUS(W1) = (0+paX) + µ9(I-X) - (k/2) ap 
2(I-X)2 
+ (1/2)(µ f -pf 0 )2/ka Pf 
2- (µf-pf0)covO(I-X)/a 
Pf 
2 
+ (1/2) kcov()Z(I-X)2/6 2 
f 
APPENDIX B 
Known Order Flow: Spread Equation 
The expected utility of a monopoly dealer isEUs(W1) for selling and EUB(W1) 
for buying. In order to calculate the spread we have EU(WI) = EUS(W1) + 
EUB(W1) 
which we can rewrite as: 
EU(W1) = (ö+paX)+µs(I-X)-(k/2)ap 2(I-X)2 
3 
+ (1/2)(µf P 0)2/kap 2- (µf p 0)covO(I-X)/aP 2 
ff 
+ (1/2) kcov()2(I-X)2/a 2 pf 
+ (cö pbX)+µ3(I+X)-(k/2)ap 2(I+X)2 
2 2 + (1/2)(gf Pf0)2/kapf - (I. x p 0)COVO(I+X)/ap 
+ (1/2) kcov()2(I+X)2/a 2 
pf 
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With EU(W1) > EU(W0) and 
EU(W0) =2 
[(ö+µs(Io)-(k/2)ß 2(Io)2 + (1/2)(µf P 0)2/kß 2 
Sf 
- 
(Rip 0)cov()(I0)/ßp 2+ (1/2) kcovO2(ID)2/ßp 2 
"ff 
we can simplify and get 
EU(W1) = (pa-pb)X - kaps 
2X2 + kcov()2X2/6f 2 
APPENDIX C 
Model of Section 4.2.: Futures Market Equilibrium 
Calculation of the futures price: 
In equilibrium: 
VNB + WNNT + YNs + ZsP =O 
By substituting the optimal futures positions into the 
equilibrium equation above and solving for p 0, we get: 
V 
[i. 
Bpfo&bafB2 
(f - cov(b)(IB+X)/6f 
2] 
BJ 
+WP 
fN. 
I 
pf0)/kNT(Tf 
2- 
cov(b)(I 
, 
)/af 21 
NT NT 1 
+Y 
[o. 
s. pfo/1csafS2 - cov(a)(IsX)/6f 
21 
SJ 
+Z [fsP_PfotsPafSP2] (µ =0 
which is: 
pf0 
[(V/k 
ba f 
2)+(W/kNT(Y 
NT2)+(Y/ks6f 
2)+(Z&SPßf 2) 
BS SP 
= (V/kbrf82) [B-kbcovbx1B+x] (µf 
+ (W/kN. l G f2) 
[()kcov(Isrr)(ý] 
+ (Y/ks(: r s2) 
[(i. 
i. s)_kscov()(Is_X)] + (Z&SP6f2)(µ SP) 
which we can rewrite as: 
Pf =S 
[(Vft. 2) [('. 
tB)-kbcov(bIB+X)] 
+ (W/kN. 2) 
[(-kcov(NrxI] 
µf + (Y/ksafs2) 
[(µ s)-kscov(a)(Is-X) 
+ (ýSP6f 2)(µ ) 
SP 
with 
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2)] 
1 
$_ 
[(V/kbcrfB2)+(W/kNT(YfNý)+(Y/ksafs2) 
+(UcspßfSP J 
Derivation of pö under homogeneous beliefs among dealers and identical 
degrees of risk aversion: 
pf=S &a2p 
f 
[Vgf 
- VkcovO(IB+X) + Wµf - Wkcov()IN,, 
+ Yµf - Ykcov()(IS-X) + 
Z. 1 f1 
with S= 1/(V+W+Y+Z)ka Pf = 
1/Mkc 
Pf , 
hence 
pf0 =1/M 
[M-covo [v(IB±)+wI+YIS-x)] 
and finally 
pf0= µf - (kcov()/M) 
[v(18ýx) 
+ WINT + Y(IS-X)] 
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APPENDIX D 
Robustness Analysis 
Futures price and varying numbers of agents: 
V 1 1 0 1 1 
W 1 1 1 0 1 
Y 1 1 1 1 0 
Z 1 0 1 1 1 
k 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Is 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Ib 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
I NT 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
X 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
E(pf) 90.1 90.1 90.1 90.1 90.1 
var(pf) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
cov( 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
M 4 3 3 3 3 
pf0 90.08 90.07333 90.08133 90.07733 90.088 
Futures price and varying numbers of agents: 
v 2 1 1 1 1 
W 1 2 1 1 1 
Y 1 1 2 1 2 
Z 1 1 1 2 2 
k 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Is 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Ib 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
I NT 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
X 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
E(pf) 90.1 90.1 90.1 90.1 90.1 
var(pf) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
cov() 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
M 5 5 5 5 6 
pf0 90.0792 90.0816 90.0752 90.084 90.07933 
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APPENDIX E 
Stochastic and Symmetric Order Flow: Section 4.3. 
E(c1) = X(ö+paX) + l(cö pbX) + (1-2? )co 
= Xcö aXpa+Xcö XXpb+co -2Xco = co + XX(pa-pb) 
E(II) = X( 0+X)+?, (Io X)+(1-2X)I0 = ö+AX+XIö XX+Iö 2? 0= 
Io 
E(pls) = µs , E(plf) = µf 
V(ct) = E[cI - E(c1)l2 =? 
[paX 
-? X(pa-pb)]2 
+ X[pbX - aX(pa-pb)] 
2+ 
(1-2)L) [ XX(pa-pb)] 
2 
=X 
[pa2x22xpa2x2ý2pa2X2+2xpapbx2.22papbX2+2pb2x2 
+? 2pb2X2-2A pb2X2+pb2X2-2X2papbX2+2XpapbX2+A, 2pa2X2 
+ , pb2X2-2XpapbX2+ , pa2X2+4), papbX2-2Vpb2X2-2X2pa2X21 
=. 
[pa2X2+pb2X2Xpa2X2+2XpapbX2Xpb2X2] 
= xx2 
[(pa2 
+ pb2) - X(pa - pb)21 
) 
[(I0_X)2_I02 
+ (ö+X)2.102 V(I1) = E[I1 - E(I1)]2 =X 
+ (1-2X)(I0 -I0] 
1 
=2, X2 
We assume that pt' is independent of I1. Thus we have 
V(pI'II) =E [(ps)2(I)2 - (EpIsEI1)2] 
2 
= E(pls I1 2) - E(pIs)2E(I1)2 
= E(pls )E(I12) - E(pIs)2E(I1)2 
= 
[v(p1s)+(E(p1s)2)] [v(I1)+(E(I1)2)] (E(pts)2)(E(I1)2) 
= var(pls)var(I1)+(E(I1)2)var(pls)+var(II)(E(p1s)2) 
= 0.2 
p 
(2%X2) + (o262p) + (2XX2)i. 1s2 
s 
P. 
= a2 
ps 
(2XX2 +1 
02) 
+ 4$2(2/X2) 
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cov(c1, p1sI1) =E 
[(c1 
- E(cl))(P1sI1 - E(P13)E(Il))] 
_E 
f l-paXplSao X)ApaXµsIö X? (pa-pb)XpI"(Iö X)+%2(pa-pb)Xµslo 
- kpbXpIS(Io+X)+XpbXg lo X, (pa-pb)XpI"(Io+X)+), (pa-pb)Xµslo 
- ), (pa-pb)Xpls(Io)+ , (pa-pb)Xµs(I0)+2X2(pa-pb)Xpls(Io) 
- 2?, 
2(pa-pb)Xµs(Io)} 
Take expectations over p13: 
_ %paXR, (Iö X)-, %paXµ9(I0)-XpbXµs( ö+X)+XpbXµs(I0) 
- ), (pa-pb)Xµs(Iö X)- , 
2(pa-pb)Xµs(I +X)+2), (pa-pb)Xµs(Io) 
= -XpaX2p. - XpbX2µs = -? X295(pa+pb) 
cov(cl, (Plf-POf)) =E 
[(cl 
- E(cl))[(plf-p0) - E(pIf-p0f)}] 
=E 
{XPaXP 
11-XpaXE(p11) -?, 
2X(pa-pb)p1f+?, 2X(pa-pb)E(pif) 
- XpbXp1f+?, pbXE(pIf) -? 
2X(pa-pb)p1f+A. 2X(pa-pb)E(plf) 
- XX(pa-pb)p1f+aX(pa-pb)E(pIf)+2), X(pa-pb)p1f 
- 2? 
2X(pa-pb)E(plf )} 
Take expectations over plf: 
_ XpaXE(pIf)-XpaXE(plf) - . 
2X(pa-pb)E(plf)+X2X(pa-pb)E(ptf) 
- XpbXE(pIf)+), pbXE(pIf) - , 
ZX(pa-pb)E(pIf)+? 2X(pa-pb)E(plf) 
- XX(pa-pb)E(pI )+A, X(pa-pb)E(p1)+2X2X(pa-pb)E(pif) 
- 2), 
2X(pa-pb)E(plf) =0 
which is a result we could expect as X and plf are the only random 
variables which are independent of each other. 
We still have E(I1) = Jo and thus 
cov(P1SI1, (Pif-po )) =E 
[(p S I1 - E(P1s)E(I1))[(Ptf-pof) - E(pIf-pof)]] 
=E 
{X(I0Xp15plf-%( I0 X)P1$E(Pl)-E(pls)Ioplf . 
+ E(pIS) OE(plf)+X( 0+X)plsplf-X(ö+X)p1SE(plf) 
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- E(pl$)Iop1f+E(P13) 0E(Plf)+P1SIoplf P1S 0E(Plf) 
- E(pls)Iop1f+E(P1s) 0E(Plf)-2Xp1sI0plf+2Xpls 0E(Plf) 
+ 2XE(pls)Ioplf-2XE(P1s) 0E(Plf )} 
=E{ 
[Pi S P, f-p, E(p I 
f)] [x(10_x)+x(10+x)+10_2x10] 
[E(p1s)p1f_Ep1Ep1] [3J_2IJ } 
Take expectations over pls and pIf: 
= 
[E(p1sp1_Ep 
1s)E(p1f)]IO - 
[E(p1s)E(p1f)_E(p1s)E(p1] [I(3_2)] 
we can rewrite E(plsplf) = cov(plsplf)+E(pIs)E(plf) and finally we get: 
cov(p1'I1, (plf pof)) = cov(pIspIf)Io 
The expected utility is: 
EU(WI) = co + XX(pa-pb) + µ31o + (µf po )N 
- (k/2)X. X21(1-? )(pa2 + pb2) + 2Xpapb] 
- (k/2) 
[1ý2 
P 
(2 , X2 + 02) + µs2(20(2)] - (k/2)a N2 
+ kXX2gs(pa+pb) - kcov(plsplf)1 NJf 
Substituting the optimal futures position N which is 
N= (µf p0 )/k62Pf - cov(pl'Ptf)I0 62Pf 
into EU(WI) : 
EU(W1) = co + A. X(pa-pb) + µslo - (k/2)Xt, X2 
1( 1-%)(pa2 + pb2) + 2%papb] 
- (k/2) 
[62P (2, X2 + I02) + µ32(2XX2)] + ka, X29s(pa+pb) 
SJ 
+ (l, 
f 
PO )2/k62P - (µf po )cov(pISPtf)Io/62P 
ff 
- (k/2(62Pf)2)6 
Pf 
(µf -P + k62Pf(µf P0)cov(plspl)/k(cY Pf 
)2 
- (k/2)62P cov(plspl)2 02/(62 )2 
ff 
- k(µf pof)cov(plsplf) 0/k62P + kcov(plsplf)2 02/62 P 
= co + ý, X(pa-pb) + gS10 
f 
(k/2)A, X2 r(1-%)(pa2 +f pb2) + 2Xpapb] 
- (k/2) 
[(2X2 
J 
+ I2) + 2(2X2)] + kXX2µ(pa+pb) 
+ (p-P 0 )2/k62Pf - (µfPö )cov(plspIf)I0aPf 
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- (µf p(If)2/2k& + 
(µf p0)cov(pIsplf)ID/y2 
Pf Pf 
+ (k/2)cov(p1splf)2I02/ 
2- (µf po )cov(pISplf)II 
dp 
Pf f 
Finally, we can simplify and get: 
EU(WI) = c0 + XX(pa-pb) + µ3l0 - (k/2)XX2 
1( 1-%)(pa2 + pb2) + 2a, papb] 
- (k/2) 
[o-2p (2XX2 + Io2) + 
s2(2XX2)1 
+ kXX2µs(pa+pb) 
+ (µf p0 )2/2kd2p 
f+ 
(k/2)cov(pI'plf)202/aýPf 
- (µf pO )cov(plsplf)ID ozp 
f 
If we set the dealers expected utility equal with the expected utility of 
no trade we obtain the influence of futures trading on the spot spread. 
The expected utility of a trader who is not active in the spot market 
simplifies a lot as there is no variance in the inventory and the cash 
position. 
Hence V(cI), V(II), cov(c1, p1II1), and cov(ci, (plf-pof)) are zero. V(p1"I1) 
is reduced to I0 2a2 
s 
The covariance cov(p1SI1, (p11 po ))is: 
cov(P15I1, (Plf-p0 )) =E 
I(PISH 
- E(Pls)E(I1))[(Plf-Po) - E(Plf-po )]] 
= p1SI0p1-pls 0E(p1f)-E(Pis)Ioplf+E(P1$)I E(Plf) 
if we take expectations over p15 and pIf we get 
= E(P1SPl)Iö E(Pls)E(Pt)I0 I0[E(Pls)E(pIf)-E(pIs)E(Plf)] 
= Io[E(P1SPtf)-E(Pls)E(Plf )] 
= Io[cov(plsplf)+E(pIs)E(plf)-E(Pls)E(Plf)] 
= cov(plsplf)I0 
Thus the expected utility of a non-active trader in the spot market is: 
EU(W0) = co + µslo + (µf pö )N - (k/2)(ýps ý2 - (k/2)Cý Pf 
N2 
- kcov(ptsplf) öN 
Derivation of the optimal futures position: 
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SEU(Wo)/SN = (µ-po )- kipf N- kcov(p13plf)I0 =0 
N= (µf po )/kcP - cov(plsplf) o/cý 
f Pf 
substituting back into EU(W0) : 
EU(W0) = c0 + µsio - (k/2)& 02 + (µf p0 )2/ka2 p 
- (µf p0 
)cov(pISpIf)I0/ý 
p 
ps 
ko-2 
Pf 
(µf p0f)2/2k2(a2 
pf 
)2 
+ 2kcý 
p 
(µf P0)cov(plspt )I0/2k2(c 
Pf 
)2 
- kýp cov(pISPIf)2)02/2(ýp 
)2 
f 
- k(µf p0f)cov(p1Splf)IO/kcp + 
kcov(plsplf)2I02/ýp 
ff 
EU(W0) = co + µt jo - (k/2)o p 
02 + (µf p0)2/2k&p 
- (µf pof)cov(plsp1f)I0/a2 + (k/2)cov(p sp 
f)2I l/a2 
pf 110 Pf 
EU(WI) = EU(W0) : 
co + XX(pa-pb) + µ$Io - (k/2)XX21(1-%)(pa2 + pb2) + 2Xpapb] 
- (k/2) 
[a2 
p 
(2? X2 + Iö) + µ2(2? X2)] + k& t(pa+pb) 
s 
+ (µf pof)2/2k6 + (k/2)cov(p1Splf)2 02/62 
Pf pf 
- (µf pö)cov(plspIf)I0 
ap 
= C0 + p. 10 - (k/2)62p I02 + (µf p0f)2/2kß2p 
- (ýL p 
f)cov(pIsplf) 0& 
p+ 
(k/2)cov(pl'plf)2 2/CY2 
p f 
_? X(pa-pb) - (k/2)AX2 (1-%)(pa2+pb2)+2xpapbl 
- (k/2) 
[cr2(2. X2) + µ2(2X. X2)] + kXX2µ(Pa+Pb) 
APPENDIX F 
Stochastic and Asymmetric Order Flow: Section 4.3. 
E(cl) _ X(ö+paY) + X(cö pbX) + (1-2?, )c0 
= a, cö XYpa+Xcö ), Xpb+co -2Xc0 = co + a, (paY-pbX) 
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E(I1) _ %(Io+X)A(Iö Y)+(1-2%)Io = ö+XX+%Io ? Y+Iä 2XIo 
=10+ %(X-Y) 
E(pis) = µs ' E(pif) = µf 2 
V(cl) = E[cI - E(cl)]2 _ %[paY - X(paY-pbX)] L22 
+% 
[pbX 
- X(paY-pbX)] + (1-2k) 
[ X(paY-pbX)] 
=X 
[pa2Y2.2Xpa2Y2+2pa2Y2+2XpaYpbX. 2? v2paYpbX+? 
2pb2X2 
+A, 2pb2X2-2Xpb2X2+pb2X2-2? 2paYpbX+2XpaYpbX+X2pa2Y2 
+ , pb2X2-2XpaYpbX+ , p2Y2+4VpaYpbX-2Vpb2X2-2Vp2Y1 
=X 
[pa2Y2+pb2X2Xpa2Y2+2paYpbXXpb2X2] 
= X(pa2Y2 + pb2X2) - X2(pa2Y2 + pb2X2) + 2X2paYpbX 
= (,, - X2)(pa2Y2 + pb2X2) + 2? 
2paYpbX 
+ (1-2., )(-X(X-Y))2 V(I1) = E[II - E(I1)]2 = %r-Y-X(X-Y)12 +x 
lx-%(X-Y)]2 
_ X[ß, 2Y2-2XY2+Y2-2). XY+2XXY+ , 
2X2+X2-2XX2+ 
, 
2X2+2XXY 
-2VXY+ß, 
2Y2+ß, Y2-2, XY+ß, X2-2Vy2+4VXY-2VX2J 
=? X2+? Y2-? 
2X2-Ä, 2Y2+2VXY 
= Ä, (X2 + Y2) - (AX - 
ÄY)2 
V(pISI1) =E 
r(p1S)2(I1)2 
- (Ep1SEI1)21 = E(p1 5 I12) - E(pls)ZE(I1)2 J 
= E(pIs 
2L 
)E(I12) - E(pIs)2E(I1)2 
= 
[var(p 
1s)+(E(p1s)2)] 
[var(I 
1)ý(E(11)2)] - 
(E(pts)2)(E(I1)2) 
= var(pls)var(I1)+(E(I1)2)var(p1S)+var(I1)(E(pIs)2) 
= alp (ýX+ß, Y)2_? 2(X2+Y2)+ 02)+2X, (X-Y)+(, %X-ß, Y)2 
sL 
+ µ, 
2[(Ä. X+xY)2-. 2(X2+Y2)]] 
V(pI'I1) _ (621$ 
[AX+Y22X2+Y2] 
+ 
2) 
+ ß2p (o+%l, (X-Y))2 
S 
cov(c1, p13I1) =E 
[(C1 
- E(cl))(pi3Il - E(pls)E(11))] 
=E 
fXp, 'paY(lo-Y)-), p1spaY(Io Y)+)Jp3pbX(Iö Y) 
-R paY(Io+X(X-Y))+), [t. aY(Io+X(X-Y)) 
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- X2LSpbX(ö+, %(X-Y))-%plspbX( ö+X) 
- ?4 1spaY(I +X)+Xp, 
spbX( ö+X)+XµspbX(IO+X(X-Y)) 
+ ), [tspaY( ö+ , (X-Y))-?, gspbX(lo+X(X-Y))-XpIspaYIo 
+ xpI"pbXIo+XµspaY(IO+;, (X-Y))-xµSpbX( ö+x(X-Y)) 
+ 2)2p I"paYI0), 
2p1spbXIO 2X2µspaY(ö+X(X-Y)) 
+ 2', 2 t pbX(ö+X(X-Y))} 
Take expectations over pls: 
= ? 4L paY (Iö Y- 0+ ö+XX-%Y-I0 XX+? Y) 
- X, tSpbX (0+XX-%Y-Iö X+I0 Iä ?. X+%Y) 
+ X2 µs paY (0+aX-? Y- 0+Y-Iö X+ 0+XX-A, Y+Io Iö-XX+%Y) 
+ X, 2.5 pbX (Iö Y-Iä %X+%Y+ ö+X-Iä X, X+%Y- ä+ ö+%X-%Y) 
= -? tSpaY2 - Xp pbX2 + (ý2p. paY-X2pSpbX)[(Y-X)+X(X-Y)] 
= AR (paY2+pbX2)+? 2µs(PaY-pbX) [(Y-X)+%(X-Y)] 
= -ß, µs 
[paY2+pbX2+( 1 -X) 
[paY2ýXpbX2XpaXpbYXpbXY]] 
= -ß, µs 
[paY2+pbX2+( 1-X) [X(paY2+pbX2)XY(pa+pb)]] 
cov(Pls11, (Plf-Po )) =E 
[(P SI 
I- 
E(P1S)E(I1))[(Plf-Po) - E(Plf-P0 )]] 
=E 
{X(10_Y)P13Ptf %(Io Y)P1sE(Plf)-E(pls)Iop1f 
+ E(Pls) 0E(Plf)+>, ( 0+X)p1sp11-X( 0+X)P1SE(pIf 
- E(p15)10p1f+E(pIS) 0E(pIf)+p1s1 
f pls oE(plf) 
- E(p13)10p1f+E(pIS) 0E(pIf)-2XpISIAf+2%pIS 0E(plf) 
+ 2XE(pIS)Ioplf-2XE(pIS) 0E(pif )} 
Ej [pspfpsE(pf)] [x(10-Y)+x(10+x)+10-2x10] 
- 
[E(p 
15)p 1f -E(pIs)E(plf 
)] [2X(10+X(X-Y))+(1-22, )(0+%(X-Y)), I 
Take expectations over pI' and pIf: 
_ 
[E(p 
13p 
f) E(p S)E(p 
1f)] 
(ö+%(X-Y)) 
- 
[E(p 
1s)E(p 1)-E(p 
s)E(Pf)] [(I0+(x_Y))] 
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we can rewrite E(plsplf) = cov(pIsplf)+E(pIs)E(pIf) and finally we get: 
cov(P1SI1, (Plf-Pa )) = cov(P1SPlf)(0+X(X-Y)) 
The respective expected utility is: 
EU(W1) = C0 +7 (paY-pbX) + µs(IO+X(X-Y)) + (µf pö )N 
- (k12) 
[(2)(a2Y2+Pb2X2)+22PaYPbX] 
- (k/2) 
[(c? 
+µ2)[(iX+%Y)2-2(X2+Y2)]+& (0+Ä(XY))2] 
ss 
- (k/2)ß Pf 
N2 - kcov(pI"PIf)(ö+X(X-Y))N 
- kµs 
[paY2+pbX2+( 1 -X) 
[x(paY2+pbx2)xxY(paýpb)]] 
Substituting the ooptimal futures possition N which is 
N= (µf Po )/kip - cov(P1sPlf)( ö+ý, (X-Y))/aP Pf f 
into EU(Wl) : 
EU(W1) = c0 + X(paY-pbX) + µs(ö+X(X-Y)) 
- (k/2) 
[(x. x2)(a2Y2+b2X2)+22paYpbX] 
- (k/2) 
[(a2 
+µs2)[(X, X+ß, Y)2-? 2(X2+Y2)]+ß2 (0+A, (X-Y))2] 
Ss 
- kg 
[paY2+pbX2+( 1-X) [x(paY2+pbX2)xY(pa+pb)]] 
+ (i f pö )2/ka -(µ-P 
o )cov(P1'Plf)( ö+%(X-Y))/& 
Pf Pf 
- (k/2)(; 
2 
f 
Er' ý )2I{2((2 )2 
f 
- 2(µf po)cov(p PIf)( 10 +>, (X-Y))/k(a2p )2 
+ cov(p1sp1f)2( 
o+X(X-Y))2/(&p 
)2J 
1 
f 
- k(µf pö)cov(pispif)( 0+)L(X-Y))/k62 Pf 
+ kcov(p 
lsp tf)2(l 
+)L(X-Y))2/a2 
Pf 
We can rewrite and get: 
EU(WI) = co + ?. (paY-pbX) + µ9( ö+X(X-Y)) 
- (k/2) 
[(X2) (pa2Y2ýpb2X2)+2? 2paYpbX] 
- (k/2) (62p +µs2)[(%l. X+%LY)2-%l, 
2(X2+Y2)]+ßZp (0+Ä. (X-Y))2I 
Ls, 
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- kp 
[paY2+pbX2+(1-,, ) [ (paY2+pbX2)-UY(pa+pb)] 1 
+ (µf p0 )2/2kGZp +(k/2)cov(pispif)2( 0+%1, (X-Y))Z/a2p 
ff 
- (µf p0f)cov(P1splf)(0+X(X-Y))/fyp 
f 
The expected utility of no trade is: 
EU(W0) = co + µsI0 - (k/2)cý p 
I0 2+ (µf pof)2/2kap 
- (µf p0f)cov(plsplf)IO/ y2pf + 
(k/2)cov(p1'plf)2 0a 
Pf 
Hence EU(W1) = EU(Wo): 
co + X(paY-pbX) + .t (I0+? (X-Y)) - 
(k/2) [(2)(pa2Y2+pb2X2)+22paYpbX] 
- (k/2) 
[(a2 
+µ2)[(X+Ä, Y)2-A. 
2(X2+Y2)]+&(0+X(X-Y))ZJ 
$9 
- kµs 
[paY2+pbX2+( 1 -) 
[x(paY2ýpbX2)xxY(pa+pb)]] 
+ (µf p0 )2/2ka2p +(k/2)cov(pisplf)2(1 +X(X-Y))2/a2 
Pf pf 
- (µf p0f)cov(P1spIf)(1 +%(X-Y))/& f 
= C0 +t Io - (k/2)(2p I0 
2+ (µf Pö )2/2ka2 P 
- (µf pö)cov(pispl 
f )1 /a2pf + (k/2)cov(pI pi 
f)2 Io /2 a2Pf 
It is obvious that some terms cancel out and we end up with: 
X(paY-pbX) + µs(X(X-Y)) - (k/2) 
[(X2)(pa2Y2+pb2X2)+22paYpbX] 
- (k/2) 
[(2 
PSs 
+µ32)[(%1, X+xY)2-x2(X2+Y2)] + ß2p (21J0(X-Y)+Ä, 
2(X-Y)? )J 
- kµ3 
[paY2+pbX2+(1-7. ) [x(paY2+pbx2)xxY(paýpb)]] 
=- kcov(p1sp1f)2[21I0(X-Y)+A2(X-Y)2]/2aß Pf 
+ (µf po)cov(pIspif)(X(X-Y))/ß2Pf 
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APPENDIX G 
Two Period Model: Section 4.4. 
U2(W) = c1 + P1SI1 +. (plt-P0)NI + E2(P2f-PIf)(NI + N2) 
- (k/2) czf (N1 + N2)2 
2 
optimal futures position N2 = E2(p2f plf)/ka 1- 
NI 
2 
Substitution of N2 into U2(W): 
U*2(W) = c1 + pIIII + (plf pö )NI + E2(P2f -PI 
f )Ni 
- E2(P2 Pif)N1+E2(P2 Pi )2/&f -(k/2)(Y2 f 
N12 
2z 
- k&f E2(P2f Pif)NI/ka'2f +(k/2)a2f N12 
22 
- k(Y2 f 
E2(P2f Plf)2/2k2(cý 
f 
)+&E Plf)Nl/kd2f - kýf N12/2 
2222 
we can simplify and get: 
U*2(W) = cI + p15I1 + (p1f-PO )NI + E2(P2f-plf)2/2ka2f2 
EUI = Eicl + E1p1SEII1 + El(plf-pof)NI 
+ Ei 
[E2(p2fp1f)2/2ka2f]-(k/2)VIcl-(k/2)V1(pSI) 
- (k12)V1 (p11-p 
f)N12-(k/2)VI [E2(p2f_p1o)2/2k02f] 
2 
- kcov(ci, p1sII)-kcov(P13Ii, (PIf-P f))NI 
- kcov(pI II, [E2(p2plf)2/2kß2f 
2 
- kcov((Plf-P 
f), [E2(p2f-plf)2/2k&f })NI 
2 
The optimal futures position N1: 
NI = Ei(P1f; P0 )/ka2f - cov(P13I1, (PIf-POf))/a2f 
- cov((Plf-PQ [E2(p2f-pIf)2/2kß2f ])& f 
21 
Replacing Ni in EU1 by the optimal futures position: 
f EUl = EIcl + EIpl sEIII + E1(pl -po 
f)2 /kc Hfl 
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- E1(Plf-po )cov(pI"I1, (Pjf pof ))/d2f 
1 
- E1(Pif-po)cov((Plf-Po ), [E2(p2f-plf)2/2kcý f 
])&f 
21 
+ El 
[E2(p2f_p1f)2/2kf ] -(k/2)Vlcl-(k/2)V1(P1s11) 
2 
- ka2f E1(plf-pö )2/2k2(a2f )2 1 
+ 2kß2f E1(p1 pof)cov(p1$I1, (plf-pö ))/2k((y 2f )2 
1 
- kcý f cov(p1 
II'(PI -pö ))2/2(af )2 
1 
+ 2kc 
Z E1(plf-pÖ)cov((p11-pQ1), [E2(p2f-plf)2/2k&f2])/2k(O5fl)2 
- 2k(72 f cov(P1sI1, 
(Plf Pö )) 
1 
(cov((p1f-POf), [E2(p2f-pl)2/2kof ]))/2(d 
1 
)2 
21 
- k&f cov((P1f-p0 
), [E2(p2f-plf)2/2kO 
f 
])2/2(O. 2 
f 
)2 
- (k/2)V1 
[E2(P2P f)2/2k2f ]-kcov(c1, p1sI1) 
2 
- kcov(pI'I1, [E2(p2p1 )2/2&f ]) 
2 
- kE1(plf-pof)cov(p1s11, (Pjf-P 
f))fk621 
I 
+ kcov(Plsii, (Pif-Pö )) 2/0.2 f 
+ kcov(P1sI1, (PIf-P0 ))cov((Plf PO ), [E2(p2f-plf)2/2ka2f2])/a2fI 
- kE1(p1 P0)cov((Plf'PQ ), [E2(p2f-plf)2/2ka2f I)/kaf 
21 
+ kcov((PlPö ), [E2(p2f pif)2/2ka2 ])(cov(PI"Il, (p1f Po )))/(ý fi 
+ kcov((Plf P0f), [E2(p2f-plf)2/2k(32f ])2/62f 
i 
which we can rewrite as 
EU1 =EIcI+ E1p1sEII1 + E1 
[E2(p2f-p1f)2/2kc72] 
- (k/2)VIcI - (k/2)VI(pI"11) 
- (k/2)VI [E2(p2f_p11)2/2ka2f] - kcov(cl, pI"I, ) 
2 
- kcov(p1SI1, [E2(p2f pl)2/2kß2 2])+E1 
(PIf-P0 )2/2kß2f1 
220 
- E1(p1f Po )cov(P13I1, (Plf-Pö ))/ä2r 
i 
+ kcov(P1sI1, (Pif Pof))cov((Plf-Pö ), [E2(p2f plf)2/2k6iD/62 fl 
+ kcov(p15I1, (p1-po ))2/2(ý f 
- E1(Plf-pö)cov((Plf-po), [E2(P2f pl)2/2kaf ])/Cý f 21 
+ k[cov((p, 
f-Pof), [E2(p2f plf)2]/2kcý f l)2/2ýf 
ii 
The next step is to replace the expectations, variances and covariances by 
the respective values which have been calculated under section 4.2. except: 
cov(p1sI1, [E2(p2f-plf)2/2k6 f2 
]), and 
cov((Plf-Po), [E2(p2f-plf)2/2ka2f ]) 
2 
If we consider the calculation of cov(pI'I1, (p1f po )) then by symmetry we 
have: 
cov(pI'I1, [E2(p2f-pif)2/2kß2f2]) = cov(pI", (E2(p2f-pl)2/2ka2f21)I0 
The utility of terminal wealth of a trader who is not active in the spot 
market, but does trade in futures is: 
sffff W0 = cl + pl I1 + (p1-Po )NI + (p2 -pl )N2 
There is no adjustment term in the second futures position. 
f2N22 
EU(W0) = c1+pISII+(p1 pö )Ni+E2(P2e_p11)N2 (k12)62 
SEU(WO)/SN2 = E2(p2f-plf) - kc 
2f 
2 
N2 =0 
N2 = E2(p2f-plf)/ka2f , substituting back we get 
U*2= cl + pISI + (p1 p0 )NI + E2(p2t-pI )2/ka2f2 
- ka2f 
2 
E2(p2f-pl)2/2kz(a2. 
fi 
)2 
U*2 = cl + pIsI1 + (p1 p0 )NI + E2(p2f-plf)2/2ka2f 
2 
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which turns out to be identical to the solution for a trader who is active 
in the spot market. 
The optimization problem of Nl is identical to the active dealer's problem. 
As a result, all the terms coming from the futures market activity are 
identical and cancel out if we set EUl = EU(W0). 
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PART TWO: EMPIRICAL PART 
ANALYSES BASED ON DATA OF THE ITALIAN SECONDARY MARKET 
OF GOVERNMENT BONDS 
223 
CHAPTER FIVE 
MARKET SEGMENTATION AND MARKET SPECIALISATION 
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5.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the structure of the Italian 
secondary market for government bonds and to explore whether the market is 
segmented with different dealers specialising in different assets. If this 
is the case then there may be opportunities for profitable arbitrage 
between different bonds. 
Using the cross-bond, cross-dealer data we investigate whether assets can 
be grouped by level of activity in it and by their returns based on the 
price quotes into distinct homogeneous groups. Similarly, dealers may be 
grouped according to the frequency of the quotes and the returns they make 
in various bonds. 
A summary of the frequency of quotes of the market makers is given in table 
5.5. in the appendix. 
From table 5.5. we can see that some of the market makers are very active, 
i. e. quote prices on many assets and they quote prices continuously. Others 
are less active which means that they quote prices over a wide range of 
assets, but not continuously. There is however a third type of market maker 
.. to 
be distinguished which is specialised in a few assets only, but on which 
prices are quoted on a continuous basis. 
We assume that all dealers know about the order flow of the various assets. 
As the data reveal, some of the dealers are very active in one or several 
bonds and they quote continuously over time in that asset. 
Our hypothesis is that market makers who are very active in a particular 
bond gain better knowledge about the future price of the bond which we can 
regard as superior information compared to the other dealers in the market. 
This fact of asymmetry of information is recognized by all market makers 
and, as a consequence, the bid-ask spread is larger in such a bond as 
uninformed market makers face increased transaction costs due to this 
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asymmetry of information. The "specialised" market maker with lower 
reservation prices than the uninformed dealers is in the position to 
undercut the uninformed dealers' prices and still make a profit. Such a 
profit comes from the difference between the spread quoted under such 
asymmetry of information and the spread without any asymmetric information 
in the market. 
The better informed dealers should exhibit a different quoting pattern than 
the less informed and hence the dealers may be grouped accordingly. 
This analysis of the structure of the Italian bond secondary market is 
carried out with daily time series data on bid and ask prices. Quotes for 
15 Italian government bonds are available. This market consists of 18 
market makers, so called primary dealers, who are obliged by regulation to 
quote their bid and ask prices for every day. 
The quotes have been collected for the period from May 1988 until April 
1989. 
The types of government bonds are: 
a) Floating rate credit certificates (CCT) with an annual coupon indexed on 
the base of treasury bills with a maturity of 12 months and without any tax 
levied on them. (asset numbers: 12838,12805,12811,12812,12817,12859, 
12825). 
b) Floating rate notes subject to a tax rate of 12.5% (asset numbers: 13009, 
13011,13013), others are subject to a tax rate of 6.25% (12879,12882). 
c) Treasury bonds (BTP) with semi annual coupons at a fixed rate (asset 
numbers: 12616 and 12610 with a tax rate of 6.25%, and 12628, with a tax 
rate of 12.5%). 
In the first part of this chapter (section 5.2. ), we identify a market 
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segmentation and a market specialization pattern based on a measure of the 
frequency of trade quotes. An alternative approach is taken in section 5.3. 
where the market segmentation is derived through the technique of cluster 
analysis. 
Finally, in section 5.4., we test the hypothesis that bonds which are 
traded by "specialised" market makers should have a higher return (larger 
spread) than other bonds due to the asymmetry of information. So 
differences in asset returns for informed and uninformed dealers should 
give the same grouping as grouping by frequency of trading. 
If we find confirmation of such grouping, we observe a market inefficiency 
and informed investors may profit from arbitrage opportunities. 
An analysis of variance using regression methods on the returns of price 
quotes will provide further evidence of the accuracy. of the segmentation 
derived in the previous sections based on the frequency of quoting. Section 
5.5. contains the conclusions. 
5.2. Market Analysis using the Frequency of Quotes 
.. 
5.2.1. Market Segmentation 
One criterion for segmenting the market is the frequency of price quotes 
for various assets'. The reason behind such a segmentation is that the 
market makers, by quoting their bid and ask prices, commit themselves to 
accepting trades and take a certain risk as there is uncertainty about the 
future price of the asset. Hence, market makers who actively quote prices 
for a particular asset are specialised in such an asset and they are 
'The quoting pattern of the dealers is given in table 5.1. in the appendix. 
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assumed to have superior knowledge about the asset fundamentals and hence 
the future price. We can form the following groups of market makers, based 
on this criterion of "frequency of quotes". 
Group I : (very actively quoting market makers) 
If we try to identify a measure for activity, we can say that these market 
makers quote prices on more than 200 days for at least four assets and, in 
addition, that they quote prices on more than 100 days for at least two 
assets. Such activity can be seen not as trading activity but as quoting 
with the purpose of conveying information to the market. Such information 
can be to signal that the dealer has superior information about this 
particular bond. 
Market makers: ICCS, ROLB, CIMI, SIGB. 
Group II: 
This time the measure is that the market maker quotes prices on more than 
200 days for three or more assets: 
Market makers: CRRU, BSMT, SPTR, BRCB, CTOS, BNAT, CRMU, MPSG. 
If we look at the less active market makers who maybe concentrate their 
activity on a few assets only we can define the third group as follows: 
Group III 
These market makers quote their prices on more than 200 days for less than 
three assets: 
Market makers: BCMT, BSSE, BNLT, BPNQ, NAPQ, BPMQ. 
In order to define the activities in a particular asset we examine the 
number of active dealers in the market for one asset. The measure for the 
first asset group is that more than four market makers quote their prices 
on this asset on more than 200 days. 
GROUP I: Asset number: 12882,12805,12812,12628,13009,13013. 
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We can define a typical asset traded by most of the market makers 
throughout the whole period as an asset on which prices have been quoted by 
at least three market makers for more than 200 days and by at least three 
market makers for more than 100 days. 
GROUP II: 
asset number: 12817,12811,12879,12610 (with differences in ask and bid) 
For the rest of the assets we can say that they are not very actively 
traded, although some of them are traded by almost every market maker, but 
not continuously over time. 
GROUP III: 
asset number: 12825,12859,13011,12838,12616. 
A summary of the classification is shown in table 5.1. below: 
Table 5.1.: Dealer and asset specification 
GROUPS OF MARKET MAKERS GROUPS OF ASSETS 
GROUP I GROUP I 
ICCS 12882 12628 
ROLB 12812 13013 
CIMI 13009 
SIGB 12805 
GROUP II GROUP II 
CRRU CTOS 12817 
BSMT BNAT 12811 
SPTR CRMU 12879 
BRCB MPSG 12610 
GROUP III GROUP III 
BCMT NAPQ 12825 12859 
BSSE BPMQ 13011 
BNLT 12838 
BPNQ 12616 
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5.2.2. Market Specialisation 
In this section, we focus on the question of which market maker is 
specialized in which asset. Specialisation means that a dealer quotes 
prices for more than 200 days in a particular asset. As a result, we get 
the combination: 
for asset 12838: market makers BCMT, BRCB, SIGB 
for asset 12805: market makers BNAT, BRCB, CTOS, ICCS, MPSG 
for asset 12811: market makers BNAT, NAPQ, BSMT, 
for asset 12812: market makers BPNQ, NAPQ, CRMU, ICCS, MPSG 
for asset 12817: market makers BCMT, CRMU, CTOS, ICCS, SPTR, and MPSG (but 
only on the ask price! ) 
for asset 12859: market makers BRCB, CRRU, SPTR, SIGB 
for asset 13009: market makers BSSE, BSMT, CRMU, ROLB, ICCS, 
for asset 13011: market makers BNLT, CIMI, ROLB, 
for asset 13013: market makers BNLT, BSSE, CIMI, ROLB, MPSG 
for asset 12825: market makers BPNQ, CRRU, SIGB 
for asset 12879: market makers BPMQ, BSMT, CRRU, 
for asset 12882: market makers BNAT, CRRU, CTOS, ROLB, SPTR, 
for asset 12628: market makers BSMT, CIMI, ROLB, ICCS, SIGB 
for asset 12616: market maker BPNQ 
for asset 12610: market makers BPNQ, CIMI, BCMT, MPSG 
As mentioned earlier, we have two types of assets, one is the floating rate 
credit certificate (CCT), the other one is the treasury bond (BTP). 
The market makers active in CCT's taxed with a rate of 6.25% are: 
BNAT, CRRU, CTOS, ROLB, SPTR, BPMQ,, BSMT 
Market makers dealing actively in CCT's with a tax rate of 12.5% are: 
BSSE, BSMT, CRMU, ROLB, ICCS, BNLT, CIMI, MPSG 
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The dealers trading in CCT's which are not subject to any tax are: 
BPNQ, NAPQ, CRMU, ICCS, MPSG, BNAT, BRCB, CTOS, BCMT, SPTR, CRRU, SIGB, 
NAPQ, BSMT 
Dealers BSMT, CIMI, ROLB, ICCS, SIGB BPNQ, BCMT, and MPSG are active in 
the treasury bonds. 
It is evident that more dealers trade in the tax free asset than in the 
taxable assets 2. This is also true for the treasury bonds which are also 
subject to taxes where we find only few dealers trading actively. This is 
not surprising as the taxable bonds represent higher transaction costs for 
the market makers. To be active in the trading of an asset a dealer has to 
keep the asset on stock to meet the market demand. However, if a market 
maker holds the bond in her inventory she is subject to pay tax on the bond 
which increases her trading costs. Thus, market makers prefer to trade in a 
tax free bond instead. 
5.3. Cluster Analysis 
Section 5.2. found groupings of dealers and assets based on quote 
frequency; the aim of this section is to define a market segmentation and 
specialization based on cluster analysis. 
Techniques for cluster analysis seek to separate a set of data into groups 
or clusters. 
There are various cluster techniques developed, such as: 
- Hierarchical techniques, in which the classes themselves are classified 
into groups, the process being repeated at different levels. 
- Optimization-partitioning techniques, in which the clusters are formed by 
2Particular bonds are subject to a tax on the yield. 
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optimization of a 'clustering criterion'; furthermore, the classes are 
mutually exclusive, thus forming a partition of the set of entities. 
- Density or mode-seeking techniques, in which clusters are formed by 
searching for regions containing a relatively dense concentration of 
entities. 
- Clumping techniques, in which the classes are clumps and can overlap. 
There are more techniques, but these are the most developed ones. We have 
applied a hierarchical clustering technique which, in this case, seemed to 
be the most appropriate method as we do not have an apparent grouping of 
market makers and assets to start with. 
Hierarchical clustering techniques may be subdivided into agglomerative 
methods which proceed by a series of successive fusions of N entities into 
groups, and divisive methods which partition the set of N entities 
successively into finer partitions. 
The results of both agglomerative, and divisive techniques may be presented 
in the form of a dendrogram, which is a two-dimensional diagram 
illustrating the fusions or partitions which have been made at each 
successive level. 
As mentioned before, the aim of cluster analysis is to arrange the N 
sampling units into more or less homogeneous groups. How this is done can 
vary. The general strategy is best appreciated in geometrical terms, with 
the N sampling units represented by points in a multidimensional space. 
In agglomerative methods, these points initially represent N separate 
clusters, each containing one member. At each of N-1 stages, two clusters 
are fused into one bigger cluster, until at the final stage all units are 
fused into a single cluster. 
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a) The single link or nearest neighbour method 
This method can be used both with similarity measures and with distance 
measures. Groups initially consisting of single individuals are fused 
according to the distance between their nearest members, the groups with 
the smallest distance being fused. Each fusion decreases by one the number 
of groups. For this method, then, the distance between groups is defined as 
the distance between their closest members. 
b) The complete link or furthest neighbour method 
This method is exactly the opposite of the single linkage method, in that 
distance between groups is now defined as the distance between their most 
remote pair of individuals. This method can also be used with similarity 
and distance measures. 
There are other measures such as the centroid cluster analysis, where the 
distance between groups is defined as the distance between the group 
centroids. The procedure then is to fuse groups according to the distance 
being fused first. 
However, a disadvantage of the centroid method is that if the sizes of the 
two groups to be fused are very different the centroid of the new group 
will be very close to that of the larger group and may remain within that 
group; the characteristics of the smaller group are then virtually lost. 
Another technique, the median cluster analysis, tries to overcome this 
problem. The strategy can be made independent of group size, the apparent 
position of the new group will then always be between the two groups to be 
fused. Although this method could be made suitable for both similarity and 
distance measures, it should be regarded as incompatible for measures such 
as correlation coefficients, since, interpretation in a geometrical sense is 
no longer possible. 
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c) The group average method 
One last method to be mentioned is the group average method. This method 
defines the distance between groups as the average of the distances between 
all pairs of individuals in the two groups. 
Various methods have been used to evaluate the groups according to the 
cluster analysis. 
The analysis of the Italian data starts by using hierarchical cluster 
analysis and we have compared the results from the single link method, the 
complete link method and the group average method. 
All these methods have been carried out on the basis of a symmetric matrix 
obtained by measuring the distances between the number of market maker's 
quotations. The measure of the distance was the squared Euclidean measure 
summed over all the assets: 
D. = 1 -Y, (Xik 
- Xýk)2 
k 
range 
where i and j are dealers and iýj 
and k are the assets with k=1,..., 15 and 
x are the number of price quotes for an asset. 
Results from the hierarchical cluster analysis are shown in table 5.2.. 
(1) 
The figures following the market maker's name indicate the average 
similarity of each group member with the other group members relative to a 
measure of dispersion within the group: this is the mean of the D.. across 
j for members i and j of the same group. It helps to identify typical 
members of each group. 
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Table 5.2. : Cluster grouping 
single link complete link group average 
GROUP I 
CTOS 76.6 
SPTR 72.3 
CRMU 72.2 
BNAT 72.2 
ICCS 70.7 
BCNT 70.4 
NAPQ 70.4 
BRBC 70.0 
BPMQ 69.3 
MPSG 68.1 
CRRU 65.4 
SIGB 65.1 
BSMT 64.0 
GROUP II 
BPNQ 100 
GROUP III 
ROLB 83.5 
BNLT 82.1 
CIMI 81.0 
BSSE 76.7 
GROUP I 
CTOS 80.3 
CRMU 76.1 
MPSG 75.3 
ICCS 74.7 
BCMT 73.5 
BRBC 73.4 
NAPQ 72.7 
BNAT 71.3 
SPTR 71.2 
BPNQ 68.3 
GROUP II 
ROLB 83.5 
BNLT 82.1 
cm 81.0 
BSSE 76.7 
GROUP III 
BPMQ 74.7 
CRRU 74.0 
SIGB 68.7 
BSMT 67.4 
GROUP I 
CTOS 80.3 
CRMU 76.1 
MPSG 75.3 
ICCS 74.7 
BCMT 73.5 
BRBC 73.4 
NAPQ 72.7 
BNAT 71.3 
SPTR 71.2 
BPNQ 68.3 
GROUP II 
BNLT 76.5 
CIMI 76.4 
ROLB 76.1 
BSSE 75.4 
BPMQ 71.1 
BSMT 70.9 
GROUP III 
CRRU 80.1 
SIGB 80.1 
From the table above we can see that the single link method leads to a 
totally different result compared with the other two methods. In addition, 
the single link method is creating one group with one member - only, i. e. 
group II with the market maker BPNQ. 
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We can examine which of the dealer groups are determined by each variate 
(asset). We can get a frequency table for each variate showing the 
frequency with which each dealer quotes in each variate. Each table is 
classified by the grouping factor and the different values of the variate 
between group members. 
For each group we then get an interaction statistic (chi-squared) which 
draws attention to groups for which the distribution within groups is 
markedly different from the overall distribution. 
Only a few assets show a high chi-squared value which means that they 
belong to a typical group and that the group behaves differently to others. 
We list the results of the complete link and the group average link only 
and skip the results from the single link method. 
There is a specialization of different groups for various assets. 
The analysis based on the complete link method shows the following: 
Group I is specialized in assets 12812, and 12817 
Group H is specialized in assets 13009,13013, and 13011 
Group III is specialized in asset 12879 
It is encouraging that these groupings make sense: 
group I specializes in non-taxable assets whereas groups II and III are 
specialized in taxable assets. 
The result of the group average method is: 
Group I is specialized in assets 12812,12817, and 12805 
Group II is specialized in assets 13009,13013, and 13011 
For group III there is no conclusive answer. 
Also in this case the tax status of the asset appears crucial in 
determining the groupings. 
We tried to get a better result by applying the non-hierarchical cluster 
analysis. However, by comparing the outcome of such a cluster analysis with 
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the results discussed above we could not find any improvement in the 
formation of groups and the significance level of specialization. 
The non-hierarchical classification methods differ according to the 
criterion that they optimize and in the algorithm used to search for an 
optimum value of the chosen criterion. 
5.4. Market Segmentation Measured by the Returns Based on Price Quotes 
5.4.1. Methodology 
In this section, we try to find a grouping pattern of the various market 
makers by analyzing their price quotes for different assets. 
Such spread differences could arise from information or risk aversion 
differences between dealers. 
In order to distinguish the quoting behaviour of the dealers we regress the 
returns based on their quotes for each asset on dealer specific variables 
and a trend variable which is different for each dealer. 
The return (r) is defined to be the return to an investor who buys the 
asset i at time t- 1 from dealer j and sells it at time t to dealer j at the 
quoted prices, i. e. 
r6j) _ (pat,, - pbt 1 
)/pbt 
lsj 
(2) 
The general model includes all the dealer specific variables and the asset 
specific variables which can be expressed as 
a) General model: 
r(1J)1 = (ß; + (3j) s+ (Cl + c) + s(jj)t (3) 
where 8 is a trend variable and c is a constant term 
i=1,..., 15 (number of assets) 
j=1,..., 18 (number of dealers) 
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We encounter a problem with the price quotes of the 15 dealers over 18 
assets which is that for some assets or some dealers there may be no quote 
at all for consecutive days. The reason behind this is that the dealers are 
obliged to quote prices for only any five assets on any day. The five 
assets chosen by a dealer may vary from day to day. 
In order to avoid any bias coming from all the zeros in the time series (no 
quotes) we multiply all the regressors and the regressand by a dummy 
variable S which is zero if the dealer does not quote and which is 1 if the 
particular dealer quotes a price in the particular asset at this day and 
then correct the degrees of freedom for the number of effective 
observations. 3 
We then test restrictions on the model by assuming that 
b) all dealers are identical: this reduces the number of regressors by the 
dealer specific variables both for the trend and the constant term: (3. ß 
andc. =c. 
with: 
i=1,..., 15 (number of assets) 
j=1 (common dealers) 
c) all assets are common. This time, the number of the asset specific 
variables is reduced: ß=ß and c=c 
with: 
i=1 (common assets) 
j=1,..., 18 (number of dealers) 
Based on the cluster analysis (complete link method) we obtained groups of 
3In order to have accurate OLS estimations we have actually written 
programs in Gauss for the various models. 
238 
dealers and assets. 
In order to test the hypothesis that dealers who are very active in a 
particular asset have an information advantage and their price quotes 
exhibit a similar pattern which allows us to group them together, we 
analyse the same groups of dealers and assets which resulted from the 
cluster analysis, this time, using the returns based on the quotes instead 
of the frequency of quotes. 
d) assets are grouped into the three following groups by restricting the 
constant terms and the trend variables to be equal within each group: 
A: assets 12812 and 12817 (with ß=P. and cI. =ca) 
B: assets 13009,13011, and 13013 (with ßl = ßb and C. = cb) 
C: assets 12838,12805,12811,12859,12825,12879,12882,12610,12628 
and 12616 (with ß=ß and c. =c) 
e) dealers are grouped into three groups by , assuming that each group 
is 
different in the trend and the constant variable: 
A: CTOS, CRMU, MPSG, ICCS, BCMT, BRBC, NAPQ, BNAT, SPTR, and BPNQ 
with ß=P. and c. =c 
B; BPMQ, CRRU, SIGB, and BSMT 
with ßi = Pb and c, = Cb 
C; ROLB, BNLT, CIMI, and BSSE 
with ß =ß andc. =c 
f) Restricted model: 
We assume that all the dealers and all the assets are homogeneous and have 
a common constant term and a common trend 
with ß=ß and c. = c. 
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5.4.2. Results 
For testing we assume that c in equation (3) is normally distributed. The 
detailed results of the respective coefficients and the t-statistics for 
each individual model are listed in tables 5.6. a)-f) in the appendix. With 
the F-tests we test the restrictions of the various models based on tables 
5.6. a)-f). The outcome of the various regressions are listed in table 5.3. 
and the results of the F-tests are shown in table 5.4. below. They show 
that for both the dealers and the assets the unrestricted version which 
allows for heterogeneous dealer behaviour and heterogeneous assets is 
clearly rejected. 
Table 5.3.: Results of the OLS regression on returns 
SSE n k 
General model a) 0.041477 476 64 
restricted dealers model b) 0.045814 476 30 
restricted assets, model c) 0.044578 476 36 
grouped dealers model e) 0.045513 476 34 
grouped assets model d) 0.044201 476 40 
all restricted model fl 0.050597 476 2 
Total sum of squares: 0.13678324 
with: SSE=residual sum of squares 
n=number of observations 
k= number of regressors 
Table 5.4. : F-tests on the returns 
Tests: restrictions n F-value 
model a) versus e) 30 476 1.3363 
model e) versus b) 4 476 0.7308 
model a) versus d) 24 476 1.1988 
model d) versus c) 4 476 0.5016 
model b) versus f) 28 476 1.6630 
model c) versus f) 34 476 1.3511 
model a) versus f) 62 476 1.4612 
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It looks like all sets of restrictions are accepted. The final result is 
that the restricted model is the superior one which implies that we have 
homogeneous dealer returns and homogeneous assets. Both the constant term 
and the trend variable are highly significant in this restricted model. 
Hence, we have to reject the hypothesis of market segmentation of the 
Italian secondary bond market. 
5.5. Conclusions 
When we compare the introspective analysis of the data structure with the 
cluster analysis we observe quite different results. 
The grouping made by each of the analyses has turned out not to be 
congruent. What we can say is that it seems that group II of the first 
analysis is very similar to group I formed under the cluster analysis. 
These groups consisting of 7 members based on the introspective analysis, 
(respectively 10 members based on the cluster analysis), have 5 members in 
common. In the same way we can say that group I resembles group II as out 
of 4 members 2 are common. 
However, in respect of specialisation we cannot observe such a trend as for 
the grouping of market makers. 
One reason may be that the specialisation of market makers for a particular 
asset has been considered from different points of view under the two 
analyses. 
With the first analysis each asset has been -examined separately whereby, 
under the cluster analysis, the significance of the specialisation has been 
evaluated over the range of all the assets. 
The same may apply to the differences in grouping of the market makers. 
It can be argued that the results obtained for the grouping based on the 
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frequency of quotes have shown that the Italian secondary market for 
government bonds can be divided into at least three segments. 
The results from the OLS analysis based on the returns computed from price 
quotes give a totally, different result. The grouping of the dealers and the 
asset is not confirmed by the findings under the OLS regression. 
In each version of the model whether restricted or unrestricted we find 
significant dealer specific or asset specific variables. Also some of the 
trend variables are significant. However, in the end, the F-tests point out 
that the model in which the assets and the dealers are homogeneous is the 
most appropriate model. 
As a result our hypothesis of a segmented market has to be rejected under 
the OLS analysis. This means that, based on the analysis of returns, the 
primary dealers in the market do not earn a monopoly profit which could 
have arisen from information asymmetry in the market and furthermore, it 
shows that there are no arbitrage opportunities for investors in the 
Italian secondary market of government bonds. 
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APPENDIX : Table 5.5a. : Dealer and asset classification 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF EACH ASSET AND EACH MARKET MAKER 
(first line: bid quotes; second line: ask quotes) 
ASs. 1 234 56 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
MARKET 
MAKERS: 
1: 216 21 119 216 1 97 1 31 1 5 3 1104 123 
216 21 119 2161 97 1 31 1 5 3 1104 123 
2: 0 21721940 25 13 10 0 0 118 203 47 0 7 
0 217 219 40 25 13 10 0 0 118 203 70 7 
3: 0 556 71 166218 2170 6 444 116 
0 556 71 166218 2170 6 444 116 
4: 38 804 0 30 19 0 0 0 213 10516 7 9 
38 804 0 30 00 0 0 213 10512 7 9 
5: 0 114 0 213 00 00 1 197 2 4 100 1 204 
0 1140 213 00 00 1 197 2 4 208 1 204 
6: 2 8 214213 13 00 0 4 0 17 1040 1 
2 8 214213 13 00 0 4 0 17 80 1 
7: 216 211 183 161 168 214 109 111 99 52 10 23 25 26 63 
216 211 183 161 168 214 109 111 99 52 10 23 27 26 63 
8: 1 500 2 189 2161 2156 101 178 22 0 6 
1 500 2 189 2161 2156 101 17822 0 6 
9: 0 5 2172 13 217 1 4 0 215 86 8 210 6 
0 5 2172 13 217 1 4 0 215 86 3 210 6 
10: 10 47 3 211 214 3 217 83 2 0 8 179 8 40 88 
10 47 3 211 214 3 217 83 2 0 8 179 8 40 88 
11: 1 99 7 42 14 209 30 1 212 210 214 101 8 7 
1 99 7 42 14 209 30 1 212 210 2142 8 7 
12: 16 209 140 91 213 19 65 39 7 67 7 215 48 0 83 
16 209 140 91 213 19 65 39 7 67 7 215 12 0 83 
13: 73 70 85 103 105 37 104 209 214 102 73 104 211 212 69 
73 70 85 103 105 37 104 209 214 102 73 104 211 212 69 
14: 0 220 41 2152172150 2 198 116216 6 
0 220 41 2152172150 2 1986 216 6 
15: 2 207 112 217 199 1 2167 18 0 3 68 9 208 10 
2 207 112 217 199 1 2167 18 0 3 69 6 208 10 
16: 175 169 156 176 217 213 92 45 51 101 162 213 116 129 37 
175 169 156 176 217 213 92 45 51 101 162 213 26 129 37 
17: 6 213 16 213 14 1 45 207 8 3 18 123 16 92 
6 213 16 213 217 1 45 207 8 3 18 208 16 92 
18: 211 19 32 26 126 216 20 5 14 196 52 200 11 205 7 
211 19 32 26 126 216 20 5 14 196 52 200 4 205 7 
243 
Table 5.5b.: List of assets and market makers 
LIST OF ASSETS AND MARKET MAKERS: 
Assets: Market Makers 
1 12838 1 BCMT 
2 12805 2 BNAT 
3 12811 3 BNLT 
4 12812 4 BPMQ 
5 12817 5 BPNQ 
6 12859 6 NAPQ 
7 13009 7 BRCB 
8 13011 8 BSSE 
9 13013 9 BSMT 
10 12825 10 CRMU 
11 12879 11 CRRU 
12 12882 12 CTOS 
13 12610 13 CIMI 
14 12628 14 ROLB 
15 12616 15 ICCS 
16 SPTR 
17 MPSG 
18 SIGB 
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Table 5.6. a) : Results of the unrestricted model a) 
Asset specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
2.7159725E-006 1.0322 0.0028028123 12.0256 
1.0300362E-007 0.0507 0.0022097187 12.1039 
3.3349355E-006 1.2763 0.0019414606 8.5239 
2.0296713E-006 0.9578 0.0018291213 9.6790 
6.0828326E-006 2.4485 0.0024452832 11.7676 
1.5450941E-005 6.7209 0.0012844033 6.4504 
1.3543880E-005 5.9535 0.0018817065 9.6671 
1.2994738E-005 5.4410 0.0020205631 9.6910 
1.5185683E-005 6.9189 0.0013535967 6.9562 
1.4411179E-005 6.7120 0.0014285247 7.9716 
1.7805725E-005 8.1519 0.0021842952 11.5081 
4.6448275E-006 2.0403 0.0022778084 11.4871 
8.3186173E-006 3.1388 0.0024088852 10.4797 
2.8415512E-006 1.1613 0.0030613679 14.1693 
2.8786882E-006 1.1815 0.0036540984 16.7380 
Dealer specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
4.1037781E-006 1.7211 -0.0012604551 -6.1221 
-1.6786992E-006 -0.6355 8.8667934E-005 0.3905 1.0239567E-005 3.8341 0.00022558285 0.9669 
1.1633029E-005 3.7925 -0.0013346248 -4.6919 
-5.9088708E-006 -2.3558 0.00094921759 4.3547 
-8.6491902E-006 -2.6312 0.0013819417 4.8494 5.4068531E-006 2.5312 -0.00092673021 -5.0087 
1.0166504E-006 0.3834 -0.00049686797 -2.1221 7.1005621E-006 2.8399 -0.00053330963 -2.4087 
-1.1409209E-006 -0.4849 -0.00093462983 -4.6519 3.5274543E-006 1.4634 2.6135795E-005 0.1274 
-2.1628471E-006 -0.8945 8.9617854E-005 0.4307 
-1.7638918E-007 -0.0732 -0.00051835180 -2.3194 2.5521628E-006 1.0393 -0.00027193165 -1.2662 1.0329598E-005 4.4581 -0.00078068114 -3.9809 
-2.1634421E-006 -0.9987 -0.00046052945 -2.3629 4.5317069E-006 1.7373 0.00080189248 3.5055 
residual sum of squares: 0.041477466 
number of observations: 476.000 
number of regressors: 64.000000 
total sum of squares: 0.13678324 
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Table 5.6. b) : Results of the restricted model f) 
coefficients: value T-values: 
Trend variable: 9.8510808E-006 22.781987 
Constant term: 0.0018397406 48.563281 
residual sum of squares: 0.050597732 
number of observations: 476.000 
number of regressors: 2.0000000 
total sum of squares: 0.13678324 
Table 5.6. c) : Results of the restricted model b) 
(dealers are homogeneous) 
Asset specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
7.1048071E-006 2.4964636 -0.0017351251 -6.8198500 1.3583494E-006 0.55390980 -0.0021387252 -9.5108969 4.9325009E-006 1.7597726 -0.0022278615 -8.8303915 4.3582284E-006 1.6787910 -0.0025956479 -10.918253 1.2528320E-005 4.6389434 -0.0019407858 -8.1897088 1.8435474E-005 6.4601831 -0.0034553126 -13.463551 
1.5391125E-005 5.9944624 -0.0022312899 -9.7532969 1.3027410E-005 4.9682653 -0.0020404604 -8.6675468 
1.5081128E-005 6.0885966 -0.0027182889 -12.001237 1.5861581E-005 6.1877867 -0.0031268645 -13.585077 1.9235037E-005 7.0348860 -0.0021771098 -8.8337978 9.1740350E-006 3.6243021 -0.0023016540 -10.091524 1.3393944E-005 4.7413169 -0.0020882416 -8.3308229 5.5753926E-006 2.1117749 -0.0010837387 -4.5455521 
Dealer specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
-1.3892241E-007 -0.066157411 0.0040185271 20.865947 
residual sum of squares: 0.045814524 
number of observations: 476.000 
number of regressors: 30.000000 
total sum of squares: 0.13678324 
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Table 5.6. d) : Results of the restricted model c) 
(assets are homogeneous) 
Asset specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
8.6493335E-006 5.4151806 0.0021123502 15.430249 
Dealer specific coefficients : 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
6.3626291E-006 2.7948048 -0.0016561353 -8.4035619 
-1.8639254E-006 -0.73679491 9.2337451E-005 0.42865728 7.0126967E-006 2.8844012 0.00066260338 3.1380719 
7.2895260E-006 2.4844572 -0.0010349481 -3.8962371 
-6.6829028E-006 -2.8032572 0.0011068566 5.3363735 
-3.3068438E-006 -1.0624686 0.00094791217 3.5457792 9.1041207E-006 4.2878050 -0.0011258171 -6.1685598 
-2.1038480E-006 -0.82340859 -9.4290448E-005 -0.42252808 2.8940832E-006 1.2104462 -0.00038027305 -1.8239929 
-4.5118541E-006 -1.9872140 -0.00092900559 -4.8765494 2.0169936E-006 0.84290238 0.00041940408 2.0792355 
-1.4343813E-006 -0.61516908 -4.2825841E-005 -0.21489437 
-3.6154741E-006 -1.5860024 -0.00035646937 -1.7137160 
-2.9245122E-006 -1.2602849 5.1497408E-006 0.025739424 9.8054423E-006 4.3851664 -0.00095418088 -5.0826363 
4.5961909E-007 0.21083002 -0.00071223827 -3.6380204 4.4189361E-006 1.8158030 0.00077804729 3.6681785 
residual sum of squares: 0.044578128 
number of observations: 476.000 
number of regressors: 36.000000 
total sum of squares: 0.13678324 
247 
Table 5.6. e) : Results of the restricted model e) 
(dealers are grouped accoding to the complete link cluster analysis) 
Asset specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
5.7850633E-006 2.0307283 -0.0016827208 -6.6203099 1.3171573E-006 0.53384317 -0.0020871686 -9.1993050 6.6371467E-006 2.3025621 -0.0021825163 -8.3612636 
4.9338473E-006 1.8807979 -0.0026136579 -10.841367 1.3929061E-005 5.0105812 -0.0018601391 -7.5660026 
1.8412503E-005 6.4254772 -0.0033483105 -12.937115 
1.6720041E-005 6.3374386 -0.0021374555 -9.0465373 1.3651908E-005 5.1357664 -0.0019318504 -8.0482392 1.6454876E-005 6.4334893 -0.0026106094 -11.109881 1.7338904E-005 6.6219219 -0.0030536479 -12.968874 1.8803694E-005 6.8801551 -0.0021201150 -8.5931857 1.0177612E-005 3.8999933 -0.0022952112 -9.7170520 1.4971159E-005 5.0182069 -0.0021331253 -8.0078993 7.3893382E-006 2.6342952 -0.0011462518 -4.4828284 
Dealer specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
-1.6430902E-006 -0.74237702 0.0039023698 19.093351 
-1.9161228E-006 -0.78601443 0.0041438440 18.403874 2.4821673E-006 1.1481022 0.0039989130 20.435626 
residual sum of squares: 0.045513544 
number of observations: 476.000 
number of regressors: 34.000000 
total sum of squares: 0.13678324 
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Table 5.6. tß : Results of the restricted model d) 
(assets are grouped accoding to the complete link cluster analysis) 
Asset specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
1.5243968E-005 8.0463558 0.0014878133 9.2823753 
6.4654011E-006 3.2168291 0.0026408503 15.192649 
7.5234444E-006 4.7080281 0.0022416774 16.297738 
Dealer specific coefficients: 
trend variables T-statistics constant term T-statistics 
4.5102876E-006 1.9685172 -0.0015411593 -7.7991342 
-1.2394240E-006 -0.49158055 1.1132447E-005 0.051810132 8.9620521E-006 3.4622381 0.00023548104 1.0455396 
8.4154151E-006 2.8760246 -0.0011642753 -4.3906976 
-7.2678800E-006 -3.0560226 0.0011453224 5.5416711 
-6.0372820E-006 -1.9272581 0.0011936060 4.4484433 9.0902567E-006 4.2775611 -0.0012009640 -6.5814243 4.6166864E-008 0.017483832 -0.00046336326 -2.0009486 4.3864418E-006 1.8270425 -0.00061133627 -2.9144366 
-5.3898451E-006 -2.3264475 -0.00094256189 -4.8457964 2.5259690E-006 1.0594495 0.00035540874 1.7672901 
-2.3250791E-006 -0.99488230 5.3880586E-006 0.027110293 
-2.1003468E-006 -0.90170231 -0.00065541808 -3.0763642 
-9.7251340E-007 -0.40045494 -0.00038034498 -1.8068664 8.8990553E-006 3.9272727 -0.00094286025 -4.9755380 
-8.8268302E-007 -0.40427375 -0.00063115667 -3.2309011 4.0306528E-006 1.6472282 0.00073740171 3.4638737 
residual sum of squares: 0.044201292 
number of observations: 476.000 
number of regressors: 40.000000 
total sum of squares: 0.13678324 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DETERMINANTS OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD 
IN A DEALERSHIP MARKET 
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6.1. Introduction 
This chapter is closely related to chapter two in which we analysed the 
determinants of the bid-ask spread for different market structures. Our aim 
is to see how these frameworks can be used to explore the trading and 
quoting pattern across dealers. 
We base our analysis on data of the Italian secondary market for government 
bonds. Initially, (after a major reorganisation of this market) 22 
government bonds are traded by 18 recognized market makers who are linked 
by an electronic circuit. Of the market makers 17 are banks of varying size 
and specialisation and 1 is a nonbank financial intermediary. 
The market is organised so that the market makers quote their prices which 
are binding for a certain period of time. These quotes are valid for up to 
5 mio lire. The price quotes are displayed on a screen of a computerised 
information system. The actual trade with the public is executed on the 
telephone. After a trading period, the aggregate volume, but not its 
distribution which was traded is made public. 
The data used are daily observations starting from 16 May 1988 until 10 
April 1989 on one of the assets: a floating rate credit certificate whose 
annual coupon rate is indexed by the rate on 12 month Treasury bills. The 
maturity date of the certificate is 1/4/1997 and the returns on the asset 
are liable to 6.25% tax. 
The quotes have been collected every day between 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock 
p. m. which is the most active trading time of the day and therefore seems 
to represent the pricing strategies of the market makers in the most 
accurate way. 
From Tables 6.1., 6.2. and 6.3. it is evident that there is considerable 
diversity of trading pattern. 
On some days there is a single dealer quoting both the best ask and bid 
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price. On other days there are several different dealers on each side of 
the market and none simultaneously on both sides. 
Under the assumption that the market order is executed by the best quoting 
dealer or, in case of several best quoting dealers, is shared among them, 
we find that several dealers are actually trading on one or the other side 
of the market. 
This suggests that theories based on dealer costs which increase with the 
size of the order, which implies that market makers are interested in 
sharing the order, are actually observed in the real world. 
In table 6.1., we list the number of days on which only one dealer quotes 
the best price and on which more than one dealer quote the best price (on 
the horizontal the bid side and on the vertical the ask side). 
Table 6.1. : Trading pattern observations 
bid side 
ask side 11>1 total 
11 114 53 167 
>1 20 21 41 
total 134 74 208 
In table 6.2., we list the number of dealers who quote the best price for 
different periods of consecutive days for the ask side. The same is 
illustrated in table 6.3. for the bid side. 
Table 6.2. : Best quoting days ask side 
no. of days no. of dealers 
< 10 days 9 
10-20 days 3 
20-40 days 4 
> 40 days 2 
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Table 6.3. : Best quoting days bid side 
no. of days no. of dealers 
< 10 days 8 
10-20 days 4 
20-40 days 4 
> 40 days 2 
With a sample of 208 daily price quotes in the single asset, we have 
analysed the 10 most commonly quoting dealers. 
In this chapter, we analyse empirically whether the inventory control 
argument is valid which means that we have to find some supportive 
evidence. We also investigate the question whether the best quoting dealer 
takes the price of the next best dealer into account by setting her price 
quote. 
Basically, we carry out two analyses. The first one is an ordinary least 
squares analysis where we test the hypothesis of the inventory control 
aspect and the next best dealer argument. In order to do that we compare 
the dealers' quotes with the variables which determine the reservation 
price. 
The second analysis investigates the pricing strategies of the market 
makers. This empirical study is based on a probit analysis which evaluates 
the probability that the dealer quotes the best price based on the 
variables which determine the reservation price. 
According to our theoretical model in chapter 2 (section 2.2.2. ), 
considering the ask side, if p4 > p, where p is the market price (i. e. 
the best price), the dealer either quotes her reservation price paR (for 
the quantity Q/k where (k-1) is the number of best quoting dealers) or she 
does not quote at all. In either case she does not get any - trade. If 
paRI[Q(k+l)/k] >p> paR (Q/k) she quotes p where she shares the market 
order. If paRI[Q(k+l)/k] <p she quotes p-e to get the whole order. 
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Thus, it is possible that the dealer, knowing that her reservation price is 
above the market price, decides not to quote at all instead of quoting her 
reservation price as she knows that she is not' competitive and that she 
will not get any trade. 
In principle, we analyse the following two hypotheses: 
(i) the determinants of the expected utility and hence reservation prices 
of each dealer are price expectations; the degree of risk aversion and the 
inventory level; 
(ii) the strategic price quoting behaviour in the market: each dealer i 
knows the reservation prices of each. of their rivals j: (p. ). From these 
each dealer forms expectations of the pattern of trades that can emerge 
under the next dealer argument , i. e. the best dealer does not quote her 
own reservation price, but the entry-limiting price of the next best 
dealer. 
If in equilibrium i is not best on a side of the market then either i does 
not quote or quotes their own reservation price, not expecting to do any 
trade at that price. On the other hand, if i is best on one side of the 
market then i quotes the next best dealer's reservation price. 
We assume that the quoted prices are in fact transaction prices. As we do 
not have any information about the individual trade we have to assume that 
the price quotes are the actual prices of the deals. We justify this 
assumption by the fact that the quotes were taken from the screen during a 
period when trading was very active which means that the quotes were 
updated very quickly. This in turn implies that the quotes and the actual 
transaction prices were very close. 
In section 6.2. we analyse the data based on a situation as in our model 
presented in chapter two, (section 2.2.2. ) for a centralised market 
structure. In such an environment, market makers know each others 
reservation prices and the order flow and they can share the market order. 
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The second analysis, in section 6.3., investigates the trading strategies 
of dealers which means we predict which dealer quotes the best price based 
on the variables which determine the reservation price. 
Section 6.4. contains a discussion of the results and the conclusions. 
6.2. Analysis of the Price Quotes in a Centralised Market 
Our data on the Italian secondary market for government bonds show ask and 
bid quotes by individual dealers (not all dealers are quoting on any given 
day) and the volume that is traded. We can deduce the inner spread and the 
dealers who are quoting the lowest ask price and the highest bid price for 
each day. We can also observe the total volume that is traded on the day 
although we do not know its division between buy and sell orders. 
To identify the active dealers and the volumes that are traded on both 
sides of the market we make the nontestable assumptions that: 
(1) the daily volume is equally divided between buy and sell orders; 
(2) the total volume on one side of the market is divided equally between 
all dealers who have the most competitive quote. 
For each day we can then identify the selling dealers, the buying dealers 
and the volume that each trading dealer trades. 
We can also calculate the quantity traded by each dealer, by dividing the 
total amount traded by the number of best quoting dealers and so get the ex 
post share or quantity traded by each best quoting dealer which is Q/M. 
The inventory of each dealer is not observable; but within the sample the 
past trading history of each trader is observable and the current inventory 
level is defined by 
Ib 
Qs 
' Ds 
Q: 
(1) it 
Iio + Dis T is M <t s s<t s 
where Dis is a dummy variable that is 1 if i bought on date s; Dis is a 
dummy that is 1 if i sold on date s. 
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The sample contains every trading day since the organised dealership market 
was created; it is thus not unreasonable to take the opening inventory as 
0. The trading pattern also appears to justify this since in most cases 
dealers buy on days before they sell. 
Both main assumptions of our model, i. e. the determinants of the 
reservation price (i) and the strategic price quoting behaviour (ii) are 
testable. 
For (i) we can test (on the bid side) 
p, =a. +µ° +y(Q/M+2I. )+e. 1]1111 
where p, is the price quote against 
p, = a. + µe + yQ/M + B. SA. + Tj , 
SBi+ e. 
where SA and SB are the gross totals 
respectively. 
(2) 
(3) 
of past sales and purchases 
For (ii) we adopt the alternative that dealers quote their own reservation 
price; the minimum profit price at which trade is undertaken. In this 
setting, dealers ignore the competitive bidding process and they do not try 
to maximize their profits. However, each dealer has to know the number of 
best quoting other dealers or has to form some expectation about it in 
order to determine the reservation prices and hence the spread. The two 
alternatives for the actual quote of i (given that dealers know their 
rivals reservation prices) are 
p. =a. +µ° +YQ/M+SSA +11, SB+E, 
as contrasted with 
(4) 
pi = a. + Al6 + yQ/M + Ö. SA. + 1j, SB. - C. if i is not best 
p=Eyp = (xj +µ! +Y-Q/M+8SA +ilSB. +e. ifiisbest (5) 
where j is the index of the critical entry limited inactive dealer, and p. 
is the actual price quote of the individual dealer. 
µi° is the individually expected market price for the next period taking 
account of the assumption that each dealer knows the distribution of the 
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market orders (i. e. OJ, Q/M are the market shares of the orders if the 
dealer is a buyer or a seller, and y represents the risk aversion of the 
dealer. 
If DUMI is a dummy variable that is 1 if i is best on a side of the market 
and 0 otherwise (5) becomes 
pi (1-DUM. )(a. + µi + yQ/M + SiSA. + fl1SBi) 
+ DUM. (a. + µý + y, Q/M +6 SAJ +T SB j) + C. (6) 
where j is the index of the critical entry limited inactive dealer. 
Dealers are assumed to have rational expectations of the future unit value 
of inventory, µ,, which we instrument by the first two price lags. 
The random error term is assumed to be normally distributed c- N(O; c2). 
We can interpret such a random error as some randomness in the measurement 
of the market prices. We can also interpret it as a deviation between the 
quotes and the transaction prices as we assumed above that the quotes are 
transaction prices. 
We first test the strategic behaviour assumptions in (6) against (4) for 
each dealer separately. By Ericsson's (1983) nonnested hypothesis test, (6) 
was accepted. So there is evidence for the next best dealers argument and 
strategic price quoting. The results of the test are listed in table 6.4. 
below. 
Table 6.4. : Non-nested test Ericsson: 
dealers 
Ask side 
(4)vs(6) (6)vs (4) 
Bid 
(4)vs(6) 
side 
(6)vs (4 ) 
2 -- -- 4.873 4.067 4 1.681 0.425 3.267 1.634 
8 1.719 0.828 62.431 3.221 
10 15.216 2.116 1.932 0.029 
11 3.633 0.352 nested m. nested m. 
12 5.256 1.121 47.716 5.174 
14 -- -- nested m. nested m. 15 -- -- 4.316 0.923 16 3.822 1.955 4.171 2.439 
18 3.709 -0.003 8.539 -0.343 
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However for some dealers there is some heteroscedasticity (using White's 
test (1980)) and autocorrelation: ( L. G. Godfrey (1978)); although the Reset 
tests give little evidence of mispecification. 
We accept the hypothesis that dealers have rational expectations of the 
future unit value of inventory which we instrumented by the first two price 
lags. The N estimates for the future price give the coefficients which are 
all very close to one which indicates that the instruments chosen 
approximate the variable very well. The results are listed in table 6.5.: 
Table 6.5.: IV estimates for the futures price 
dealers 
Bid side 
coefficient t-value 
Ask side 
coefficient t-value 
2 1.0063 118.00 0.9923 130.69 
4 1.0323 101.92 0.9380 47.79 
8 1.0039 115.61 0.9790 111.29 
10 0.9960 67.43 0.9770 76.84 
11 1.0261 89.00 0.9790 177.52 
12 1.0850 72.72 0.8420 78.81 
14 1.0280 96.83 0.9740 146.18 
15 0.9890 29.50 0.9650 79.49 
16 1.0210 94.18 0.9820 122.33 
18 1.0350 83.84 0.9999 156.93 
Although we have found significant evidence of the next best dealer 
argument we still have to find the appropriate form of the model for each 
dealer separately as mentioned under (i) above. 
We can test (2) against (3) by imposing restrictions on (6). If T_ -6 
only the opening inventory of a dealer enters into the trading decision; we 
call this model 2. Past buying and selling must have a common effect but 
the effect may be different to that of current trading. 
If in addition y=S we have the full model of (2). So we test the 
assumptions in (i) by successively testing ri=-S (Model 2) and then y=S 
(Model 3); the unrestricted model of (6) is Model 1. In order to determine 
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which model is valid for each dealer we conducted an F-test. The results 
(in table 6.6. and 6.7. ) show that the unrestricted version is the 
appropriate model for most of the dealers. The restricted version only 
applies for two dealers on the bid side. 
Table 6.6.: Model form evaluation for the ask side 
Ask side 
dealers no. obs. SSEr SSEm SSEu 
2 196 7.678 7.371 * 7.281 
4 197 21.349 20.563 * 20.499 
8 173 5.728 5.591 * 5.570 
10 175 6.524 6.324 6.018* 
11 201 5.755 5.477 * 5.395 
12 203 12.656 12.166 11.092* 
14 200 6.549 6.133 5.302* 
15 69 1.104 0.894* 0.865 
16 200 5.981 5.613 5.477* 
18 158 3.798 3.597 3.4878 
Table 6.7.: Model form evaluation for the bid side 
Bid side 
dealers no. obs. SSEr SSEm SSEu 
2 196 11.157 11.016 10.702* 
4 198 10.674* 10.638 10.541 
8 173 9.102 8.622 7.928* 
10 175 7.958 7.668 * 7.694 
11 201 9.628* 9.590 9.484 
12 202 13.158 12.684 12.317* 
14 199 9.231 9.085 8.521* 
15 68 2.630 2.627 2.261* 
16 200 9.567 9.391 9.038* 
18 158 7.788 7.743 7.437* 
where: no. obs. = number of observations, 
SSEr = residual sum of squares of the restricted model (model 1) 
SSEm = RSS of the less restricted model (model 2) 
SSEu = RSS of the unrestricted model (model 3) 
The asterisks indicate the superior model according to an F-test on the 
restrictions. 
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The diagnostic tests of the OLS regression of the reduced form are slightly 
improved by using the appropriate version for each dealer compared to the 
unrestricted version. 
Table 6.8.: Diagnostic. tests on OLS regressions 
dealers 
Bid side 
autocorr. hetero RESET 
Ask side 
autocorr. hetero RESET 
2 0.000 4.844** 0.324 0.150 1.530 0 .739 4 1.560 0.717 2.2 21 0.400 5.346** 1 . 084 8 0.410 0.430 0.141 0.340 2.980 0.025 
10 -0.070** 0.322 0.532 0.970 2.302* 0 .985 11 5.990* 1.539 0.169 5.330* 0.289 1 . 721 12 20.310** 0.309 2.300 110.160** 4.234** 4.855* 
14 8.26** 0.038 2.016 10.340** 2.225* 0.890 
15 0.350 4.926** 0.324 10.860** 3.182* 0.016 
16 0.470 3.290* 1.2 58 0.830 0.501 0 .098 18 11.740** 2.293 1.585 2.980 11.011** 7.201** 
(Asterisks mean that the null hypotheses are rejected. ) 
The final models, i. e. the respective version of the restrictions and the 
reduction to significant coefficients, give us some insights to the theory. 
On the bid side we observe mainly two strategies which on the one side is 
that the determinants of the reservation price are the next best critical 
dealers inventory positions. This is true for 6 dealers out of ten. On the 
other side, some of the dealers (three of them) consider their own 
inventory positions only. One dealer does rely on the volume traded only. 
On the ask side we observe that only one dealer takes into account the next 
best critical dealer's inventory. Six dealers rely on their own . 
inventory 
position and the volume traded. Two dealers rely on the volume traded only. 
The results are listed in tables 6.14. and 6.15. in the appendix. 
However, we have to mention that a weakness of this approach is that we 
have to identify the next best critical dealer by the actual quote (which 
includes measurement error) and not by the expected dealer quote. 
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6.3. Investigation of Pricing Strategies 
In this analysis we compare the observed market price with the determinants 
of each dealers reservation price to predict which dealers quote the best 
price. For example if pa is the market ask price and (3) gives the 
reservation price, the probability of the dealer quoting the best ask is 
Pr(pR < p'). The probability of the dealer not quoting is the probability 
that her reservation ask price is above the market ask, since the market 
ask is set strategically just below the critical dealers reservation price. 
So for an equilibrium: 
(i) for any trader i who is buying on day t 
-pb(l+rt)+a. +go +yQ/M+BiSA, +71, SBi+ei >0 
(ii) for any dealer i who is selling on day t 
pa (l+rt)-ai-go -c. Q/M-diSA. -eiSBi+ei>0 
(iii) for any dealer i who is not selling on day t 
pi (1+rt)- a. -µi-c. Q/M-diSA. -eiSB1+e1<0 
(iv) for any dealer i who is not buying on day t 
- pb (1+rt) + a. ++ yýQ/M + SiSA. + ri. SBi+ ci <0 
Hence the probability that i buys is 
Pr( -pb(l+rt)+a. +µi +y. Q/M+. SiSA. +T. SBi+ei >0) (7) 
and the probability that i sells is 
Pr( pt (l+rt) - a, - µý - c. Q/M - diSA. - e. SBi+ ei >0) (8) 
The likelihood function for the observed pattern of trading for', a single 
dealer i over the sample of 208 trading days for one side of the market is 
then 
Pr(Di208, "' Dil) = Pr(Di208 IDi207.... Di1)Pr(Di207 IDi206'"'Dil) 
......... Pr(Di2 I Di1) Pr(Di1) (9) 
where Dit is a dummy that is 1 if trader i is active, i. e. quotes the best 
price, on that side on day t and 0 otherwise. In each conditional 
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probability, we can treat the past history of trading, given by the 
dummies, as predetermined and so perform a probit analysis for each trader 
across timer. 
The results of the probit analysis will predict which traders should be 
observed to be selling or buying on particular days. 
Again, as with the OLS regressions, we can test (2) against (3) by imposing 
restrictions on (7)-(9). If i=-5 or e=-d only the opening inventory 
of a dealer enters into the trading decision; we call this model 2. Past 
buying and selling must have a common effect but the effect may be 
different to that of current trading. 
If in addition y=8 or c=d we have the model of (2). So we test the 
assumptions in (i) by successively testing ii=-S (Model 2) and then y=5 
Model 3); the unrestricted model of (7)-(9) is Model 1. 
We try modeling price expectations extrapolatively: 
pt (l+rt) - µi t= ;+ ýyl(l+r)pt + ; y2(1+r)2pt_1 +7 
(1+r)3p, 
_2 
+ ut 
where pt is the best price quote on the relevant side of the market. This 
may induce heteroscedasticity in the probit with the variance of the error 
e related to the interest rate. We test for this. 
We estimate models 1-3 for each dealer on each side of the market and use 
likelihood ratio tests to derive a preferred form of model. The results are 
listed in table 6.9. below. 
Here x2 is a likelihood ratio test of joint significance of the regressors; 
with an asterisk it is significant at the 5% level. Generally the probits 
are significant. The next step consists of reducing the chosen equation by 
IIn addition there is the question of possible correlation between the 
errors Eaand cb; bivariate probits revealed that for most dealers there 
was insignificant correlation. 
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eliminating the insignificant variables. 
The final version ("model 4") is the one with the highest possible overall 
significance level with significant t-statistics for all variables 
included. 
Table 6.9.: Likelihood ratio tests 
Dealers model 1 LRT model 2 
(1 vs 2) 
LRT model 3 
(2 vs 3) 
Log LH Log LH Log LH 
A 2 -63.487* 0.014 -63.480 0.03 -63.495 
B 2 -74.996* 0.054 -74.969 5.954 -71.992 
A 4 -72.232 8.246 -68.109* 0.12 -68.049 
B 4 -85.878* 0.314 -85.721 0.626 -85.408 
A 8 -53.553* 0.274 -53.416 1.686 -52.573 
B 8 -70.757 3.978 -68.768 8.104 -64.716* 
A 10 -93.769 5.550 -90.994* 2.382 -89.803 
B 10 -106.35 16.842 -97.929 14.09 -90.884* 
A 11 -40.302 3.062 -38.771 4.572 -36.485* 
B 11 -63.228* 0.020 -63.218 1.948 -62.244 
A 12 -67.567 3.652 -65.741* 0.100 -65.691 
B 12 -50.581 4.222 -48.470 3.054 -46.943* 
A 14 -32.235* 0.102 -32.184 0.068 -32.150 
B 14 -56.136* 0.056 -56.108 0.150 -56.033 
A 15 -32.770* 0.942 -32.299 0.042 -32.278 
B 15 -58.700 3.780 -56.810* 1.326 -56.147 
A 16 -108.34 4.600 -106.04* 0.02 -106.03 
B 16 -104.75 10.628 -99.436* 1.038 -98.917 
A 18 -72.441* 0.920 -71.981 0.786 -71.588 
B 18 -93.815* 2.266 -92.682 4.352 -90.506 
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LRT=Likelihood ratio test and Log LH=log likelihood value. "A" stands for 
ask quotes and "B" for bid quotes. The asterisks indicate the model 
selected to be reduced further. 
If we examine the accuracy of predicted trading days and non-trading days 
we can say that the non-trading days are correctly predicted for almost 
100%. However, there is a much lower percentage for the trading days. 
The results of the probits also support partially the theory. The findings 
are listed in tables 6.16. and 6.17. in the appendix. 
For the bid side results are mixed: 6 dealers show significant coefficients 
for inventory as well as past prices. Only one dealer supports the 
inventory control model whereas 3 dealers rely on past prices only. The ask 
side turns out to be different. 2 dealers are mixed; 4 dealers rely on past 
prices only, and the remaining 4 dealers support the inventory control 
argument. 
The respective results are listed in table 6.10. below. 
Table 6.10. : Overview of the Probit results 
Bid side: 
number of dealers 
Ask side: 
PROBIT PROBIT 
inventory 14 
past prices 34 
mixed 62 
The results of the diagnostic tests are much better than for the OLS 
regressions. The test for normality has been rejected for only one dealer 
on the ask side. Heteroscedasticity is found on both sides of the market, 
but for one dealer on each side only. The missspecification tests show a 
slightly different result. Three dealers on the buying side and one dealer 
on both sides of the market fail the test. 
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However, the majority of the tests pass as can be seen in table 6.11. 
below. 
The tests used are Lagrange multiplier variants of tests for omitted 
variables, heteroscedasticity and normality, see Ch. Orme (1988). 
From the probit equations we can identify the critical dealer on each side 
of the market on each day; this is the dealer with the predicted 
reservation price closest to the market price. 
Table 6.11.: Diagnostic tests for the probits 
dealer normality omitted var. hetero 
Bid side 
2 3.046 1.082 2.044 
4 4.293 4.293 ** 8.018 ** 
8 0.728 3.904 ** 0.004 
10 2.977 3.386 ** 1.708 
11 3.405 0.776 0.057 
12 0.962 1.861 0.814 
14 3.486 9.808 ** 0.206 
15 0.103 0.013 1.241 
16 1.102 0.365 0.069 
18 4.452 0.143 1.057 
Ask side 
2 2.119 0.976 0.033 
4 1.124 3.310 ** 1.086 
8 4.486 0.339 1.132 
10 2.179 0.668 0.066 
11 1.133 0.283 0.766 
12 1.343 1.312 1.769 
14 0.405 1.397 0.216 
15 0.987 0.787 0.477 
16 6.704 ** 0.244 10.270 ** 
18 2.622 0.143 0.871 
We expect that the market ask price should be above the active dealer's 
reservation prices but close to the lowest inactive dealer's reservation 
ask. Also the market bid price should be below the reservation bid price of 
the best quoting dealer, but close to the maximum of the reservation bids 
of the inactive dealers. The means and standard deviations over time of 
these prices are given in Table 6.12. (based on the probit analysis). 
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Table 6.12.: Analysis of the market prices 
Mean a 
Market Ask 93.264 0.993 
Critical Ask 93.881 1.063 
Market Bid 93.252 1.049 
Critical Bid 92.645 1.145 
The relative means are consistent with the theory if around 2% is 
interpreted as small. The critical prices display more variability than the 
best market prices; in part this may reflect the estimation error that is 
incorporated within them. 
The number of days on which particular dealers are critical one are listed 
in table 6.13. below. 
Table 6.13. : Probit predictions 
dealers: 24 8 10 11 12 14 15 16 18 
number of days 
bid 25 26 8 40 4 617 48 40 
ask 9 21 8 73 7 20 30 58 6 
From this table it is evident that there is a strong concentration amongst 
dealers with dealer 16 dominating the bid side and dealer 10 dominating the 
ask side. 
6.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have analysed two issues. First, we investigated whether 
the inventory control argument is valid for the Italian secondary market 
and, secondly, whether dealers exhibit a strategic price quoting behaviour. 
The findings show that we have differences between the bid and ask side. 
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The OLS estimations reveal that, on the bid side, market makers rely 
heavily on the inventories. Out of ten dealers, six of them seem to take 
into account the next best dealer's inventory position whereas three market 
makers quote their price related to their own inventory position. On the 
ask side, we find that the inventory control argument is confirmed for 
seven market makers of which six base on their own inventory position and a 
single dealer relates the quote to the next best dealer's inventory 
position. Hence we can say that we do have evidence that the inventory is 
important in determining the price quote. In addition, the strategic 
pricing. behaviour is also confirmed, but it seems to be more applicable on 
the bid than on the ask side. 
We also get some evidence on the inventory control assumption under the 
probit analysis. This time, the bid side shows somewhat different results 
as only one dealer quotes her price based on the inventory position. Three 
dealers take into account the past prices only whereas six dealers balance 
their quoting on past prices and their inventory positions. 
On the ask side, we do not get any conclusive evidence as there are four 
dealers who rely on past prices and four dealers who consider their 
inventory positions for quoting their prices. Two market makers take into 
account both the past prices and their inventories. 
Finally, we can summarise our findings by saying that we do have evidence 
of the inventory control argument and the strategic behaviour. 
We have presented an analysis for the Italian secondary market for 
government bonds which takes into account the possibility of sharing of the 
market order which seems to be the case in this market. 
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APPENDIX 
The variables are: 
CONST=constant term, 
EXP = current market price either the ask price or the bid price depending 
whether the current inventory is positive or negative respectively, 
INVA = [Q/N-21] where Q=volume and I=approximation of inventory (as 
described above) 
INVB = [Q/N+2I], 
INi = (sbi sai) where sbi is the trade history of dealer i on the bid 
side and sai is the trade history of dealer i on the ask side. 
NAV=Q/N (number of sellers) and NBV=Q/M (number of buyers) 
duma (for the ask side) and dumb (for the bid side) are dummy variables 
defined as : d=1 if dealer is best and d=0 if dealer is not best. 
1-d is a dummy representing the reverse case. 
1-dINVA / 1-dINVB = INVA / INVB multiplied by the dummy 1-d. 
1-dsa/1-dsb = sa /sb multiplied by the dummy 1-d. 
dcrsa / dcrsb = the next best dealers sa /sb multiplied by the dummy d. 
1-dvol = [Q/N] multiplied by the dummy (1-d). 
dsa / dsb = sa / sb multiplied by the dummy d. 
dvol = [Q/N1 multiplied by d. 
The following tables show the coefficients and the respective t-values for 
the OLS and the PROBIT regressions: 
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Table 6.14. : Results of the OLS estimation on the ask side 
dealers var i able coeff. -value t-statistics 
2 constant 0.140 5.248 
1- dIN2 -0.001 -2.507 
1- d NAV -0.002 -2.780 
dNAV -0.004 -2.821 
4 cons t ant 0.067 2.286 
1-dIN4 0.002 4.954 
8 constant 0.072 4.006 
1-dIN8 -0.002 -4.488 
10 constant 0.070 2.802 
1-dsa 0.0003 2.510 
dc rsa 0.001 2.239 
duma -0.177 -2.159 
11 co nst ant 0.192 10.537 
1- dNAV -0.001 -2.966 
dNAV -0.003 -3.422 
12 constant 0.120 2.749 
1-dsa 0.001 5.014 
1- d NAV -0.001 -1.890 
duma -0.143 -2.213 
14 constant 0.324 13.062 
1- dsb -0.121 -4.596 
1- dNAV -0.001 -2.944 
dNAV 0.005 2.454 
duma -0.520 -5.272 
15 constant 0.087 3.409 
1-dIN1s 0.002 3.101 
1- dNAV -0.002 -2.880 
16 constant 0.174 8.158 
1- dNAV -0.002 -2.806 dNAV -0.002 -1.663 duma -0.090 -2.177 
18 constant 0.062 2.606 
1-dsa 0.0004 5.087 
1- dNAV -0.001 -2.232 
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Table 6.15. : Results of the OLS estimation on the bid side 
dealers vari able coef f. -value t-statistics 
2 con st ant -0.066 -3.664 
dc rs a- 0.002 2.326 
dc rsb -0.003 -2.089 
4 1- dI NVB -0.001 -3.355 
8 con st ant -0.065 -3.355 
dc rsa 0.002 4.225 
dc rsb -0.001 -1.863 
10 1- d NB V -0.001 -1.988 
11 cons t ant -0.048 -2.803 
1- dI NVB -0.001 -3.370 
12 cons t ant -0.106 -5.859 
dc rsa 0.001 3.557 
14 constant -0.078 -5.100 
dc rsb -0.003 -4.087 
dNBV 0.002 2.423 
15 1- dsb 0.011 1.713 
dc rsb -0.001 -3.285 
16 constant -0.074 -2.812 
1- dsa 0.0002 1.738 
dc rsa 0.001 3.029 
18 cons t ant -0.156 -4.109 1- dsb 0.0003 2.557 
dumb 0.204 3.883 
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TEXT CUT 
OFF IN 
ORIGINAL 
Table 6.16.: Results of the Probit analysis (Bid side) 
D CONST. EXP EXP[-1] EXP[-2] INVB IN SA SB NBV 
2 -1.31 1.15 (-2.70) (2.64) 
4 1'. 77 -1.49 
(2.74) (-2.79) 
8 42.27 1.72 -2 . 58 11.71 -4.62 (2.58) (2.81) (-3.08) (2.8) (-2.4 
10 -5 . 97 5.40 -18.11 
7.33 -6.95 
(-3.50) (3.48) (-5.1) (4.6) (-3 "9 11 19.40 -0.61 -2.58 
(1.60) (-l. 70) (- 1.4) 
12 -1.94 1.57 -22.7 (-2.95) (2.88) (-2.5 
14 0.76 -0.65 
(1.95) (-2.06) 
15 25 .64 1.53 -1 . 
98 35.34 -3 .35 (1.84) (3.06) (-3.62) (2.70) (- 1.8 
16 -15.76 0.45 -4.54 ( ) (1.67) (-2.9 
18 1 . OS - 
4,37 
(-8 . 52) 
(2.20) 
Table 6.17. : Results of the Probit analysis (Ask side) 
D CONST. EXP EXP[-1] EXP[-2] INVA IN SA SB NAV 
2 19 . 55 -0.63 
6.1 1 
(1.86) (-2.02) (2.35) 
4 -0.51 -0.63 -10.40 -4 . 31 (-2.55) (-2.02) (-3.2) (-2.; 
8 -34.13 1.06 (-2 . 56) (2.47) 10 -0.96 0.75 6.80 -3.4! (-3.15) (3.06) (3.19) (- 2 .1 11 -1.17 6.80 -13.5 3.51 (-3 . 08) 
(1.83) (-2.5) (2 . 1; 12 1.62 -1 . 35 -2 . 6; (3.52) (-3.59) 
14 29 . 42 1.26 -1 . 
86 
(1 . 76) (1.63) (-3.14) 15 -1.04 14.86 (-3 . 67) 
(2.46) 
16 -0 . 62 -4.27 -2.52 (-4.15) (-1.9) (- 2 .( 18 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A MEASURE OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD 
IN THE SECONDARY MARKET 
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7.1. Introduction 
Since the publication of the paper by Roll (1984), various researchers have 
investigated the effect of price changes on the effective bid-ask spread. 
Roll created a measure which allows the effective bid-ask spread to be 
inferred directly from a time series of market prices. His method is simple 
in that he requires the transaction prices themselves only. However, he had 
to impose the assumptions of an informationally efficient market and that 
the probability distribution of observed price changes is stationary. 
Roll derived a measure of the spread by examining the changes of prices 
following a transaction. Under the assumption of an efficient market, it is 
not possible that the change in prices occurs due to new information in the 
market. Hence, assuming a constant bid-ask spread over a certain period, 
the change in transaction prices is due to the spread only which represents 
a cost compensation to the market maker, (as proposed by the theory of 
Demsetz (1968)). 
A transaction, corresponding either to a buy or sell order, occurs at the 
bid price or at the ask price with equal probability. By examining recorded 
transaction prices we cannot observe whether the preceding transaction was 
at the ask or the bid, hence, the probability distribution of price changes 
consists of two parts, i. e. the probability of a change if the transaction 
is at the bid or the ask. Based on the joint probability of a buy or sell 
order a measure for the bid ask spread can be derived which Roll shows to 
be: ' 
s= 2v/ (-cov) 
whereby cov is defined as the first order serial covariance of transaction 
price changes. Note this has to be negative. The variance of price changes 
'Roll: pp. 1129 resp. 1135 
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includes new information in the market whereas on the other hand the 
covariance between price changes cannot be due to new information if 
markets are efficient. If markets are efficient we have cov(Ap t, Ap*t-j )=0 
with j#0 and where - p* is , 
the unobserved "true" value of the asset. It is 
also true that cov(Op#t, Opt j 
)=O. 2 
Roll supports his theory with empirical results derived from data of AMEX 
and NYSE listed stocks, between 1963 and 1982 on 
returns based on transaction prices. 
One of the various extensions to the model of Roll is 
(1989). He examines, amongst others, the relation 
bid-ask spread and the serial covariance of transactio 
hand and the serial covariance of quoted returns on 
one-day and five-day 
the approach of Stoll 
between the quoted 
n returns on the one 
the other hand. The 
determinants of the spread are expressed as a function of the probability 
of a price reversal, it, and the magnitude of an adverse price change, S 
(0<5<1) which actually is a fraction of the quoted spread S. 
Data from NASDAQ/NMS (National Market System) stocks are used to show the 
time series behaviour of the transaction prices and the quoted prices and 
the respective spread. The data used are over a three months period, i. e. 
October, November, and December 1984. 
The empirical results of Stoll are twofold. First, the serial covariances 
of transaction returns are strongly negatively associated with the square 
of quoted spreads which is in accordance with the findings of Roll. Second, 
the results for the serial covariances of returns derived from price quotes 
are not conclusive. The serial covariances seem to be negatively associated 
with the square of quoted spreads, but the level of significance is not 
satisfactory for all months. In addition, the proportion of variation 
explained is also very small. 
2See Roll (1984) pp. 1135. 
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In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis within the framework of 
Stoll. In particular, we focus on the relation between the serial 
covariance of returns calculated from daily price quotes and the square of 
quoted spreads where the results of Stoll did not bring any conclusive 
evidence. We also examine the variance components. That is we allow for 
different intercepts of the regression lines which could lead to the 
findings of market imperfections 3. Furthermore, we analyse whether there 
are differences in the relation between the covariances of price changes 
and the spread for different assets. We use daily data as well as weekly 
data in order to determine the serial correlation between the price changes 
and the bid-ask spread. 
The paper is structured so that in section two, the theory of the spread 
and the serial covariance is presented, based on the paper of Stoll. In 
section three the data of the Italian bond market are described. Our 
empirical model formulations are given in section four and the results are 
presented and interpreted in section five. The final section contains the 
implications and conclusions. 
7.2. The Theory of Spread and Serial Covariance 
7.2.1. The Spread 
Stoll defines the measures of the spread to be the price reversal S (as a 
fraction of the spread S) and the probability of a reversal it. The spread 
is assumed to be constant over time. 
3Both Roll and Stoll considered an efficient market. However, Roll observed 
that his regression line showed a significantly positive intercept which 
means that there are imperfections in the market. 
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Figure 7.1. below can be explained as follows: 
If we start with a purchase (bid transaction) we expect a subsequent sale 
(ask transaction) with a probability of 1t and the size of the price 
reversal is (1-5)S. On the other side, the probability for a subsequent 
purchase (preceding transaction still assumed to be a purchase) is (1-n) 
and the respective magnitude of the price reversal is -SS. In case of an 
initial ask transaction followed by an ask transaction the size of the 
reversal is SS. 
If we first start with a sale (ask transaction) we have a subsequent 
purchase with probability it and the size of the price reversal is -(1-8)S. 
If the subsequent transaction is a sale (given that the first transaction 
is a purchase) the probability of a price reversal is (1-7c) and the size of 
the reversal is S. 
(1-n) 
SS 
A 
A\ 7C 
n -(1-S)S A (1-S) S 
B 
ý1-n) 
/'(1-6)S 
B 
-SS\1-zc) 
"B 
Figure 7.1. : Determinants of the spread measure 
" where A: ask transaction; B: bid transaction; it: probability of a price 
reversal; (1-5)S: size of a price reversal as a function of the spread S 
with 0<8<1. 
4Stoll pp. 119 
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Stoll gives three views on the definition of the spread with varying size 
of the parameters S and it. First, he considers the case identical to Roll 
where the spread represents a transaction cost compensation only. In this 
scenario 5 equals 0 -and it is 0.5 as the market maker does not change 
his/her price relative to the "true" market price p* (the expected market 
price) in order to adjust inventory or as a response to asy mmetric 
information. This is illustrated in figure 7.2. (A). 
p 
pa 
P* 
pb 
p 
pa 
P* 
pb 
t 
p 
pa 
P* 
pb 
t 
t-1 
(A) (B) (C) 
Figure 7.2. : Pricing strategies 
t 
The second view is that the market makers adjust their quotes to maintain 
an optimal inventory level. This is the view of the theories of Stoll 
(1989), Ho and Stoll (1981/1983), and Amihud/Mendelson (1980). This implies 
that after a sale (purchase) the price will be lowered (increased) in order 
to induce a purchase (sale). The respective parameters become: 5=0.5 (as 
the spread is twice the inventory cost - see Ho and Stoll (1983)) and 
l>1t>0.5. The third view is dominated by adverse information costs (as 
defined by the theories of Copeland and Galai (1983), and Glosten/Milgrom 
(1985)). The reason for a price change is the revision of the equilibrium 
price after a transaction has taken place, based on the information 
obtained from the transaction price. 
Under the assumption that all traders have superior information to the 
market maker the adjustment of the bid and ask prices is the same as the 
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t-1 t t-1 t 
one described for the inventory control model. The respective parameters 
are: 5=0.5 and n=0.5. 
7.2.2. The Serial Covariance of Price Changes 
The serial covariance of price changes can be explained by examining what 
the reasons are for such a change. A price change of a security (AS) may 
occur for different reasons. A part of a price change can be explained by 
the expected price change due to basic securities characteristics (SC). 
Another influence on the price change may be due to the existence of the 
spread (OP, ) combined with order reversal and a third reason may be that 
new information has arrived at the market place (es) where E(e1)=0. 
The total price change can be expressed as 
AS = SC + AP +e ttt 
Updating ASc+I = SC + AP t+1 
+ £c+t and so the serial covariance of price 
changes is 
cov(AS c , OS c+t )=cov(AP c 'AP c+t )+cov(AP c ,u c+t )+cov(e c , 
AP 
t+ I) 
+cov(8c, cc+t) 
Due to the fact that the price changes caused by new information, in an 
efficient market, are serially uncorrelated, and in addition, are also 
uncorrelated both with lagged and leading values of the price change due to 
the existence of a spread, the covariance becomes: 
cov(ASc, A Sc+t)=cov(A Pc'APc+t 
This implies that the serial covariance of price changes is caused by the 
covariance induced by the spread only, still assuming an efficient market. 
Under the assumption of a constant spread and symmetry, the serial 
covariance of price changes can be obtained either by the ask quotes or by 
the bid quotes. 
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Now, considering figure 7.1., and assuming that the starting transaction is 
a bid, the price change can be derived to be (1-5)S with probability it for 
(At -Bt_, ) and -SS with probability (1-7t) for (Bi Bc-1). 
By symmetry, the same is true if the transaction in period t is an ask. 
Now, the possible price change AS can be derived as follows according to 
the pattern defined in figure 7.1.. 
We assume that the preceding transaction is a purchase: 
(A1 Bt 
1)=(1-S)S with probability it 
OS = 
(Bt B1 
1)=-5S with probability 
(1-7t). 
This time, we start from a sale transaction: 
(Bt -A, _, 
)=-(1-5)S with probability it 
AS= 
(At -At 1)=SS with probability 
(1-7). 
Hence, the expected price change conditional on a purchase transaction is 
E(OS, I Bt 
t)=n(1-S)S+(1-n)(-SS)=(n-S)S. 
The respective expected price change for the sale transaction is 
E(AStI Aý 
1)=1t(-(1-S))S+(1-n)(SS)=-(ý-S)S. 
The spread, as the difference between the purchase and the sale is 2(7c-5)S. 
The serial covariance depends on two consecutive periods. We have already 
defined the respective pattern of price changes in figure I for two periods 
for the bid transaction. 
Under the assumption of symmetry, the same is true for the ask transaction. 
Given the underlying joint distribution 5 of successive transaction price 
changes, the covariance is 
5Stoll pp. 133 appendix A 
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cov(ASt, OSt 1) = 
(1-n)282S2 - 5S(1-5)S7C(1-n) + 5S(1-8)Sic(1-7C) - (1-5)2S2it2 
cov(ASt, ASt 1) = 
S2[S2(1 - 27t) - n2(1 - 25) 
In our case, we are particularly interested in the covariance of price 
changes for the quoted prices. In this case the joint distribution is 
simpler as the value of the price change, from the initial change in a bid 
price (Bt -B, _, 
), can only be either -SS if the preceding transaction was at 
the bid or +SS if the transaction in the previous period was at the ask. 
Also for the next period, the price changes can take on the same values 
only6. Hence the joint distribution of successive changes can be tabulated 
as 
Table 7.1. : Joint distribution in the bid price changes 7 
AB 
t 
Initial trade at bid Initial t rade at ask 
-5s 
5s 
AB Next trade at bid -(SS 
1-I[ 1C 
t+l Next trade at ask 
bs 71 1-7t 
Under the assumption of a symmetric market coy a= 
coy b= coy q 
where coy 
q 
is 
the covariance of the quoted prices. 
Hence, the serial covariance of changes in quoted prices is 
cov=(1-1t)S2S2-iS2S2 which finally becomes cov=52S2(1-2n). 
The predictions for the outcome of the value of the covariance under the 
different models can be summarised as 
I. -cov=O under the order processing model with 5=0 and n=0.5 
2. cov=O under the adverse information model with 5=0.5 and 7c=0.5 
3. -0.25S2 < coy <0 under the inventory control model with 5=0.5 and 
ßo. 5. 
6Stoll pp-133 appendix B 
Stoll pp. 133. 
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7.3. Empirical Analysis of the Covariance of Price Changes 
The empirical analysis is carried out with price quotes of eighteen market 
makers in the Italian- secondary market for government bonds. Fifteen assets 
are examined over a period of approximately 150 consecutive trading days 
from May 1988 until January 1989. 
The daily estimation is based on seven periods of 21 trading days. 
Consequently, seven covariances of price quote changes have been derived. 
We have examined the ask quotes (pa)and the bid quotes (pb) separately. As 
an - alternative analysis weekly data from the same sample period were taken. 
For the weekly data we computed six covariances each ranging over a period 
of four weeks. 
In comparison with Stoll's data set, we have seven covariances 
(observations) which have been computed over approximately 150 trading days 
instead of three covariances over a period of roughly 60 days for the daily 
data analysis. This may give us more accurate results. However, we only 
have 15 assets to compare where Stoll analyses 700-800 assets. Initially, 
we run a simple regression with the covariances as the dependent variable 
and the proportional spread of the effective bid and ask quotes as the 
single explanatory variable. From the individual quotes we can evaluate the 
market quote which is the highest bid and the lowest ask quote (under the 
assumption of Bertrand price competition among market makers). The 
proportional spread is calculated by dividing the difference between the 
highest ask and the lowest bid quote by the sum of the respective ask and 
bid quote. The squared spread has been scaled by multiplying it by 10,000. 
The number of days considered for the daily analysis is 147 and the number 
of days for the weekly analysis is 120. 
Our analysis investigates several issues. The first version of the models 
given below regards all assets to be identical in respect of the 
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relationship between the serial covariance and the spread. Thus the 
parameters a and (3 are common. The second version accounts for other 
influences than from the existence of the spread. We have argued above that 
in an efficient market all the information should be conveyed to the market 
through the occurrence of a transaction and hence be incorporated in the 
prices. According to the model presented in the previous section the only 
influence on the price changes should come from the spread (which is 
assumed to be constant) if the market works efficiently which means that 
all the information should be incorporated in the prices. Hence, if we 
observe another influence we can interpret it as a kind of "inefficiency" 
in the market. In order to distinguish this influence among the assets we 
let a vary between the assets. The third version presented below assumes 
differences between the various assets in the extent of the relationship 
between the serial covariance and the spread. This is expressed in (3 which 
vanes among assets. 
The form of the simple regression can be written as 
model [1]: 
(cov). =a+ S2 + E. (1) 
P 
a 
t. t (1) (1) ,ti. t 
and (cov) =a+ß S2 + C. (2) Pbi. t (2) (2) i ,tt, t 
where i=1,..., 15 and 
t=1,..., 7 for daily data 
t=1,..., 6 for weekly data. 
The effect of market inefficiencies on the relation between the covariance 
' of price changes and the spread can be expressed as 
model [2]: 
(ccov). a. +ß S2. + c. (3) 
a , (1) (t) ., t 
and (cov); a; (2)+ß(2)S2; t+ 
£; 
t 
(4) 
Pb 
where i=1,..., 15 and 
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5 
t=1,..., 7 for daily data 
t=1,..., 6 for weekly data. 
Another regression captures the effects for each individual asset 
separately. The respective form of regression is 
model [3]: 
(cov)l, 
t a(1)+1i(1)S`i, t+ 
£i, 
t 
(5) 
Pa 
and (cov)1= a(2)+ß1(2)S21 + el 
t 
(6) 
Pb 
where i=1,..., 15 and 
t=1,..., 7 for daily data 
t=1,..., 6 for weekly data. 
All estimations have been carried out by the method of ordinary least 
squares, with coefficient restrictions imposed across equations according 
to the different models. 
This is done by stacking the equations for different assets. Consequently 
diagnostic tests for " heteroscedasticity" are in fact tests for 
heteroscedasticity for the disturbance of each asset and also for a common 
variance of the disturbance across assets. 
Similarly a functional form test would test both that each asset is well 
specified and that all assets have a common form. 
7.4. Empirical Results 
The evidence we want to show is twofold. Firstly, to get a confirmation of 
. the Stoll theory we expect the relation between the covariance of the price 
changes and the spread to be negative. Secondly, the results of the daily 
data analysis are compared with the findings of the weekly data analysis. 
Generally, we can say that the restricted model with common assets (model 
[11) does not show any significant influence of the spread. The serial 
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correlation seems to be positive rather than negative for both tie aZy 
and the weekly data. 
The results for model (1) are listed in table 7.2. below. 
Table 7.2.: Results of model (1) 
Ask side constant t-stat. spread t-stat. n 
daily 0.0176 3.1495 0.4032 0.5147 147 
weekly -0.0261 -0.6590 -0.0001 -0.3505 120 
Bid side constant t-stat. spread t-stat. 
daily 0.0155 2.9277 1.0992 1.4839 147 
weekly 0.0043 1.4131 -0.0001 -0.6810 120 
For both sides of the market of model (1) we get very low F-values for the 
explanatory power. Nevertheless, the diagnostic tests which include an 
autocorrelation test, a test for heteroscedasticity, and a reset test, are 
all accepted. 
The only exception is that there exists some autocorrelation on the ask and 
the bid side for the daily data. The test results are shown in table 7.3. 
Table 7.3. : Diagnostic test results of model (1) 
ask - 
side autoc. 
hetero RESET 
side autoc. 
hetero RESET 
daily 8.93 0.112 0.604 daily 15.74 0.089 0.328 
weekly 0.01 0.458 1.13 0 weekly 2.68 0.555 0.737 
Our estimation of model (2) shows clearly that there are imperfections in 
the Italian secondary market as we have several significant coefficients 
for different assets on both sides of the market and based on both the 
daily data as well as the weekly data. 
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On the bid side we get a significant positive serial covariance of price 
changes and the spread on daily data. Although the other spread 
coefficients are not significant we can observe that there is a tendency 
for asset specific constant terms to become negative with weekly data 
(table 7.4. ). 
Table 7.4. : Results of model (2) 
Ask side Bid side 
daily weekly daily weekly 
coeff. value It -stat 
I 
value It-stat. value It-stat. 
I 
value It-stat. 
spread 
al 
a2 
0 
a4 
a5 
a6 
a7 
a8 
a9 
a10 
all 
a12 
a13 
a14 
a15 
0.281 0.321 
0.085 5.87 0 
0.076 5.565 
0.003 0.23 5 
0.005 0.377 
0.006 0.414 
-0.008 -0.594 0.003 0.221 
0.009 0.657 
0.012 0.885 
0.002 0.132 
0.014 0.888 
0.018 1.312 
0.007 0.45 3 
0.009 0.653 
0.031 1.659 
-0.001 -0.167 0.012 0.093 
0.019 0.148 
-0.003 -0.027 0.006 0.049 
-0.005 -0.036 
-0.489 -3.677 0.006 0.045 
0.002 0.019 
0.005 0.036 
0.007 0.055 
0.009 0.068 
0.001 0.003 
-0.019 -0.144 0.010 0.074 
-0.008 -0.064 
1.943 
0.086 
0.081 
0.001 
0.005 
-0.005 
-0.001 
-0.003 
-0.001 0.005 
0.001 
-0.001 0.011 
-0.003 0.001 
-0.004 
2.615 
7.002 
6.942 
0.073 
0.445 
-0.400 
-0.108 
-0.258 
-0.099 0.401 
0.076 
-0.078 0.931 
-0.241 0.056 
-0.221 
-0.001 0.033 
0.015 
0.005 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
-0.008 0.001 
-0.017 0.004 
0.001 
0.006 
0.012 
-0.282 3.328 
1.527 
0.539 
0.066 
0.029 
0.099 
0.143 
0.045 
-0.827 0.068 
-1.687 0.454 
0.109 
0.527 
1.210 
The tests carried out reveal some autocorrelation for the weekly data on 
the ask side and we have heteroscedastic error terms for the daily data on 
the bid side. The RESET test is significant on the bid side for both the 
daily and the weekly data; there is evidence here to reject the hypothesis. 
Table 7.5. : Diagnostic test results of model (2) 
ask 
side autoc. hetero RESET side autoc. 
hetero RESET 
daily 0.52 1.351 0.435 daily 1.70 5.972 17.38 
weekly 4.17 1.084 0.017 weekly 0.36 1.028 4.242 
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The positive serial correlation between the price changes and the bid-ask 
spread is confirmed by model (3) in one asset on the ask side and two 
assets on the bid side based on the daily data. None of the negative 
coefficients is significant at the 95 % level. 
If we examine the coefficients of the weekly data we observe that the only 
significant value is negative which is on the bid side. The detailed 
results are shown in table 7.6. below. 
Table 7.6. : Results of model (3) 
coeff. 
Ask side 
daily weekly 
value t-stat value t-stat. 
Bid side 
daily weekly 
value t-stat. value t-stat. 
ß1 0.261 1.254 -0.326 -0.082 0.213 1.811 0.737 1.637 132 1.874 1.164 1.454 0.164 4.519 3.069 1.2 83 0.830 
133 -2.422 -0.652 3.614 0.046 -3.275 -1.116 -2.271 -0.139 P4 -0.722 -0.263 5.163 0.097 -2.686 -0.800 0.297 0.065 135 -2.595 -1.659 0.795 0.011 -1.204 -0.733 0.062 0.135 ß6 3.545 1.78 6 -1.313 -0.070 -0.967 -0.892 0.011 0.055 ß7 -1.121 -0.595 -0.276 -0.104 -1.324 -1.085 -0.150 -0.064 ß8 -0.424 -0.508 0.107 0.178 -0.201 -0.351 -0.002 -0.043 139 -19.75 -0.302 -0.079 -0.086 -33.37 -0.901 0.012 0.180 1310 -33.95 -0.720 -0.009 -0.029 -28.31 -1.058 -0.001 -0.016 1311 -4.979 -0.129 -0.003 -0.009 -6.473 -0.298 -0.060 -2.877 1312 -19.56 -0.402 -0.058 -0.168 -10.46 -0.379 0.003 0.135 ß13 -18.44 -0.462 0.002 0.006 -12.91 -0.569 0.004 0.197 1314 -17.20 -0.462 0.128 0.221 -8.322 -0.394 0.005 0.132 015 8.986 0.345 -0.017 -0.043 2.092 0.141 0.009 0.317 
c onst 0.025 2.536 -0.039 -0.973 0.024 3.990 0.002 0.856 
The diagnostic test results are different now for model (2). We cannot find 
any autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity, but, on the bid side, the RESET 
test is significant again for both the daily and the weekly data. The test 
parameters are listed in table 7.7. 
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Table 7.7. : Diagnostic test results of model (3) 
side autoc. 
hetero RESET 
side autoc. 
hetero RESET 
daily 0.86 1.493 0.000 daily 1.40 0.695 8.717 
weekly 0.02 0.027 0.027 weekly 0.14 0.779 28.09 
7.5. Conclusions 
The empirical analysis of this paper, based on data from the Italian 
secondary market for government bonds, has investigated evidence of the 
relation between the serial covariance of price changes and the bid-ask 
spread in a dealership market. 
The most important finding is that, in contrast to Stoll's inventory 
control model, 8 the serial correlation tends to be positive. However, we 
can observe that the serial correlation tends to get negative if we use 
weekly data. 
It can be argued that the positive serial correlation is caused by the fact 
that dealers, assumed to be risk averse, do not correct the whole size of 
their inventory adjustment in the next transaction, but gradually adjust 
over several periods to their preferred inventory position. Hence, as a 
consequence we can observe some positive relationship based on daily data 
as the price reversal will not take place after one transaction. or even 
within one day. 
" Another important point is the missspecification problem on the bid side. 
It suggests that there is another influence on the price reversal. 
Considering that we used data of a dealership market with several competing 
8Note, that it is equally contrary to Roll's transaction cost approach. 
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market makers it is very likely that there is strategic pricing behaviour 
in the market. This may have an adverse influence also on the expected 
serial correlation and could cause the misspecification. 
Finally, we showed that there is a kind of "inefficiency" in the Italian 
secondary market. This is confirmed by the daily data regression as well as 
by the weekly data investigation. However, it seems that the bid side is 
slightly more efficient than the ask side. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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In this thesis we have analysed the profit margins of market makers in 
dealership markets. Particular interest is given to the notion of risk 
insurance for the market makers and the investigation of the degree of 
competition in the market. 
We investigate the bid-ask spread in a centralised market structure and in 
a fragmented market where dealers do not have full information. We take a 
new approach compared to the existing theories and assume that market 
orders can be split between the best quoting dealers. Hence, we assume that 
market makers are risk averse and that they face decreasing returns to 
scale. Market makers can reduce their risk exposure by sharing a market 
order instead of trading the whole order and thus face an increase in risk 
exposure. 
We have shown for both market structures, the centralised and the 
fragmented, that the equilibrium price is lower than in the traditional 
setting. By allowing the splitting of the order there may be the situation 
in the market that there is not the same number of active dealers on the 
bid side and on the ask side which implies that two or more different 
dealers buy and sell. This situation results in the fact that the bid-ask 
spread depends on the inventory levels of the market makers which is in 
contrast to Ho and Stoll. They claim that, in a one period framework, the 
bid-ask spread is independent of inventory positions. 
Furthermore, we find that the spread is not the same for a centralised and 
a -fragmented market. The spread in a fragmented market is larger than in a 
centralised market. This can be explained by the higher risk of trading 
which dealers face in a fragmented market which comes from incomplete 
information. However, with a very large number of dealers in the market, 
the spreads tend to be equal. 
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Our investigation of risk insurance is extended by analysing the influence 
of diversification of a dealer's portfolio on the bid-ask spread. 
We assume that a dealer in the spot market may find that she is able to 
hedge some of her inventory risk by trading in futures contracts. 
The effects of futures trading on the spot market bid-ask spread has not so 
far been investigated. Our prediction is that the market maker can reduce 
the risk exposure by trading in futures and thus the spot market bid-ask 
spread is smaller than without trading. However, this result is only 
obtained in a centralised market with one monopoly dealer who is assumed to 
execute also the transaction in the subsequent period. If there are 
different dealers active on each side of the market the finding is 
different. Depending on the covariance of the spot and the futures prices, 
the futures price expectations, and the inventory positions of the market 
makers the influence can be positive or negative which means that there is 
the possibility that the spot bid-ask spread is larger than without futures 
trading. 
If we change our analysis in the way that the order flow in the spot market 
is not known to the market makers we get a different result. 
By assuming that the buy and sell order quantities are identical we do not 
find any influence of futures trading on the spot bid-ask spread. This 
comes from the fact that, due to the uncertainty of the order flow, the 
expected inventory is the same with trading or without trading in the spot 
market and therefore trading in futures does not affect the spread. 
The change of this assumption and by allowing asymmetry in purchases. and 
sales gives an effect of futures trading on the spot spread. The parameters 
which determine the sign of the influence on the spot bid-ask spread are 
the inventory position, the covariance between the spot and the futures 
prices, the futures price expectation, and the difference between purchases 
and sales in the spot market. However, the model formula does not give us 
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an unambiguous result. This problem could be investigated by an empirical 
analysis which may bring evidence of sign of the influence. 
Our empirical studies are aimed to support some of our theoretical 
findings. We have shown that under the assumption of risk averse dealers 
and decreasing returns to scale the inventory control arguments are still 
valid. We find that especially on the ask side the market makers rely on 
their inventory positions. We observe a somewhat different result on the 
bid side. Dealers seem to take into account the inventory and the past 
prices by quoting their prices. In addition, our empirical investigation 
shows that we find some evidence of the next best dealer argument in the 
Italian secondary market for government bonds. We analysed the parameters 
which determine the reservation prices and we find that several dealers 
rely on the next best dealer's parameters such as the inventory position by 
quoting their prices. This result is supported more strongly on the bid 
side than on the ask side. 
However, by applying a different measure of the bid-ask spread which is the 
serial covariance of price changes we find that in the short run the 
inventory control aspect does not come into effect. The reason may be that 
there are other factors which influence the pricing strategies of market 
makers such as strategic behaviour. However, in the long run, which means 
that we base our analysis on weekly instead of daily data, the inventory 
control argument is supported. 
In order to put all the above empirical results into perspective, we have 
analysed the quoting behaviour of the market makers in this Italian market. 
The price quotes of the dealers exhibits a distinct pattern which shows 
that some dealers are very active in one or several assets. This leads to 
the question whether some dealers can make excess profits by trading in a 
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particular asset. If so the market can be expected to be segmented and that 
there are arbitrage opportunities in the market which would mean that the 
market is inefficient. Our finding is that there are no statistically 
significant differences. between the returns of the various assets, although 
we could find some inefficiency in the market. 
Our research shows that there is still scope for further analyses in this 
area. In our investigation of the bid-ask spread we do not include any 
aspects of interdealer trading. 
Although it is a valid argument to include interdealer trading in the 
analysis, we think that in our competitive market structure the competitive 
pressure on price almost eliminates the need of interdealer trading in 
order to balance the inventory position. In addition, the possibility of 
sharing the market order makes interdealer trading less attractive. 
Another aspect which we have not explored is the trading procedure itself. 
As we have pointed out the design of markets is important in respect of 
market liquidity. In our bid-ask spread models we assume that the market 
makers quote their prices at the same time and trading is executed 
--according to an auction procedure. Such an auction procedure depends on the 
transparency in the market. Most the existing models consider such a 
framework. Scope for further research is the change of such auction 
procedures to a two stage bargaining situation between the market makers 
and the private investors. 
On the empirical side, it is interesting to see how the spot market 
bid-ask spread is affected by futures trading. Our model in chapter four, 
gives testable predictions which can bring some evidence on the interaction 
of spot and futures market. 
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